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ABSTRACT 
The Legal Powers to Detain the Mentally Ill in Ireland: Medicalism or Legalism? 
Jennifer Brown 
The thesis examines the extent to which medicalism and legalism have influenced the legal 
powers of detaining the mentally ill in Ireland from the late eighteenth century to date. 
Utilising academic literature, government publications and original interviews with treating 
psychiatrists and service users, the thesis provides the first comprehensive socio-legal 
analysis of the law concerning mental health detention, the interpretation of the law and the 
operation of the law in Irish society. It transpires that a specific approach to the legal powers 
of detention became embedded in Irish society‘s response to mental illness. This approach 
provided psychiatry with significant power in the detention, care and treatment of the 
mentally ill and society ardently relied on psychiatry to manage the perceived social problem 
caused by mental illness. Simultaneously, legal powers of detention dominated by 
medicalism have been ingrained in the Irish psyche. Over time, however, legalism evolved as 
a result of the widespread critique of psychiatry‘s role in the detention of the mentally ill. 
Furthermore, a strong line of international law established that the rights of the mentally ill in 
detention required greater protection. These developments were subsequently enshrined in 
the Irish law governing the legal powers of detention and new provisions were introduced 
that reduced psychiatry‘s control in the detention of the mentally ill. Despite these changes to 
the law governing the legal powers of detention, it has been found that further movement in 
the direction of legalism will require a more comprehensive shift among those applying the 
law, in particular, the judiciary and the psychiatric profession. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
1.09 Introduction 
In analysing the evolution of the legal powers to detain the mentally ill, it becomes apparent 
that various historical and contemporary legal and sociological influences have had a 
determinate effect on the manner in which this is regulated in Ireland. Concurrently, the law 
has played a definitive role in the evolution of the Irish mental health system, indeed, as 
Fennell has outlined, in terms of its influences, discourse, ideas and structures the law is a 
source of the mental health system.
1
 This is particularly valid in the Irish case which in 1817, 
through legislation, established one of the oldest, enduring and extensive public asylum 
systems in the world. Similar systems were not seen in England until 1845 and Scotland until 
1857.
2
 Consequently, Reuber believes that it is of little surprise that the country boasting the 
oldest public asylum system in the world came to have the highest percentage of their 
population in mental health detention in the world.
3
 However, despite the early legal 
establishment of an asylum system, from this point onwards Irish legislation tended to lag 
behind that of the developed world. In the creation of new legislation there was significant 
reliance on English legislation that was often ten years its predecessor. Thus, for example, 
many of the provisions of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 are broadly similar to that of the 
English Mental Health Act 1930. Similarly, the establishment of mental health tribunals and a 
Mental Health Commission under the Mental Health Act 2001, are akin to the tribunals 
established under the English Mental Health Act 1959 and the Commission established under 
the Mental Health Act 1983. 
                                                     
1
 Phil Fennell, ―Law and Society: The Legal Constitution of the Psychiatric System‖ (1986) 13(1) Journal of 
Law and Psychiatry 35. 
2
 Markus Reuber, ‗Moral Management and the ‗Unseen Eye‘: Public Lunatic Asylums in Ireland, 1800-1845‘ in 
Elizabeth Malcolm and Greta Jones (eds), Medicine, Disease and the State in Ireland 1650-1940 (Cork 
University Press 1999) 208-233.  
3
 In 1955 Ireland had 7.1 persons per 1000 of the population in in-patient psychiatric treatment, the second 
highest position on the list was the USSR which had 6.1, followed by the US that had 5.1 and then Northern 
Ireland which had 4.4. WHO, Annual Epidemiological and Vital Statistics (1955); Markus Reuber, ―The 
architecture of psychological management: the Irish asylums (1901-1922)‖ (1996) 26 Psychological Medicine 
1179, 1187. 
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The nineteenth century witnessed a period of rapid asylum expansion not only in Ireland but 
also in Britain, Europe and America.
4
 For some, this expansion has been attributed to the 
effects of an urbanising society‘s increased sensitivity to the ever growing public presence of 
the insane in the crowded cities and towns.
5
 This sensitivity emerged at a time when society‘s 
attitude to the suffering of those who had previously been outcast became more humane.
6
 
Additionally, it has been claimed that an actual increase in the incidence of insanity occurred 
during this time as a result of rising alcoholism, rising rates of neurosyphillis and possibly 
rising rates of schizophrenia.
7
 Given the apparent ‗epidemic of insanity‘ in Ireland, a question 
naturally arises as to its source. If the source of mental illness is biological then it is 
incumbent upon the psychiatric profession to care for and treat the ill. Psychiatry is a 
specialism of medicine; a traditional caring profession that is underlined by benevolent and 
humanistic principles. However, these benign characteristics of the psychiatric profession are 
called into question when the biological nature of mental illness is disputed. There is now a 
significant volume of work which contests the biological nature of mental illness and instead 
attributes it to the social control of deviance through psychiatry.
8
 In Ireland, it is argued that 
various social forces were responsible for the advancement of the asylum system, as opposed 
to a biological epidemic of insanity.
9
  
The thesis focuses on the role of the law in mental health detention. As will be seen the law 
influenced the creation of an asylum system which provided for high rates of detention, yet 
                                                     
4
 See generally Andrew Scull, Museums of Madness: The Social Organisation of Insanity in Nineteenth- 
Century England (Allen Lane 1979); Roy Porter, Mind Forg‟d Manacles: A History of Madness in England 
from the Restoration to the Regency (Harvard University Press 1987); Michael Foucault, Madness and 
Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Plon 1961, Pantheon 1965); Robert Castel, The 
Regulation of Madness; The Origins of Incarceration in France (University of California Press 1988); Andrew 
Scull, Social Order/Mental Disorder; Anglo-American Psychiatry in Historical Perspective (University of 
California Press 1989). 
5
 See generally Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac 
(Wiley 1998); Edward Shorter, A Historical Dictionary of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press 2005); Andrew 
Scull, Museums of Madness: The Social Organisation of Insanity in Nineteenth- Century England (Allen Lane 
1979). 
6
 See generally Michael Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Plon 
1961, Pantheon 1965); Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of 
Prozac (Wiley 1998); Edward Shorter, A Historical Dictionary of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press 2005). 
7
 Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac (Wiley 1998) 48-
65; Edward Shorter, A Historical Dictionary of Psychiatry (Oxford University Press 2005) 5; Edward Hare 
―Schizophrenia as a Recent Disease‖ (1988) 153 British Journal of Psychiatry 521. 
8
 See generally RD Laing, The Divided Self (Penguin 1965); Thomas Scheff, Being Mentally Ill (Aldine 1966); 
Erving Goffman, Asylums (Penguin 1968); Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory 
of Personal Conduct (Harper and Row 1960); David Ingleby, ‗Understanding Mental Illness‘ in David Ingleby 
(ed), Critical Psychiatry: The Politics of Mental Health (Penguin  1981); Geoff Baruch & Andrew Treacher, 
Psychiatry Observed (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1978); Philip Bean, Compulsory Admissions to Mental 
Hospitals (John Wiley & Sons 1980). 
9
 See generally Damien Brennan, Irish Insanity; 1800-2000 (Routledge 2014). 
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subsequently, the high rates of detention had a deterministic influence on the creation, 
operation and interpretation of new mental health law. The role of law in regulating mental 
health systems has come to engender great contention in the legal, historical and sociological 
disciplines alike. This conflict is multifaceted but is centred upon the role of psychiatry in the 
detention of the mentally ill and the manner in which the law should control this. The primary 
conflict in relation to the philosophy of mental health detention has been the extent to which 
legal regulation should control psychiatric power. In this manner the evolution of mental 
health law has been seen in terms of a pendulous movement between two extremes of 
medicalism and legalism.
10
 Socio-legal analysis is used to determine why the legal powers to 
detain the mentally ill developed in the way they did, who influenced them and what their 
impact was. 
1.02 Research Question 
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the influence of this medicalism and legalism in the 
powers to detain the mentally ill in Ireland. The research question relates to adults only. 
Powers to detain mentally ill children differ from those for adults and are outside the scope of 
this thesis. The thesis examines the development of legal powers to detain the mentally ill and 
focuses on the law, the judicial interpretation of the law and the operation of the law from the 
late 1700s to early 2014. In doing so it examines significant changes in approach from a 
socio-legal perspective utilising the medicalism and legalism theories.  
1.03 Methodology 
In recent years a purely doctrinal analysis of the law has been criticized on the grounds that it 
is a rigid, inflexible and inward looking approach to understanding what the law is and the 
operation of the legal system.
11
 Concurrently, the benefits of using other disciplines such as 
sociology, political science, economics, psychology, history and feminism as aids to legal 
research have been widely recognised. This inter-disciplinary or socio-legal research is 
thought to provide a more realistic and refined understanding of the law. It does so by filling 
the gap between ‗law in books‘ and ‗law in action‘ and allows for an understanding of the 
operation of law in society.
12
 For this reason, the thesis utilises and combines different 
                                                     
10
 See generally Kathleen Jones, A History of the Mental Health Services (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972). 
11
 D.W. Vick, ‗Interdisciplinary and the Discipline of Law‘ (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 164; Reza 
Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and Methods in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005); 1-27. 
12
 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 
1-16. 
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methods. Firstly, the thesis draws on sociological and historical analysis to explain the 
influence of medicalism and legalism in the evolution of the legal power to detain in Ireland. 
Sociology, concerned generally with the study of society, focuses on society as a whole 
without restricting its knowledge to any one institutional dimension of society.
13
 It thus offers 
the possibility of providing a more comprehensive analysis of the role of law within the 
broader social and political context of mental health detention.
14
 Historical analysis is also 
essential as it provides the background to, and again, an understanding as to why the law 
developed in the way that it did. It is believed that a doctrinal analysis of the law and the case 
law would fail to provide an adequate understanding of the law, its creation, its amendment 
and its impact on its subjects, those charged with its application and wider Irish society. For 
example, a purely doctrinal analysis of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 would fail to explain 
how psychiatry professionalised in Ireland and came to occupy the dominant role in mental 
health detention.  
 
Despite the criticisms of doctrinal analysis, at times it is essential, thus a doctrinal analysis of 
the statutes, their judicial interpretation, relevant academic literature and government 
reports
15
 is provided. However, where it has been impossible to find any information on a 
particular aspect of the research question, it has been necessary to conduct qualitative 
research. Socio-legal scholarship employs a wide range of applied social science methods 
including quantitative and qualitative research.
16
 Therefore in the examination of mental 
health tribunals in Ireland, original interviews with treating psychiatrists and service users are 
employed to analyse the operation of the legal power to detain. These qualitative interviews 
are used as there is limited information available on the operation of Irish mental health 
tribunals and this was deemed the best approach to elucidating information, given the 
constraints imposed by the legislation. 
 
                                                     
13
 Mathieu Deflem, Sociology of Law; Visions of a Scholarly Tradition (Cambridge University Press 2008) 7. 
14
 On socio-legal theory and research methods see generally Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007); Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory 
and Methods in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005); Mathieu Deflem, Sociology of Law; Visions of a 
Scholarly Tradition (Cambridge University Press 2008); Roman Tomasic, The Sociology of Law (Sage 
Publications 1985). 
15
 Department of Health and Children, Review of the Operation of the Mental Health Act 2001; Findings and 
Conclusions (2007); Mental Health Commission, Report on the Operation of Part 2 of the Mental Health Act 
2001 (2008); Department of Health and Children, Interim Report of the Steering Group on the Review of the 
Mental Health Act 2001 (2012). 
16
 See generally Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and Methods in Socio-Legal Research (Hart 
Publishing 2005). 
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1.04 Medicalism & Legalism 
In establishing an explanatory device by which mental health laws can be understood this 
thesis utilises theories of legalism and medicalism. However, the law‘s role in the regulation 
of the legal power to detain has engendered significant debate about such legalism and 
medicalism. The seminal work conducted in this area has focused on English and Welsh 
mental health legislation.
17
 In examining the Irish legislation, this work has been instructive. 
Indeed, the evolution of legalism and medicalism has followed the same trajectory in both 
countries. From the work conducted to date it is seen that as mental health legislation has 
evolved over time, the conceptions of medicalism and legalism have changed. A 
straightforward interpretation of these theories is provided by Fennell: 
“Legalism focuses on the coercive aspects of psychiatry such as detention, forcible treatment 
and restraint, and seeks to regulate them by imposing due process safeguards. Medicalism 
seeks to take advantage of the ideological role of law to submerge these coercive dimensions 
of psychiatry, and encourage their perception as medical treatments whose administration 
should be a matter of clinical judgement rather than a subject of legal regulation.”18 
The traditional justification for legally safeguarding the rights of the insane was the 
possibility that the determination of insanity was incorrect, or that the need for detention was 
unwarranted given the severity of the insanity.
19
 Therefore, mental health laws, including the 
Lunacy Act 1890 and the Mental Treatment Act 1930 in England, and the Lunacy Acts 1821-
1826 and the Criminal Lunatics Act 1838-1867 in Ireland, focused on safeguarding the 
individual‘s right to liberty. The legislation, which espoused legalism, prescribed statutory 
minimum standards to guide and restrict the discretion of the many decision makers in the 
detention process. Furthermore, the need for detention was determined by judges.  
                                                     
17
 See generally, Kathleen Jones, ―The limitations of the legal approach to mental health law‖ (1980) 3(1) 
International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1; Larry O Gostin, ‗The Ideaology of Entitlement: The Application 
of Contemporary Legal Approaches to Psychiatry‘ in Philip Bean (ed), Mental Illness: Trends and Changes 
(John Wiley 1983) 27-54; Clive Unsworth, The Politics of Mental Health Legislation (Clarendon Press 1987); 
Phil Fennell, ―Law and Society: The Legal Constitution of the Psychiatric System‖ (1986) 13(1) Journal of Law 
and Psychiatry 35; Nikolas Rose, ―Unreasonable Rights, Mental Illness and the Limits of the Law‖ (1985) 12(2) 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 199; Nicola Glover-Thomas, Reconstructing Mental Health Law and Policy 
(Butterworths 2002); Willis J Spaulding, ―Mapping the New-Legalism of the English Mental Health System‖ 
(1989) 17(2) Law, Medicine & Healtcare, 187; Bernadette McSherry & Penelope Weller (eds), Rethinking 
Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Hart Publishing 2010). 
18
 Phil Fennell, Treatment Without Consent; Law, Psychiatry and the Treatment of Mentally Disordered People 
since 1845 (Routledge 1996) 10. 
19
 Willis J Spaulding, ―Mapping the New-Legalism of the English Mental Health System‖ (1989) 17(2) Law, 
Medicine & Healtcare, 187. 
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With the passing of time, legalism came to attribute anti-psychiatry connotations and 
medicalism evolved as an alternative. In support of medicalism, Jones has interpreted the 
term legalism in a negative sense, believing that as the mental health field is one of the least 
predictable it follows that it is one of the least appropriate for ‗formalistic‘ or ‗mechanistic‘ 
approaches of law. Rather, open textured law that is enabling and permits maximum medical 
discretion within a loose framework of regulation is preferable.
20
 In this sense Jones believes 
that legal formalism results in an over emphasis on procedural correctness to the detriment of 
the substantive aim of treating the mentally ill. Furthermore, she believes that professional 
ethics ensure abuse is exceptional and, legislating for the exceptional results in disruption and 
damage to the psychiatric processes. It has been claimed that the ‗juridogenic harm‘, an 
analogy of iatrogenic harm, caused by legal processes in the detention of the mentally ill can 
affect and undermine existing and future therapeutic relationships.
21
 It is also argued that 
legalism can have stigmatising effects whereby the use of certain legislation and/or judicial 
determination in the detention process quasi-criminalises the mentally ill and contributes to 
their social exclusion.
22
 
Opponents of medicalism see it as providing the possibility for uncontrolled medical 
discretion, which cannot be ensured to always act in the best interests of patients.
23
 Bean 
describes how a mental health system governed by ‗therapeutic rules‘, which bear analogy to 
medicalism, has several characteristics. The rules are loosely formulated to permit the 
minimum of control over the medical profession and permit the maximum use of professional 
discretion. Significantly, however, there is a divestment of the traditional legal processes and 
the usual legal rights of the citizen are absent.
24
 Therefore, those who reject medicalism and 
support legalism, argue that a framework of legal rules is essential for the protection of 
patients.
25
  
                                                     
20
 Kathleen Jones, ―The limitations of the legal approach to mental health law‖ (1980) 3(1) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1, 8-9. See generally Kathleen Jones, A History of the Mental Health Services 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972). 
21
 William Obomanu & Harry Kennedy, ―Juridogenic Harm: Statutory Principles for the New Mental Health 
Tribunals‖ (2001) 25 Psychiatric Bulletin 331. 
22
 Kathleen Jones, ―The limitations of the legal approach to mental health law‖ (1980) 3(1) International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 1. 
23
 Phil Fennell, Treatment Without Consent; Law, Psychiatry and the Treatment of Mentally Disordered People 
since 1845 (Routledge 1996) 10. 
24
 Philip Bean, ―The Mental Health Act 1959: Some Issues Concerning Rule Enforcement‖ (1975) 2(2) British 
Journal of Law and Society 225, 228. 
25
 Nicola Glover-Thomas, Reconstructing Mental Health Law and Policy (Butterworths 2002) vi. 
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During the 1980s, Gostin urged reform based on what he termed a ‗new legalism‘. In 
furtherance of the protection of patients‘ rights, Gostin too championed the introduction of 
greater procedural safeguards and stricter regulation of psychiatry.
26
  Far from being a part of 
the anti-psychiatry movement, Gostin believed that where compulsion was involved, the 
expert should minimally explain and justify their decision to a lay person, utilising objective 
behavioural criteria to support this.
27The difference in Gostin‘s new legalism was that his 
―ideology of entitlement‖ emphasised an enforceable right to care that was to be provided in 
the least restrictive setting as possible. Gostin linked concern for traditional rights to due 
process and review of detention by the courts with the ideology of entitlement to adequate 
treatment and services. The focus of legal restrictions on medical discretion was no longer 
focused solely on detention; instead, the ideology of entitlement also required limitations on 
the exercise of psychiatric power with respect to psychiatric care and treatment.
28
 In essence 
legalism moved into the post commitment realm. 
Gostin‘s new legalism was enshrined in the English Mental Health Act 1983. In its operation, 
however, an alternative strategy to Gostin‘s legalism emerged. Medical discretion in the 
treatment and also in the detention of voluntary patients was restricted, but it was restricted 
through the use of second medical opinions rather than judicial or mental health review 
tribunal pronouncements. These new restrictions, which ensured that decisions would 
continue to be made in the medical best interests of the detained, were acceptable to the 
psychiatric profession and were favoured over the hard and fast restrictions suggested by 
Gostin. Whether the use of second medical opinions is independent or provides a better 
restraint on arbitrary medical decision making than lawyers can is open to question. What is 
definitely at issue is the symbolic political significance to the patient.
29
 Rose has cast doubt 
on the extent to which such provisions impact upon the detention process. For him a legalist 
form of mental health legislation that is rights based does not alter the decisions that are made 
about detention or treatment and does not provide effective monitoring and constraining of 
medical discretion. Instead, it merely causes a shift in the discourse and changes the 
                                                     
26
 Larry O Gostin, ―Perspectives on Mental health Reforms‖ (1982) 10 Journal of Law and Society 47; Larry O 
Gostin, ‗The Ideaology of Entitlement: The Application of Contemporary Legal Approaches to Psychiatry‘ in 
Philip Bean (ed), Mental Illness: Trends and Changes (John Wiley 1983) 27-54. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Willis J Spaulding, ―Mapping the New-Legalism of the English Mental Health System‖ (1989) 17(2) Law, 
Medicine & Healtcare, 187. 
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personnel involved.
30
 Despite the fact that the new legalism focused on a broader conception 
of patient‘s right including the right challenge detention and treatment without consent, 
Unsworth has also highlighted how this legalism has, in a way, become a mode of medical 
power.
31
 In this manner compliance with procedural safeguards can actually legitimise the 
medical decision to detain.
32
 With respect to this issue, Fennell outlines how the new 
legalism, in reality, maintains the codification of clinical power and authority, especially in 
cases concerning treatment without consent.
33
 Weller, comparably opines that patient rights 
have been lost in translation because of the continued acceptance of medical authority.
34
 
Despite the difficulties with defining legalism and medicalism, and the criticisms thereof, this 
thesis draws from and builds on these theories.
35
 In doing so the thesis utilises a specific 
definition of legalism and its correlative medicalism and analyses their influence on the legal 
powers to detain the mentally ill. While the literature concerning legalism and medicalism 
has since evolved to consider issues concerning treatment in England and Wales, the thesis is 
primarily restricted to considering the theories with respect to detention in Ireland at this 
point. The aim is to utilise these theories in an explanative manner and to provide some 
understanding as to the reasoning behind the creation, interpretation and operation of 
detention provisions in mental health law in Ireland. In this sense Unsworth‘s definition of 
legalism is most appropriate for the purposes of the thesis. For Unsworth, legalism, in the 
psychiatric context,   
“is focused upon relationships between mental health professionals, especially psychiatrists, 
and their patients, and entails the superimposition of legal duties and rights upon therapeutic 
and social responsibilities and expectations, principally for the protection of the patient or 
potential patient…the rule of law takes priority, if necessary at the expense of other 
                                                     
30
 Nikolas Rose, ―Unreasonable Rights: Mental Illness and the Limits of the Law‖ (1985) 12 (2) Journal of Law 
and Society 199, 206-207. 
31
 Clive Unsworth, The Politics of Mental Health Legislation (Clarendon Press 1987) 315-352. 
32
 Clive Unsworth, The Politics of Mental Health Legislation (Clarendon Press 1987) 11-12. 
33
 Phil Fennell, ‗Institutionalising the Community: The Codification of Clinical Authority and the Limits of 
Rights-Based Approaches‘ in Bernadette McSherry & Penelope Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental 
Health Laws (Hart Publishing 2010) 13-51. 
34
 Penelope Weller ‗Lost in Translation: Human Rights and Mental Health Law‘ in Bernadette McSherry & 
Penelope Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Hart Publishing 2010) 51-73. 
35
 For a critique of Gostin‘s legalism see Nikolas Rose, ―Unreasonable Rights, Mental Illness and the Limits of 
the Law‖ (1985) 12(2) Journal of Law and Psychiatry 199. 
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considerations, including that which is deemed to be optimally therapeutic by 
professionals.”36  
For the purposes of the thesis, the actors involved are expanded to include the medical 
profession generally as opposed to mental health professionals solely. The definition of 
medicalism, for the purposes of the thesis, is derived from this definition of legalism. 
Medicalism is focused on the relationship between medical professionals and their patients. It 
provides minimum legal control over the medical profession to permit the maximum use of 
medical discretion upon therapeutic and social responsibilities and expectations, principally 
for the treatment of the patient or potential patient. That which is deemed optimally 
therapeutic by medical professionals takes priority, if necessary at the expense of other 
considerations, such as the civil rights of the patient or the procedural requirements of law. 
1.05 Constitutional Rights, Human Rights and Mental Health Detention 
Given that the above discussion of legalism and medicalism refers often to the rights of 
persons the subject of mental health detention, at this point, it is appropriate to discuss the 
changing nature of these rights in some detail. In Ireland constitutional and human rights take 
precedence over legislation and common law. The list of constitutional rights that could be 
affected by mental health detention is lengthy, but primarily includes the right to liberty,
37
 the 
right to bodily integrity
38
 and the right to autonomy or self-determination.
39
 The manner by 
which these rights have been argued in cases concerning mental health detention will be 
discussed in further detail in throughout the thesis. However, at this point it is necessary to 
highlight that until relatively recently the right to liberty was the only right that was 
challenged in relation to mental health detention in Ireland. More recently, there have been 
some challenges to the Mental Health Act 2001 concerning the treatment received by persons 
detained thereunder, and in particular their capacity to refuse this treatment.
40
This again is 
discussed in further detail below.
41
 
At the international level the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has played an 
influential role in protecting the rights of those affected by mental health detention at the state 
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level.
42
 The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 permits arguments about the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to be made in all Irish courts.  In addition 
all organs of the State must perform their functions in a manner compatible with the ECHR. 
Ultimately, there is the possibility to bring a case against the State to the ECtHR for failure to 
guarantee the rights enshrined in the ECHR.  
The main Articles of the ECHR that are relevant to mental health detention are: Article 5, the 
right to liberty and security; Article 6, the right to a fair trial; Article 3, the prohibition of 
torture; and Article 8, the right to respect for private and family life. The ECtHR case law in 
relation to mental health detention deals with civil and political human rights that are 
essentially negative in character. These rights place limits on government power and 
interference with rights as opposed to socio-economic rights which require the State to 
provide mental health services. It places limits on government power and interference with 
rights in three main areas: detention, conditions of confinement and review of detention.
43
 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR in relation to mental health detention, review and discharge 
has since 1979 built in the terms of Article 5 to create a number of clear requirements which 
are discussed in Chapter 4.
44
 
The new legalism that was discussed above drew heavily on these negative rights but also 
argued that there should be effective access to cultural and socio-economic rights. 
Essentially, there was maturation in terms of the rights which legalism sought to protect, and 
they now included the rights to dignity, autonomy, privacy and the right to adequate care and 
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service. New legalism has therefore also been termed rights-based legalism.
45
 Traditionally, 
the legal rights were only applied and attributed to the rational legal person, and as the 
mentally ill were not considered rational, exceptions to the law such as restrictions on liberty 
were allowed. The significant change in the new legalism approach was that it no longer 
considered the mentally ill to be lacking rationality and there was an understanding that they 
were imbued with the same rights as others.
46
  
The ECtHR has since then been prepared to attach positive rights to adequate treatment and 
care in mental health detention
47
 and even to mental health services outside of 
detention.
48
More recently, the ECtHR has further considered a broader collection of rights in 
cases concerning guardianship and capacity of persons with mental illness. Significantly, in 
2008 the ECtHR held that the placing of a man under guardianship without his knowledge 
and his subsequent detention in a mental hospital amounted to a violation of Articles 5, 6 and 
8. The ECtHR opined that the “…interference with the applicant‟s private life was very 
serious. As a result of his incapacitation the applicant became fully dependant on his official 
guardian in almost all areas of life.‖49In a similar case in 2012, whereby the applicant was 
divested of his legal capacity and subsequently detained, the ECtHR found that there was a 
breach of Articles 5 and 6 but did not consider the Article 8 argument. Importantly, however, 
the ECtHR also found that the conditions of his detention were so degrading that they 
amounted to a violation of Article 3.
50
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) was enacted in 2006 
and opened for signature in 2007. The CRPD focuses on the social model of disability and 
locates the ‗problem‘ with disability in the social organisation and discriminatory attitudes of 
society.
51
 Significantly, it makes no reference to involuntary detention of the mentally ill and 
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provides that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere as persons 
before the law and similarly enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects 
of life.
52
 The CRPD is significant in merging both civil and political rights with economic, 
cultural and social rights. Fennell argues that in terms of protecting the rights of the mentally 
ill going forward, there must be a re-conceptualisation of mental health rights into disability 
rights as it ‗lays greater emphasis on positive rights and upholds the social inclusion, anti-
stigma and equality agenda, without losing sight of the key imperative of legality, due 
process and proportionality.‘53 While the CRPD obviously had no influence on the Mental 
Health Act 2001, it is likely that it will have an impact on legalism going forward, and this 
will be considered in relation to Irish mental capacity legislation in Chapter 6. 
1.06 Thesis Outline & Structure 
The thesis is primarily limited to civil legal powers to detain; however, at certain points in the 
history of Irish mental health detention the criminal detention procedures have played a 
significant and influential role. Indeed, the Criminal Lunatics Acts 1838-1867 were the 
primary mode of entry into the asylum until the enactment of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 
(the 1945 Act) and are therefore discussed in some detail. Subsequently, the examination 
focuses on civil detention, in particular, the legal powers to detain established in the 1945 Act 
and the Mental Health Act 2001 (the 2001 Act). Unsworth has highlighted that, in particular, 
admission procedures have historically provided the most sensitive indication of the 
prevalence of legalism and for this reason they are a primary focus of the thesis.
54
 
Additionally, the legal provisions in the 2001 Act which provide for a multi-disciplinary 
review of the medical decision to detain also provide compelling indications as to the 
prevalence of legalism or medicalism and are a necessary focus of the thesis as well. In terms 
of the admission and review provisions in the 2001 Act, the European Convention on Human 
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Rights and its interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights has had a significant 
influence and is therefore discussed where relevant. Finally, the judicial interpretation of the 
law and/or its operation can be illustrative of the judicial preference for a medicalist or 
legalist system of metal health law.   
Chapter 2 examines the influence of medicalism and legalism from 1780 to 1921 and reveals 
the factors that allowed medicalism to dominate the evolution of legal powers to detain. 
Chapter 3 provides an examination of the influence of medicalism in the detention of the 
mentally ill from 1921 to 1990. In particular it analyses the influence of medicalism in 
the development, enactment and judicial interpretation of the 1945 Act. Chapter 4 examines 
the influence of medicalism and legalism from 1990 to 2014. It explains the factors that 
resulted in the articulation of legalism in the 2001 Act but questions the dominance of 
legalism in its operation and judicial interpretation. A significant feature of the 2001 Act was 
the establishment of Mental Health Tribunals (MHTs) which review the medical decision to 
detain. Chapter 5 assesses the nature and operation of MHTs to determine the extent to which 
they adhere to legalism or medicalism. Chapter 6 provides conclusions. 
1.07 Language & Terms Used 
At this point, it is important to highlight the nature of the language used in the legislation and 
throughout the thesis. The labels which are attached to persons who are the subject of mental 
health detention have long been considered stigmatising. Such stigma flows both from 
informal and formal or professional language used. Terms such as ‗mental illness‘ and 
‗patient‘ are criticised for their indiscriminate adoption of a medical interpretation of mental 
illness. When the biological nature of mental illness is contested these labels naturally 
become a point of controversy. These terms are used throughout the thesis, not because of the 
author‘s endorsement of a medical interpretation of mental illness but because the terms are 
historically accurate. The thesis utilises the language of the time as it provides a revealing 
insight into the approach to mental illness and is, in itself, conspicuous of the intention of the 
legislation. So, in the early stages of the asylum, insanity had yet to be conceived of as an 
illness. Detention was the primary purpose of the legislation. The Lunacy Act 1821-1826 and 
the Criminal Lunatics Act 1838-1867 utilised the terms insane, lunacy and asylum. With the 
introduction of the Mental Treatment Act 1945, the title of the Act was evidence of the new 
purpose of the legislation - the treatment of the mentally ill. Insanity had been transformed 
into an illness that could be cured by the psychiatric profession, provided that treatment was 
16 
 
obtained. The terms of the Act consequently referred to the mentally ill, who were to be 
detained in mental hospitals. Again with the title of the Mental Health Act 2001, the choice of 
wording was significant. The title of the Act and the terms used signified a broadening of 
psychiatric influence. Psychiatry was no longer solely responsible for the treatment and 
eradication of mental illness, but was now responsible for its prevention too. Through a 
positive and preventative re-orientation of psychiatry the role of the psychiatrist expanded 
into the provision of general mental health care and welfare for the nation. Mental illness was 
further aligned with other physical illness and the site of intervention was changed to 
approved psychiatric centres and units located in general hospitals. 
1.08 Conclusion 
To date many studies have focused on various aspects of the law, the history or the sociology 
of mental illness in Ireland.
55
 None, however, have applied these approaches 
contemporaneously nor examined the law, its operation and interpretation collectively. In 
doing so the thesis therefore provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of powers to 
detain the mentally ill in Ireland from the late 1700s to date. In addition, the thesis provides 
the first detailed account of the operation of Irish MHTs, utilising field research involving 
qualitative interviews. Cumulatively, the thesis provides an original contribution to the 
existing academic knowledge on Irish mental health law.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ORIGINS OF MEDICALISM & LEGALISM 
IN THE LEGAL POWERS TO DETAIN THE INSANE 
 2.01 Introduction 
This chapter examines the origins and evolution of the legal powers to detain the insane from 
the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century when Ireland gained independence 
from Britain. Through a historical examination, the origins and development of medicalism, 
and to a lesser extent legalism, become apparent and as a result a more adequate account of 
current powers of detention emerges.  It is argued that the changing responses to insanity 
were neither the result of chance nor the product of a mere accumulation of incremental, ad 
hoc decisions absent of any underlying dynamic or logic. While the chapter examines the 
economic, social and political developments that influenced the creation of legislation 
concerning the powers to detain the insane, the primary focus is on the law and the operation 
of the law. 
2.02 The Origins of Government Provision for the Insane; Workhouses & Prisons 
During the first half of the eighteenth century in Ireland, the ―insane‖ were typically viewed 
as wild animals absent of reason.
56
 The majority of the insane would have been kept in the 
family home. Early Irish law actually obliged the kin of the insane, aged or physically 
disabled to care for them.
57
 The insane would likely have experienced cruelties as many 
would have been kept chained in outhouses, pits and makeshift cages in the family home. 
Where the insane were not cared for in the family home they would have been homeless, 
wandering at large throughout the country, subject to ridicule and torment.
58
 Despite this lack 
of care, exploitation of the insane was against the law and one could not enter into a contract 
with a lunatic, incite a lunatic to commit a crime or ―impregnate or cause two lunatics to 
mate.‖59 
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The latter half of the eighteenth century witnessed a period of economic expansion in Ireland. 
By the end of the eighteenth century, the effects of agricultural, industrial and commercial 
development were everywhere to be seen. Dublin, Cork and other centres had expanded and 
the population had risen from less than 2.5 million in the early eighteenth century to perhaps 
5 million by 1800.
60
 The expansion in the economy and the population meant that families no 
longer had the capabilities to care for the insane at home and an ever increasing number were 
to be found destitute in the newly formed and populated towns and cities. The insane became 
a visible and public problem.
61
 In 1796 Marquis de Latocnaye commented that ‗one of the 
most painful spectacles to be seen in nearly all the principal towns of Ireland is the number of 
weak-minded persons in the streets.‘62 Although in many cases families were no longer 
providing for the insane, government intervention was limited and strongly linked to the 
control and punishment of the ‗undeserving poor‘.63 Ireland at the time was under British 
colonial rule. Political thought was not directed towards responsibility for people within 
Ireland, which was reflected in the absence of a Poor Law.
64
 
By the end of the eighteenth century, however, a combination of political, economic and 
social factors had created a bleak and threatening national landscape. The facade of 
prosperity that had emerged during the eighteenth century concealed dangerous weaknesses: 
the agricultural economy was very weak and the manufacturing enterprises were in general 
smaller and less technologically advanced than their English and Scottish counterparts.
65
 
Thus, towards the end of the eighteenth century Ireland was over populated with an ailing 
economy which was leading to deteriorating social conditions. Furthermore, the continued 
Irish struggle for independence from Britain resulted in a precarious political situation and 
general public unrest.
66
 The more visible the poor became, the more they were considered a 
threat to social order. This new perception resulted in a general change in the response to 
deviance in which the beginnings of centralised and highly organised government control 
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were seen through increased segregation of deviants from the normal population and more 
refined differentiation in the varieties of deviance.
67
  
Initial moves had already been made in this direction with the establishment of several 
workhouses under an Act of 1772 which sought to relieve the public of the nuisance of 
proliferating beggars, particularly in the cities and towns.
68
 The 1772 Act was primarily 
punitive rather than charitable in design although it did distinguish ‗deserving‘ and 
‗undeserving poor‘. The undeserving poor, generally beggars, could be committed forcibly to 
workhouses while the deserving poor, generally the infirm, could be admitted voluntarily. 
The Dublin House of Industry (workhouse) provided the first form of public provision for the 
insane whereby ten lunatic cells were established in the workhouse in 1776.
69
 However, even 
where there was no specific provision, the insane came to form a large segment of the 
inmates of the workhouses nationwide.
70
 
In addition to the workhouses, the insane were also detained in prisons. Prison conditions 
during the eighteenth century were extremely poor. Following investigations on the matter by 
various parliamentary committees, the Prisons Act 1786 and its Amendment in 1787 
attempted to improve some of the squalid conditions for those detained through the creation 
of the post of an inspector-general of prisons. In keeping with the government‘s new effort to 
segregate and classify groups in society, the Prisons (Amendment) Act 1787 provided for 
specialised ‗lunatic‘ wards in the few workhouses dotted throughout the country.71 These 
lunatic wards were not the product of benevolent intentions, but rather, an attempt to make 
the workhouses and the prisons more efficient and the inmates more manageable. The infirm 
in general interfered with workhouse and prison discipline, the insane in particular caused 
chaos and demoralisation. The lunatic wards allowed for better control of the insane and 
better control of the rest of the inmates in the prisons and workhouses.
72
 Nevertheless, the 
insane were still considered as part of the wider class of the poor or the criminal. As such it 
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was two magistrates who determined whether they should be detained under this prison 
legislation.
73
  
In the end, only four wards were provided in the workhouses under the Prisons Act 1787 and 
during the rest of the eighteenth century England made no further specialised provision for 
the insane.
74
 Public provision aside, some private attempts were made to provide for the 
insane. Unlike England, there was no extensive system of private asylums, however, some 
private asylums were established on a voluntary basis.
75
 St. Patrick‘s Hospital, established as 
a result of the bequest of Jonathan Swift was the first asylum in the country. It opened in 
1757 and by 1789 had approximately 109 inmates.
76
 In a mode typical of eighteenth-century 
Dublin hospitals, it was sustained by voluntary donations and parliamentary grants. The Cork 
Lunatic Asylum was founded in 1799 by Dr William Saunders Hallaran. Around this time 
there was also a modest growth in the number of private asylums in Ireland.
77
 
The eighteenth century marked the beginnings of the government‘s involvement in the 
classification of different groups in society and the segregation of the deviant through 
detention. For the purposes of this chapter it marked the beginning of the government‘s 
involvement in establishing specific detention provisions for the insane. These concepts of 
classification and segregation through detention were to remain dominant into the nineteenth 
century and were to have a significant impact on the development of the asylum system.  
2.03 The Birth of the Asylum 1817 to 1830 
The birth of the asylum system in Ireland must be seen as intimately connected to a whole 
series of historically specific and closely interrelated changes in the Irish political, economic 
and social situation.
78
 Aspirations for a stable and prosperous Irish society saw a concerted 
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effort to establish social order in the face of disorder, political discord, over-population and a 
weak agrarian economy.
79
 For centuries Ireland had been under British colonial rule. In 1800 
the Act of Union, under which Ireland and Britain became one political unit, abolished the 
Irish Parliament which had existed in one form or another since the thirteenth century.
80
 
Quite simply, Britain did not trust it to govern Ireland effectively, especially when Britain 
was at war with revolutionary Napoleonic France. Against much opposition, advocates of the 
Union argued that it would create a stable Ireland, with a higher standard of living 
comparable to that of England and sought a ‗programme of conciliation and reform‘ 
including an attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the poor‘.81 Government intervention 
grew throughout the century yet the nature of this colonial administration meant that the 
emerging social interventions were designed for control and maintenance of order rather than 
the provision of welfare for the populace.
82
 
As it had been in the eighteenth century, the guiding principles for social intervention in the 
nineteenth century were classification and segregation, albeit, in an intensified form. These 
two concepts were now considered prerequisites for any progressive and well organised 
society. The insane had contributed to social disorder in the country and now it was believed 
that their disruptive presence in prisons and workhouses could be avoided by their complete 
segregation. For centuries, in the absence of institutions, the insane had been tolerated; now 
that tolerance was fading as the system of prisons and workhouses offered the possibility of 
controlling them.
83
 By the nineteenth century, however, these institutions increasingly came 
to be seen as inappropriate for the detention of the insane and further segregation was 
required.
84
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to opposition on the grounds of taxation, a government grant was secured in 1810 for the 
establishment of a separate general asylum for the insane.
85
 The Richmond Asylum, built 
between 1810 and 1815, replaced the lunatic ward of the Dublin House of Industry and 
became the major and only centre of public care for the insane in the country. In 1814 the 
Richmond Lunatic Asylum was opened with accommodation for 300 lunatics.
86
It quickly 
became overcrowded and it was clear that systematic reform throughout Ireland, not only 
Dublin, was needed. 
87
  
Between 1812 and 1817, the Chief Secretary of Ireland was Robert Peel. During this time he 
set about asserting the power of central government in the social control of the Irish populace. 
Most notable of his efforts were measures for the policing of Ireland and the establishment of 
the system of public asylums. In both cases he was of the view that the Irish gentry were 
unwilling or unable to ensure the disciplinary measures necessary for the good government of 
Ireland.
88
 Between 1814 and 1816 Peel directed two inquiries into the public care of the 
insane. These inquiries recommended the formation of district asylums ‗exclusively 
appropriated to the reception of the insane‘. The Committees responsible for the inquiries 
were of the opinion that it was the duty of the government to provide for the insane and as 
such there needed to be central control of an additional four or five asylums country wide. As 
a result, the Lunacy (Ireland) Act 1821 was passed and in conjunction with amending Acts in 
1825 and 1826 resulted in the construction of eight asylums in the first stage of the 
foundation of an asylum system in Ireland.
89
 In 1825 the first asylum was established in 
Armagh followed by a further eight in Ballinasloe, Belfast, Carlow, Clonmel, Derry, 
Limerick, Maryborough and Waterford.
90
 The initial asylums were conservative in size 
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compared with those constructed from the mid-1830s onwards. For example, Ballinasloe only 
had 150 beds.
91
 Significantly, the development of a public asylum system preceded the 
establishment of a similar system in England. The early implementation of this policy has 
been attributed to the ease with which a colonial administration could impose policies and 
laws on otherwise dissenting parties at a local level, as it could be done with force if 
necessary. This option was lacking in England.
92
 
The original enthusiasm in the establishment of the asylums had led to an optimistic 
expectation about the cure of the insane. Instead, many of the insane remained incurable and 
accumulated in the asylum without any expectation of early discharge.
93
 The asylums quickly 
became overcrowded and the overcrowding led to deterioration in the care provided.
94
 More 
asylums were needed and by 1830 several had been built nationwide, with still more 
planned.
95
 
2.04 Moral Treatment & the Medical Take-Over 
The initial development of the asylum system was stimulated by the view that, given the 
proper setting, moral treatment offered the prospect of cure for many forms of insanity.
96
 
Moral treatment was a therapeutic approach that had emerged as an alternative to traditional 
―medical‖ treatments for the insane.  This approach believed that a cure for insanity was 
possible but through humane management as opposed to the orthodox medical treatments 
which were primitive in nature and mostly involved bloodletting, purging and physical 
restraints such as chains and manacles. Moral treatment repudiated the use of force, 
preferring the use of ‗moral control‘, a therapy by which psychological ascendency would be 
established over the lunatic by the moral governor through character, expertise and moral 
example.
97
 It had its origins in post-revolutionary France where, Philippe Pinel famously 
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struck the chains from the limbs of lunatics in the Paris asylums.
98
In reality it was actually 
Pinel‘s assistant, Pussin, who removed the shackles at a later date, nevertheless, Pinel can be 
credited with transforming French perception of the mad into the sick.
99
 In Britain, the same 
principles were being applied by a Quaker family, the Tukes, who founded the hugely 
influential York Retreat for the insane.
100
 The moral treatment used in the York Retreat 
emphasised the importance of the relationship between the governor and the insane and 
believed that the use of reward and punishment, reason and emotion would help relieve the 
symptoms of insanity. The moral governor established comprehensive rules and constant 
surveillance, enforced by simple rewards and punishments. Sanity was to be restored through 
self-discipline.
101
 Moral treatment demonstrated how the existing responses to insanity were 
actually unnecessary cruelties and Pinel and Tuke were held as enlightened reformers of their 
time. However, accepting only the benevolent aspects of moral treatment fails to recognise its 
role in social control and Scull and Foucault have questioned its undisputed humanitarian 
intentions.
102
 For Scull through moral treatment the main instruments of control in the asylum 
became the graded punishment and reward system, shame and guilt became the new methods 
of coercion, and by establishing good work habits the lunatic could be rehabilitated as a 
productive member of society.
103
 
The manner of care established in the first public asylum in Ireland, the Richmond Asylum, 
and other asylums thereafter was based on moral treatment. Dr Jackson the physician to the 
Richmond Asylum stressed moral treatment, comfort and a therapeutic environment. Dr 
Saunders Halloran in Cork advocated a similar approach.
104
 However these two physicians 
were the exception to the norm and the majority of the asylums were run by a governor, a 
layman, who was referred to as the ‗moral governor‘. As the role of the asylum was in the 
management and guidance of the lunatic, not his subjection to physical treatment, moral 
                                                     
98
 William F Bynum, ‗Rationales for Therapy in British Psychiatry, 1770–1835‘ in Andrew Scull (ed), 
Madhouses, Mad-Doctors, and Madmen: The Social History of Psychiatry in the Victorian Era 
(Athlone/University of Pennsylvania Press 1981) 35–57. 
99
 Dora B Weiner, ‗Le geste de Pinel: The history of a psychiatric myth‘ in Mark S Micale & Roy Porter (eds), 
Discovering the History of Psychiatry (Oxford 1994), 244. 
100
 Anne Digby, ‗Moral Treatment at the York Retreat‘ in William Bynum, Roy Porter and Michael Shepard 
(eds) The Anatomy of Madness (Tavistock 1985) Vol 2, 52-72. 
101
 Andrew Scull, Insanity of the Place/Place of Insanity, Essays on the History of Psychiatry (Routlegde 2006) 
115. 
102
 Michael Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Plon 1961, 
Pantheon 1965); Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull (eds), Social Control and the State, Historical and 
Comparative Essays (Martin Robinson & Company Ltd 1983) 145-152. 
103
 Stanley Cohen & Andrew Scull (eds), Social Control and the State, Historical and Comparative Essays 
(Martin Robinson & Company Ltd 1983) 152-153. 
104
 Arthur P Williamson, ―Psychiatry, moral management and the origins of social policy for mentally ill people 
in Ireland‖ (1992) 161(9) Irish Journal of Medical Science 155. 
25 
 
treatment had no real medical basis and there was no need for medical management. There 
was also nothing in the training of a physician or apothecary that qualified them for the moral 
governor role. As a result most appointments made were of non-medical personnel. However, 
it was accepted that there should be a physician on the staff appointed to treat any physical 
illness. These were employed in a visiting capacity only.
105
  
2.05 Psychiatric Professionalisation & the Origins of Medicalism 
The fact the moral treatment did not end medical involvement in the care of the insane has 
been attributed to the ingenuity and political astuteness of a number of Irish physicians who 
used the asylum to effectuate the professionalisation of psychiatry.
106
 There are several 
fundamental characteristics of a profession. Members of a profession are thought to have 
expertise in a specific body of knowledge, that is formulated through specialised education 
and training. They provide a service, of which they have a monopoly, through the exclusion 
of or dominance over similar occupations. In furtherance of this monopolisation, external 
supervision and interference is excluded and internal supervision of the profession is 
promoted. Cumulatively this provides the profession with income, power and prestige.
107
 
When the asylums were first established in Ireland there was no profession of psychiatry, as 
the asylum system expanded, however, this changed and the characteristics of an Irish 
psychiatric profession emerged. Through the asylum, physicians advanced their own social 
status as a profession, which was dependent on them achieving dominance over similar 
occupations and a monopoly control of insanity in general. 
As mentioned, most of the asylums were run by lay moral governors, however, several 
influential members of the medical profession strongly objected to their administration by lay 
men and resented both their status as the principal officer and their lack of a professional 
qualification.
108
 In some asylums physicians had actually been appointed to the role of moral 
governor, for example Dr Robert Stewart in Belfast in 1835 and Dr James Flynn in Clonmel 
in 1841. In these asylums the physicians established a medical system of asylum control. In 
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other asylums where there were lay moral governors, there was a significant medical 
influence also. In Carlow the visiting physician Dr John Jacob had established complete 
authority over the lay moral governor. As a result, treatment of those detained in the Carlow 
asylum was medical as opposed to moral with 41 residents taking medication for the cure of 
insanity.
109
However, this was not the norm and it took further developments for the 
establishment of medical dominance. 
One of the first moves towards the establishment of a distinct psychiatric profession in 
Ireland was the creation of a professional organisation; the Association of Medical Officers 
of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane. Founded in 1841, the Association drew its 
membership from the medical staff of the asylums in Britain and Ireland.
110
 The Association 
held annual meetings for the consideration of common interests and purposes. It is unclear 
whether any Irish representation attended the first two meetings, but at the third meeting Dr 
Robert Steward of Belfast attended and the subsequent year acted as secretary.
111
 Given the 
fact that the asylums were predominantly run by lay persons the Association had a somewhat 
precarious start. Dr Stewart, along with other medics campaigned against this. Most notably, 
Dr John Jacob circulated a pamphlet in 1834 ridiculing the idea of anyone other than a medic 
being competent to apply moral treatment.
112
 With the passage of time, the Association grew 
in importance and by 1853 was publishing its own journal. The Asylum Journal which later 
became the Asylum Journal of Mental Science in 1855, the Journal of Mental Science in 1858 
and the British Journal of Psychiatry in 1963, provided a fundamental ‗means of vivifying 
and extending and uniting‘ a scattered membership, and forming the centre of the 
profession‘s vitality.113 From the beginning the Journal showed a lively interest in Irish 
affairs.
114
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Another crucial move in the professionalisation of psychiatry was made at the legislative 
level around this time. Up until, 1843 the Inspectors of Prisons were also responsible for the 
inspection of asylums and therefore their position made them influential as the main advisors 
on lunacy matters to the Lord Lieutenant (British monarch‘s official representative and head 
of the Irish executive during British rule). However, they showed little interest in the issue of 
the insane and were very tolerant and sparing in their criticisms of both public and private 
asylums.
115
 In 1841, Dr Francis White, a surgeon in the Richmond Asylum, initiated a 
campaign to secure medical participation in the development of lunacy policy. White 
criticised the inspections of the asylums by the Inspectors of Prisons, claiming they were of 
no benefit. White‘s campaigning had brought him to notice and when one of the inspectors 
died later that year he was appointed as an Inspector of Prisons. During his time in this role 
he worked to establish a separate Lunacy Inspectorate and in his new position he was in a 
position to influence the Government on such matters.
116
  
The General Rules for the Governance of All District Lunatic Asylums 1843
117
 were the first 
step in which White sought to establish medical control of the asylums. Such rules were 
necessary, as White explained to the 1843 Committee on the Lunatic Poor, because the 
asylums had not fulfilled their object of cure in spite of their significant cost. He implied that 
the lack of medical management of the asylums was to blame for this failure and what was 
needed was a set of rules which would define the duties of the various officers involved.
118
 
When it was agreed to establish these Rules, White drafted them without recourse to any 
asylum personnel, with the exception of some of the medical officers. The result was a 
complete reversal of previous responsibilities in the asylum. The 1843 Rules standardised the 
asylum regulations and in practice served to consolidate medical authority within them.
119
 
Under the Rules, the visiting physician became responsible for the ‗moral and medical 
treatment‘ of the insane as well as advising governors as to when they should be discharged. 
In the furtherance of these duties, the physician was required to attend the asylum 3 days a 
week where there were more than 250 lunatics in residence. The result was that the governor 
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became the agent of the physician.
120
 While it was accepted by White that the governors had 
felt slighted by the new rules he believed that upon careful consideration the Lords 
Committee would realise the new arrangements were advantageous to ‗public and patient‘. 
The possibility of any other opinion on the matter was dismissed with references made to the 
exclusive authority of medical expertise. When commenting on the objection to medical 
control by the previous Inspector of Prisons, White stated that Major Woodward, not being a 
medical man could not be held to have the best experience in such matters.
121
 The assertion 
of medical expertise was the basis for the profession‘s claim to the management of asylums 
despite the fact that this expertise had no factual basis at this point. 
Subsequently, the Office of Lunacy was created in 1846.
122
 The legislation which created it 
provided for two posts of Inspectors of Lunacy who had the duty of inspecting and reporting 
on asylums and other institutions caring for lunatics once a year and was detached from the 
prison system. The role of the Inspectorate was not only the review of standards of care in the 
asylums but also to manage the direction of the whole system.
123
 In this manner, external 
interference and supervision of the asylum and the medical treatment therein was displaced 
and internal medical supervision was achieved. White and another physician, Dr Nugent, 
were appointed as the first Inspectors of Lunatics. While the qualifications for the post were 
undefined in the legislation, it was assumed from the beginning that only physicians would be 
appointed. White, and his fellow Inspector Nugent, then set out to consolidate the medical 
influence in the review of the system and its development and operation.
124
  
White and Nugent wanted to replace the lay governors in the asylums as had already been 
achieved in those outlined above. The English and Scottish members of the Association of 
Medical Officers of Asylums and Hospitals for the Insane also vehemently supported their 
Irish colleagues in lobbying for the appointment of physicians in all public hospitals.
125
 White 
and Nugent began to remove the lay management of the asylums as soon as was possible, 
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initially by replacing those who retired or died. In addition, any new asylum now had a 
medical governor appointed ab initio. By 1853, nine of the fourteen asylums were controlled 
by physicians and in 1859, only one lay manager remained.
126
 
As a result of the replacement of the moral governors of the asylums with physicians, a 
conflict had arisen between the role of this new medical manager and the visiting physician. 
It was argued that the role of the visiting physician demeaned that of the resident physician 
who was now believed to be the expert in insanity. Consequently, the post of Resident 
Medical Superintendent was established under the Asylum Rules 1862. These Rules 
established the definitive authority of the Resident Medical Superintendent in the asylum who 
was provided with complete responsibility for the medical and moral treatment of all 
residents and for the domestic management of the asylum. The visiting physician‘s role was 
reduced to that of a consultant. This new found authority in the asylum created the conditions 
for the emergence of a new specialisation in Irish medicine; psychiatry. Its emergence was 
not determined by its theoretical or practical superiority in the treatment of the insane but 
rather by institutional politics.
127
 
Other measures such as the attempt to enhance the exclusivity of the psychiatric knowledge 
by seeking to establish a specialist teaching school in St. Patrick‘s Asylum were made by 
White. While this school never came to fruition, perhaps because hospital resources became 
restricted in the Famine, it is evidence of his incredible foresight in his attempts to further the 
profession.
128
 A more successful endeavour in influencing the running of the asylum in 
accordance with medical principles came with the Inspectors of Lunacy‘s attendance at the 
meetings of asylum boards. On their suggestion they were subsequently made ex officio 
members of all the district asylum boards by the Lord Lieutenant and involved themselves 
fully in all matters concerning the development of the asylums, except financial matters.
129
 
Cumulatively, these measures resulted in a medical monopoly over the asylum system. 
It was on the basis of their control over the new and expanding asylum system that psychiatry 
made use of its medical identity to construe a particular status and authority to its work. 
While psychiatry was slow to establish itself as a profession of power and status, through its 
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work in the asylum it came to be the dominant force in insanity.
130
 The government 
effectively handed over the asylums to physicians and as a result had largely removed the 
institutions and those detained therein from the public arena.
131
 Through the ingenuity and 
political astuteness of certain physicians and their organisational power, psychiatry was 
established as a profession. The monopoly over the asylum provided the potential for 
defining the social reality in which the members of psychiatry were to function.
132
 In doing so 
the psychiatric profession became the dominant agent in all matters concerning insanity, as is 
evidenced not only in the treatment and care of those detained but also in the inspection of 
the asylums by the Inspectors of Lunacy and their membership of the asylum boards. 
Importantly, psychiatry‘s involvement in the asylum, its role in detention and the monopoly 
over the legitimate treatment of insanity formed the foundation of psychiatric control over 
various forms of behaviour. It was now psychiatry that determined who was insane, what was 
normal or not, and who could be subject to detention, and thus, their power extended far 
beyond the asylum. Consequently, these developments resulted in the birth of medicalism 
whereby psychiatry was provided with complete control over the treatment and care of the 
insane in Ireland.   
2.06 The Law & the Insane  
As stated in the introduction, legal provisions concerning detention admission processes 
provide good indications as to the existence of medicalism or legalism. Therefore, it is 
necessary to examine these in order to get an understanding of the development of 
medicalism or legalism during this period. During the early stages of asylum building 
medical opinion was not yet indispensable. Accordingly, admission to the first public asylum, 
the Richmond Asylum, was based on a certificate of insanity signed by a clergyman, a 
magistrate (judge) or a physician.
133
 It is no coincidence that members of the three traditional 
professions of religion, law and medicine were provided with this authority, for these bodies 
had a significant power and prestige in society as a result of their professional status.
134
 
Although the purpose of the legislation was not to control medical discretion, it could be said 
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that these provisions represented an early form of legalism in that they were designed to 
prevent arbitrary detention.  
Subsequently, the legislation which provided for the first round of asylum building, the 
Lunacy (Ireland) Act 1821, established a detention procedure which corresponded with the 
emerging ideals of the asylum system.
135
 The rhetoric of the asylum system was care rather 
than punishment, therefore it was no longer a magistrate or clergyman who determined the 
suitability of detention, and in line with medicalism, this now came within the sole remit of 
the physician. Applications for admission to the district asylums needed to be accompanied 
by a medical certificate of insanity and a statement from next of kin confirming poverty. The 
person seeking admission of a friend or relative also had to provide an undertaking to take 
back this person when requested to do so by the asylum board.
136
 The requirement for 
medical certification could be seen as peculiar given that, at the time, the manner of care 
established in the asylums was moral treatment, which was administered by lay men. As 
stated, entry into the asylum had previously been decided by one of three professionals; 
magistrates, clergymen or physicians. However, the new purpose of the asylum was care and 
treatment.  Physicians had traditionally been involved in the care and treatment of people in 
general and therefore, out of these three professionals, physicians were now the most 
appropriate people for the job. In 1843, this medicalism was further developed whereby the 
Asylums Rules provided that, in an emergency, the physician could detain on his own 
authority without the approval of the asylum board.
137
 
Specific legislation governing detention in private asylums was also enacted. In 1844 there 
were approximately 14 private asylums detaining 299 people, approximately 12% of the total 
population of the insane in public and private asylums.
138
 For these, the Private Asylums Act 
1842 provided that all admissions should be at the instance of an order made by a relative or 
friend. The detention required certification from two physicians who had separately examined 
the proposed lunatic and who were independent from the asylum and its proprietors. The 
private asylums also required licences, whereas charitable and public asylums did not. In 
addition they were subject to inspections every six months by the two Inspectors of Lunacy 
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as opposed to the annual inspection of public asylums. Where the asylum was not run by a 
physician, it was required that one visit fortnightly.
139
 These enhanced protective 
requirements had their origins in English agitation over private asylums, of which there were 
many.
140
  The distinction between the admission and detention of private and pauper lunatics 
also highlights the histories of the two classes. Public asylums were seen by the government 
as paternalistic institutions erected for the care of the insane poor. As no direct financial 
advantage would issue to the asylum governors in the committal of a poor person, one 
medical certificate was a sufficient safeguard to ensure correct admission. Alternatively, 
private asylums were places of profit where wealthy people might be detained to the 
pecuniary advantage of the asylum owner. As there was a higher risk of unwarranted 
detention, heightened safeguards were needed and two medical certificates were deemed 
necessary to protect against abuse. Thus, for the rich, whose rights required more protection 
we see the beginnings of legalism, albeit, in a form that relied on medical discretion and 
control.  
Although the thesis is primarily concerned with civil detention procedures, it is necessary to 
consider the Criminal Lunatics (Ireland) Act 1838, as through its abuse it became the primary 
manner by which persons entered the asylum in Ireland during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. The 1838 Act was enacted to provide for the detention of ‗criminal lunatics‘ and 
sought to make ‗provision for the better prevention of crime being committed by persons 
insane‘. However, there was no requirement for the person to have committed a crime; they 
just had to be presumed to be dangerous.  Given that the 1838 Act concerned the detention of 
criminal lunatics, two magistrates were responsible for ordering the detention and could call 
to their assistance any physician to certify the person as a dangerous lunatic or idiot. The 
criminal lunatic would be committed to a prison where they would remain until they were 
discharged by an order of two magistrates (including one who had signed the committal 
warrant) or until they were transferred to an asylum by order of the Lord Lieutenant.
141
 
Although there was the option of using medical evidence to inform their decision, the 
magistrates were free not to do so and could make the committal on their own judgement or 
‗from other proof‘. This other proof could be an unsworn statement from the person seeking 
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the committal.
142
 While it is difficult to attribute to the 1838 Act a definitive legalism label, a 
conjectural explanation is that, as it was criminality that was at issue, it was adjudged that 
expertise in this area lay with magistrates rather than physicians. Therefore, there was no role 
for medical discretion and there was some need to protect the rights of those accused.  
In reality, the extent to which this legalism resulted in the protection of those accused was 
negligible and the 1838 Act was subject to wide abuse. The 1838 Act was used in inventive 
ways to have persons detained in asylums by those involved in its operation, including 
families, physicians and the magistrates.
143
 There was great laxity in its administration by 
magistrates; where medical advice was sought it was often unquestioned, and the use of 
unreliable and unsworn evidence was common. This form of admission became the most 
popular mode of detention in Ireland during the nineteenth century.
144
 From the beginning it 
was much easier to have a person detained under the 1838 Act, as unlike an ordinary 
admission to a district asylum, there was no requirement of proof of poverty. Also, the usual 
form of admission to an asylum required a responsible person to take back the lunatic when 
called on to do so by the asylum board. Admission under the 1838 Act avoided this. As the 
person was now a ‗criminal lunatic‘ the judicial procedure encompassed a government 
responsibility for his care and the protection of society.
145
 There was also no definition of 
insanity and this provided the possibility for detention on a wide range of grounds. In this 
manner there were many cases where admissions to asylums were not on the basis of insanity 
but rather the wish to remove persons from the community for other, less benign, reasons.
146
  
During its thirty years in existence the Criminal Lunatics Act 1838 created a series of crises 
for both the asylum system and the prisons to which ‗dangerous lunatics‘ were detained until 
they were transferred to an asylum.
147
 This state of affairs led to an amendment in the law in 
1845 that provided that a person could not be detained as a ‗dangerous lunatic‘ without 
evidence on oath of one or more credible witnesses given before the committing 
magistrates.
148
 This new provision and other efforts made by the Inspectors of Lunacy, such 
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as the compiling of a registry of criminal and dangerous lunatics somewhat reduced the 
numbers in prisons, nevertheless, these efforts to exert control over judicial behaviour were 
not enough to resolve the many problems that had been created, in particular, acute 
overcrowding.  The 1838 Act was not repealed until 1867. Various reasons are proffered for 
this delay, the most important being that there was already serious overcrowding of the 
asylums too. The first ten district asylums had been intended to accommodate 1,220 people 
but by 1843 they housed 2,028 people and this number continued to grow.
149
 When new 
asylums were built they quickly became overcrowded and the response remained the same; 
build more or add extensions.
150
 If the law were to change and require the detention of 
dangerous lunatics in asylums as opposed to prisons, there would be an unmanageable 
pressure placed on the system.
151
 
In 1867 the Lunacy (Ireland) Act was enacted and provided that dangerous lunatics could 
only be committed to an asylum. Admission was now based on the order of two magistrates 
with a compulsory certificate of dangerousness from a physician. Discharge was secured on 
the certificate of the medical superintendent or visiting physician.
152
 In line with medicalism, 
medical certification was no longer dispensable. At the hands of the magistrates a crisis had 
evolved, medical input was therefore required to ensure only those who were actually 
dangerously insane were detained. Despite the intentions, however, the change in law had 
little effect. By 1890 the Dangerous Lunatics Act 1867 was behind three out of four male 
admissions and almost seven out of ten female admissions. In this manner it had remained, 
and continued until after the end of the Union in 1921 to remain, the primary mode of 
entering the public asylum. The Inspectors of Lunacy, the asylum boards and the asylum 
physicians were critical of this approach claiming that it negatively affected the individual 
and their family and friends by labelling them as a criminal.
153
Through the use of the 
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Criminal Lunatic Acts 1838-1867, insanity became intimately linked with criminality.
154
 This 
contrasts with the situation in England where insanity was linked with poverty.
155
  
2.07 Explaining Asylum Expansion 
In late nineteenth-century, the Lunacy Inspectorate undertook an examination of insanity in 
Ireland. Numbers in the asylums had significantly increased from the inception of the first 
asylum and this was causing a significant financial burden on the public purse. The Lunacy 
Inspectorate assumed that an increase in the asylum population reflected an increase in 
insanity. Reasons cited for the increase in the incidence of insanity in Reports of the 
Inspectorate and leading psychiatrists at the time included heredity, alcohol, intermarriage, 
the drinking of tea of an inferior quality, and the dietary change (among the peasantry) from 
porridge to bread and tea.
156
 By today‘s standards such explanations are questionable.  
Since Foucault‘s Folie et Déraison opened the door for the interpretation of insanity as a 
socio-political rather than biological phenomenon, most social historians have attributed 
asylums‘ growth to social, rather than biological factors.157 The impact of industrialisation 
and capitalism on asylum utilisation has been observed by Foucault in France and Scull and 
Porter in England.
158
 For them, asylums were an exhibition of a modernising culture; a 
resource developed by a society who now had the economic power to strive towards an ideal 
of civilisation that required the control of the insane.
159
 In turn, the professional staff and 
growing admissions helped to legitimise the nineteenth-century asylum, thus lowering the 
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threshold for deviant behaviour that families were willing to tolerate.
160
 Significantly, 
however, these theories are not easily applied to the Irish situation. The application of these 
theories would suggest that Ireland‘s asylum expansion is attributable to the industrialisation 
and capitalisation of Irish society. However, as highlighted, Ireland‘s experience of 
industrialisation and capitalism was limited, yet Ireland had the highest asylum usage in the 
world. Furthermore, non-industrialised regions, particularly along the west coast of Ireland, 
had the highest rate of detention in asylums.
161
  
In Ireland the rise in asylum numbers instead is attributed to a host of economic, social and 
political factors. During the nineteenth century the economic situation in Ireland faced 
deepening crisis. It was against this background that the Poor Law Act 1838 was enacted. 
The Poor Law emphasised control and maintenance of order, and also reinforced the 
distinction between ‗deserving‘ and ‗undeserving poor‘.162 From the beginning there were 
serious problems with imposing a British model of poor relief in Ireland. Firstly, the scale of 
destitution in Ireland was far greater than that in Britain and there was very little difference 
between ratepayers and the destitute. Therefore, the workhouse could not act as a deterrent in 
the way that it might in Britain‘s industrialised, wage-labour economy.163 Moreover, the 
workhouse was the only provision made for the poor as opposed to other provisions in 
Britain.
164
 The differences between the British and the Irish Poor Laws were deliberate. There 
was reluctance to provide anything for the poor in Ireland in general but the alternative of 
continued dependence on repression would most certainly have led to insurrection. 
Accordingly, these restrictions were imposed on what was believed to be a work shy and 
rebellious nation.
165
 The harsh conditions of the workhouse were designed to deter persons 
and entry into it was seen as a disgrace and a sign of family failure.
166
 Despite the 
introduction of the Poor Law, economic conditions remained weak and the Great Famine of 
1845-50 is often seen as the culmination of a classic crisis of subsistence; a rising population 
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pressing against the ceiling of limited resources. The Famine caused an unmanageable 
reliance on the workhouses in the absence of any other measures taken by the government.
167
 
The workhouses which had come to be occupied by the starving and diseased were given a 
new role and a stigma that had not been anticipated. During the Famine, in particular, there 
was a rapid increase in overall asylum figures, but also the numbers of insane in the 
workhouses. The asylums, however, stood in contrast to the feared workhouse and were often 
seen as necessary, charitable institutions and were likely to have been used as an alternative 
way to secure food.
168
  
Alternatively, the asylums may have been used to get rid of unwanted family members for 
other reasons. It was in this manner that the Criminal Lunatics Acts 1838-1867 had come to 
be significantly abused as seen above.
169
 Workhouse masters also took advantage of the 1838 
Act. As asylums could not refuse to accept any person admitted under the 1838 Act, many 
workhouse masters would have persons detained thereunder and transferred to an asylum. 
Many of these persons could have indeed been troublesome, yet perhaps did not suffer from 
insanity of the degree which required detention in an asylum.
170
 The transferral of persons 
from the workhouses to the asylums was a particular issue for the Inspectors of Lunatic 
Asylums. Legislation was passed towards the end of the nineteenth century aimed at reducing 
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the numbers in the asylums by transferring them to workhouses or by allowing the Asylum 
Committees establish auxiliary asylums in unused workhouses or other suitable buildings for 
the reception of chronic lunatics, who were not dangerous and did not require specialised care 
and treatment.
171
  
In this manner during the nineteenth century a complicated relationship had developed 
between the asylum, the workhouse and the prison. While there is little doubt that these three 
institutions would always have had a close relationship due to their role in social control, the 
Dangerous Lunatics Act of 1838 determined this course.
172
 The lack of alternatives to the 
asylum and the lack of cure for those detained meant that numbers in the asylums continued 
to increase.
173
 However, instead of developing new approaches to improve the current system 
or tackle the root problems, the approach was merely to build auxiliary asylums for chronic 
incurable lunatics or transfer them to vacated workhouses or other suitable buildings.
174
 
There is little doubt that there was a mutually re-enforcing pattern of asylum building and 
detention where the sudden availability of asylum beds led to increased rates of presentation 
by the insane who had previously lived with families, in workhouses or were homeless.
175
 
The vastness of the asylum system must not be underestimated and in some parts of the 
country it would have been hard to reduce both politically and economically. This was 
especially true in rural Ireland where the asylums were one of the largest employers and the 
largest consumers of locally produced goods.
176
 At the same time there was scant support for 
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their further financing. The full burden of the first manifestations of a welfare state, the 
introduction of the Poor Law in 1838 and the realisation that those needing care in the asylum 
system well exceeded that originally envisaged, was felt by those who had to foot the bill, the 
ratepayers. The Irish population had almost halved between 1841 and 1911, from 
approximately eight to four million, however, the number detained in asylums during this 
time increased from approximately 3,000 to 24,655.
177
 Consequently, in 1870 £166,000 was 
required for the maintenance of the district asylums and this increased to £602,000 in 1914, 
more than half the amount spent on poor relief in that year. Given the huge growth in the 
expense of the asylums, it is of little surprise that the fiscal burden constituted the central 
political question of asylum management during the latter half of the nineteenth century.
178
 
The fact that there were no reformers advocating a change in the asylum system must be 
attributed in large part to the office whose main responsibility was the control of the asylum 
system, the Lunacy Inspectorate. From the 1870s onwards the Lunacy Inspectorate had 
demonstrated an inability or a want to pursue anything more than routine administrative 
functions and little change was shown in asylum policy.
179
 To add to the lack of innovative 
personnel in the Inspectorate, the office was plagued with conflicts of interest. The Inspectors 
were members of the board of control, the body whose duty was the planning and 
construction of district asylums. Furthermore, they had been made ex officio members of all 
asylum boards from 1853 to 1861. Therefore, any criticism of the asylum system, the 
buildings and the conditions of those confined in them, could ultimately be attributed to their 
failure as an efficient and competent inspectorial administration. Moreover, the Inspectors 
Nugent and Hatchell (whom succeeded White) and indeed all Inspectors between 1845 and 
1921 themselves had personal conflicts of interest. Both were medical men. Nugent was a 
member of the Medico-Psychological Association. His alliances were thus very much on the 
side of the psychiatric profession. Even more, Hatchell was father to two of the twenty two 
district asylum medical superintendents in the later 1880s. The fact that the Inspectors were 
involved in all facets of the running of the asylum and had personal affiliations and alliances 
with those in charge of them meant that the possibilities of impartial inquiry into the 
conditions of asylums generally and into cases of ill-treatment more specifically were limited. 
This situation led to cover-ups and excuses in addition to disputes between inspectors and 
boards of governors, between governors and superintendents and even between inspectors 
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and superintendents.
180
 It also ensured the continued adherence to medicalism in the 
operation of the asylum system but at this point its continuation was under threat. 
2.08 Psychiatry’s ‘Second Revolution’ & the Medicalisation of Insanity 
Despite the asylums‘ therapeutic ideals, little therapy was provided in the significantly 
overcrowded institutions. The moral treatment that had flourished at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century had declined rapidly. Although no definitive explanation can be provided 
for this, it can be assumed that the tendency to build very large asylums during the century 
made it impossible for the medical superintendent to keep in touch with those detained and 
necessitated their being left, to a large extent alone, in overcrowded asylums. There is little 
doubt that moral treatment was replaced by isolation and restraint. In detention these people 
did not impose upon the public conscience and their safe custody was seen to be necessary to 
prevent harm occurring to themselves or others. This was accepted by the public for the 
various reasons explained above. 
While the primacy of psychiatry in caring for the insane had been firmly established this had 
been achieved without any real tangible success in curing the insane. By the twentieth 
century the expense of the asylums and the lack of success in curing the insane meant that 
psychiatry was facing a crisis of legitimacy. The First World War had also resulted in a 
serious questioning of the dominant bio-determinist model of psychiatry. This was built on 
the assumption that insanity was hereditary, the result of an impaired gene pool. Eugenics had 
emerged out of these assumptions and eugenic policies of sterilisation and separation
181
 were 
openly advocated in Britain
182
 and Ireland.
183
 During the War, those fighting began to break 
down with ‗shellshock‘. Significantly, the officers were breaking down at a higher rate than 
the lower ranks. These officers and soldiers could not be construed as being genetically 
inferior and so this posed a crisis for the hereditarianism construct of insanity.
184
 Around this 
time Freud established a new diagnosis of ‗neurosis‘ the symptoms of which included stress, 
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depression, anxiety, obsessive behaviour and hypochondria. Freud‘s claim that neurosis was 
the manifestation of an individual‘s internal struggles, not the product of a physical condition, 
transformed the conception of insanity from an organic and physical theory to a 
psychological and sociological one.
185
 It therefore expanded the understanding of insanity by 
including various forms of deviant behaviour and emotional problems. Psychotherapy, or 
talking therapy, was used to treat neurosis. On the back of this, new specialties were 
developed, including clinical and educational psychology, psychoanalysis, criminology and 
social work which emerged in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
186
 Some of these 
were relatively autonomous and, at least temporarily, contested psychiatry‘s dominance 
during this period.
187
However, unlike psychiatry, these other specialities lacked independent 
control of the institutions within which they worked and remained resigned to bureaucratic 
subordination.
188
  
Psychiatry remained resilient and as seen with its response to moral treatment it owed its 
existence to the ability to absorb foreign practices. This continued to be the formulation for 
success in the twentieth century. Though psychoanalysis and psychotherapy was in many 
ways incompatible with the rest of psychiatry, it nevertheless provided the profession with an 
approach to the neuroses and the resulting alliance proved so successful that it was termed 
psychiatry‘s second revolution.189 In addition, psychiatry was enabled to extend its practice 
beyond the asylum population that formed its conventional jurisdiction, to other sites of 
intervention such as the psychiatric casualties of war,
190
 the management of childhood
191
 and 
alcoholism,
192
 to name but a few. In this manner Freud had supplied a new optimism in the 
treatment of insanity at a time where this was desperately required for the profession‘s 
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legitimacy, and ensured their continued dominance in the asylum system into the twentieth 
century.
193
 
Up to this point, Irish psychiatry had developed outside the realm of general medicine in 
Ireland.
194
 Several psychiatrists began to recognise the need for and urged a closer link with 
general hospitals and public health services. In 1921 a conference of the Irish district 
asylums, attended by members of the psychiatric profession from around the country, was 
held and several recommendations were made that forged a closer relationship with the 
general health services. In furtherance of the professionalisation of psychiatry it was 
recommended that an Irish Medico-Psychological Association be set up as an examining 
body and that the Medico-Psychological Association of Great Britain and Ireland be so 
recognised. Notably, they recommended that it be a condition of employment for all persons 
entering the asylum service as attendants or nurses from June 1921 onwards to be only given 
probationary contracts as opposed to permanent contracts until they had obtained a 
recognised Medico-Psychological Association certificate of proficiency in mental nursing. 
Nurses naturally provided healthcare, whereas previously wardens were simply required to 
control and care for the insane. It was also recommended that the management committees 
should change the names of the institutions under their control from district lunatic asylums 
to district mental hospitals.
195
  
Accordingly, it can be claimed that this period witnessed the ―medicalisation‖ of insanity 
whereby insanity came to be defined in medical terms, medical language was used to 
describe it, a medical framework was adopted to understand it and medical interventions were 
used to ―treat‖ it.196 In the past, deviant behaviour in the form of insanity was defined in 
religious and criminal terms as immoral, sinful or illegitimate. With the growth of the asylum 
and the instatement of psychiatry this deviant behaviour became more and more subject to 
medicalisation and treated as a health problem. This was despite the fact that very few mental 
disorders had a proven biological cause or cure. Based on this medicalisation the domain of 
psychiatry began to expand and while new treatments such as psychotherapy were embraced, 
the fixed centre of psychiatry remained the physiological approach which linked the 
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profession most visibly to the rest of medicine. Without this link the profession‘s power 
would be hugely reduced as the link provided the essential lifeline of respectability and trust.  
2.09 Conclusion 
The development of an asylum system and powers of detention that enshrined medicalism 
and legalism were the result of a series of historically specific and closely connected changes 
in Irish society‘s political, economic and social structure and correlative transitions in the 
intellectual and cultural perspectives of its population. The early nineteenth century saw the 
creation of the specific policy of segregation and detention for the management of the insane 
and as such the asylum came to be an indispensable social institution. The psychiatric 
profession played an essential role in the asylum‘s legitimation and by 1921 the asylum 
system had transitioned from lay operation, treatment and inspection to the complete medical 
operation, treatment and inspection which coincided with the professionalisation of 
psychiatry and the medicalisation of insanity.  
Although the civil aspects of detention were consistent with medicalism, the primary manner 
of detention under the Criminal Lunatics Acts 1838-1867 was not. By 1921 there was 
growing dissatisfaction with the role of the magistrates in the detention of the insane as they 
were seen as a contributing factor to the vast over-crowding of the asylum system. 
Furthermore, as a result of the burgeoning medicalisation of insanity, their role was 
increasingly being seen as inappropriate. This was the predominant influence on the re-
orientation of powers of detention in the twentieth century and provides an understanding as 
to the specific type and form of medicalism that developed in Ireland which became so 
embedded in the treatment and detention of the mentally ill. Despite the varying influence of 
medicalism and legalism, what this period had established was a policy of segregation and 
detention that has remained a constant since then. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INFLUENCE OF MEDICALISM IN 
THE MENTAL TREATMENT ACT 1945 
 
3.01 Introduction 
This chapter examines the advancement of medicalism in mental health detention from the 
early twentieth century up to 2001 when new legislation concerning mental health detention 
was enacted. In a similar manner to the previous chapter, it is necessary to examine the 
approach to mental health detention in the twentieth century to better understand and explain 
the rationale behind current legal powers of detention. The end result of a series of specific 
and closely connected changes in Irish society‘s political, economic and social structure and 
correlative shifts in the perspectives of its population was that insanity was considered an 
illness by the early twentieth century. Moreover, psychiatry had emerged as the authoritative 
profession in the treatment of this illness. This new motivation dominated the detention of the 
‗mentally ill‘ in Ireland during the twentieth century, conspicuously evidenced by the change 
in terms used; mental illness as opposed to insanity and mental hospital as opposed to 
asylum.  
The primary focus of the chapter is the enactment of the 1945 that provided psychiatry with 
complete control in the detention of the mentally ill. The 1945 Act governed the legal powers 
of detention for over 50 years. Utilising socio-legal theory, this chapter examines the 
influence of medicalism and legalism on the legal powers of detention provided in the 1945 
Act, their operation by doctors and their interpretation by the Courts throughout this period. 
In doing so the chapter examines the anti-psychiatry, de-institutionalisation and human rights 
movements and the impact they had on the legal powers to detain at an international level and 
in Ireland. 
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3.02 Mental Health Policy in Independent Ireland 
In the opening decades of the twentieth century government intervention and welfare 
provision were becoming increasingly accepted in Ireland.
197
 Areas of the public and private 
sphere that previously went unregulated were transformed by new legislation covering topics 
such as welfare, children, health, housing, education, land, agriculture and services.
198
 In 
1922, the Irish Free State came into being and reflective of the new government‘s desire to 
bestow rights upon its citizens the first Irish Constitution was enacted. The 1922 Constitution 
provided for the protection of certain fundamental rights, including the right to liberty, and 
vested the courts with the express power to invalidate legislation adjudged to infringe such 
rights.
199
 There was also a desire to increase the welfare provisions in the Free State which 
resonated with wider international trends in the development of welfare systems.
200
 However, 
the Irish civil war accompanied the establishment of the Free State from 1922 to 1923 and in 
its aftermath the reconstruction of Ireland‘s economy and civil society was the primary aim. 
This was a difficult task owing to the effects of a sustained conflict, recession and a 
subsequent trade war with Britain between 1932 and 1938. Thus, despite the promising signs 
for the development of social policy at the turn of the century, the early decades were marked 
by a conservative and cautious approach to welfare expenditure.
201
 
Nonetheless, some advances were made during this period which affected mental health 
policy. The Department of Local Government and Health was created in 1925 with 
responsibility for the asylum system. The same year the Local Government Act renamed 
asylums as mental hospitals, as had been advocated at the 1921 Irish district asylums 
conference. The asylum system continued to pose a significant issue for the government in 
terms of its huge population and correlative cost; in 1925 there were 19,562 people in 
detention.
202
 As a result between 1906 and 1925 four Commissions were established which 
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dealt, to a greater or lesser extent, with issues relating to the provision for the mentally ill in 
Ireland.
203
The Report of the Commission on the Sick and Destitute Poor including the Insane 
Poor 1927 highlighted the serious problems of overcrowding and the lack of treatment in the 
asylums.
204
 It recommended significant changes to the system of care for the insane in Ireland 
including the establishment of a system of auxiliary mental hospitals in old workhouses, the 
development of outpatient clinics and the introduction of a voluntary admission status. 
While other advances in the health sector were made during the 1930s, including the 
development of a network of hospitals throughout Ireland, the response to mental illness 
remained stagnant.
205
 It is likely that reform of the asylum could not be contemplated until an 
adequate health system was established in Ireland.  By the 1940s, there was the belief that 
implementation of the recommendations made by the 1927 Commission combined with 
psychiatry‘s early treatment of mental illness would decrease the mental hospitals‘ population 
as greater numbers would be cured through the use of psychiatric treatment. Accordingly, 
new legislation was required to give effect to this.  
3.03 The Influence of Medicalism on the Mental Treatment Act 1945 
The professionalisation of psychiatry and the medicalisation of insanity that were discussed 
in the previous chapter played a pivotal role in the twentieth century when new mental health 
legislation was considered. Based on developments in the nineteenth century, psychiatry had 
come to be seen as an esteemed body in society, respected by the general population and 
other professions. While the operation and inspection of the asylums was dominated by 
medicalism, the legal powers of detention were not. The subsequent analysis of the 1945 Act 
examines how the creation, operation and interpretation of the 1945 Act by the legislature, 
psychiatry and the judiciary came to be dominated by medicalism. The importance of the 
1945 Act is not to be underestimated. Indeed, as Unsworth and Fennell have established ―law 
actually constitutes the mental health system, in the sense that it authoritatively constructs, 
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empowers, and regulates the relationships between the agents who perform mental health 
functions.‖206 
a. Influence of Medicalism in the General Provisions of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 
This section considers the influence of medicalism in the general provisions of the 1945 Act 
including its aim and purpose, the establishment of medical exclusivity and authority, the 
definition of mental illness, the creation of voluntary admission and outpatient treatment and 
the provision of medical immunity from litigation.  
i. The Aim & Purpose of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 
The drafting of the 1945 Act had been instigated and executed by a doctor who was the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Health at the time. In addition to his personal 
examination of the issues presented by mental illness, there was reliance on information 
provided by psychiatrists engaged in the administration of mental health services.
207
 Debates 
on the Mental Treatment Bill saw politicians display deference to the psychiatric profession. 
In introducing the Bill, the Parliamentary Secretary made it clear that complete confidence 
was to be entrusted in the psychiatric profession in the deliverance of their duties under it. 
Significantly, there was virtually no opposition to the Bill and where there were any 
criticisms of it, it was intimated that, as laymen, the politicians concerned could not 
understand the specifics. Similarly, other politicians were of the belief that the Bill would be 
better discussed by ―medical experts‖ as it dealt primarily with medical matters.208  
The purpose of the 1945 Act was unashamedly the treatment of the mentally ill. It was 
claimed by the legislature that the overall aim of the 1945 Act was to remove the stigma 
associated with lunacy and the asylums and treat mental illness as the disease that it was. This 
stigma was believed to be a barrier to the early treatment and cure of mental illness; it meant 
that persons delayed seeking treatment for themselves or their family members until it was 
too late to effect any cure. The detention of persons under the Criminal Lunatics Acts 1838-
1867 had created a specific stigma whereby detention in mental hospitals had come to be 
associated with the negative connotations of criminality. The influence of medicalism is seen 
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by removing the powers of detention from the magistrates; the 1945 Act sought to ―totally 
depart from this procedure and to deal with persons suffering from mental derangement as 
patients who are mentally ill and who should be arranged for and treated by medical 
practitioners‖.209 The political espousal of medicalism also aimed to secure public acceptance 
of the shift from insanity to mental illness which would allow for early treatment and cure. 
The 1945 Act completely changed the discourse and insanity was now to be understood as a 
medical disease that could be treated and cured. It was believed that this would prevent the 
over accumulation of non-curable cases in the mental hospitals and consequently there would 
be a reduction in State expenditure on the provision of services. Throughout the resulting 
provisions of the 1945 Act the acceptance of medicalism is evident. 
ii. Medical Exclusivity & Authority  
Resident Medical Superintendent 
The 1945 Act determined that a doctor, known as the resident medical superintendent, was to 
be in charge of and resident in each district mental hospital.
210
 The administration of mental 
hospitals was separate from that of general hospitals until the 1960s and essentially the 
medical superintendent worked with little supervision from any higher authority.
211
  
Inspector of Mental Hospitals 
As before, to ensure standards were upheld in the mental hospitals, the 1945 Act provided for 
the post of Inspector of Mental Hospitals who was required to be a doctor.
212
 The powers and 
duties of the Inspector were vast. The Inspector was required to inspect each mental hospital 
and every part of it at least once a year, but also, whenever they saw fit. Furthermore, he/she 
was required to assess the mental and bodily condition of all the residents, the facilities, the 
propriety of the detentions and the discharges. Special attention had to be paid to the situation 
of any detained person where the propriety of their detention was in doubt and the Inspector 
was required to inform the Minister of Health if he/she thought the detention required further 
consideration. The Minister could then order the Inspector to conduct another examination of 
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the patient, and having considered this, the Minister could discharge the patient if he/she 
thought this was proper. Where the institution was not run by a mental hospital authority, the 
Inspector and the resident medical superintendent of the nearest mental hospital would be 
required to examine the patient and the Minister would consider their report and discharge the 
patient if he/she thought this was proper. The Inspector was also required to make an annual 
report on each mental institution.
213
 In line with medicalism, these measures provided for 
psychiatric exclusivity and prevented any non- medical oversight in the care and treatment of 
the mentally ill detained in mental hospitals. 
iii. Defining Mental Illness 
Demonstrative of the open-textured law espoused by medicalism, notably, the 1945 Act did 
not contain a definition of ‗mental illness‘. Given the trust placed in psychiatry it was seen as 
unnecessary to circumscribe those who could be detained. Consequently, the range of persons 
who could be detained under the 1945 Act was unlimited by the legislature as the definition 
of mental illness became a subjective determination by medical professionals on a case by 
case basis. Indicative of psychiatry‘s role in the maintenance of social order, a wide range of 
persons could be subject to detention, including alcoholics and addicts.
214
 Significantly, a 
person believed to be of unsound mind that was not under proper care or control or was 
neglected or cruelly treated by any relative or other person having the care or charge of him 
could also be detained in a mental hospital.
215
  
iv. Voluntary Admission & Outpatient Treatment 
The 1945 Act supplied psychiatry with a previously absent legitimacy by providing for 
treatment on a voluntary basis.
216
 Previously, a patient had to be detained in a mental hospital 
before he/she could receive treatment. This formality and certification was believed to have 
acted as a deterrent to persons who could avail themselves of treatment at the early stages of 
illness. Early treatment was believed to be essential to reducing the numbers resident in the 
mental hospitals who required prolonged or permanent treatment, as was the ―considered 
opinion of specialists engaged in the treatment of mental disease.‖217 Therefore, to allow 
easier access to treatment it was essential to remove all the formalities such as certification 
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and formal detention which were likely to deter or discourage patients from seeking treatment 
of their own accord.  
Other provisions of the 1945 Act advanced the idea of ‗outpatient treatment‘ and provided for 
the establishment of consulting rooms and clinics. Here, patients could seek medical advice 
and treatment without being formally admitted to a mental hospital.
218
 Another form of 
outpatient treatment and detention that was included in the 1945 Act was ‗boarding out‘. This 
would allow mental hospital authorities to board out patients in private dwellings.
219
 The 
rationale for this was that there were large numbers of patients who did not need to be 
detained in institutions are they were not dangerous. A mental hospital authority could 
appoint a committee to visit patients boarded-out and to report on their condition and that of 
their dwellings.
220
  
Most of these provisions had been advocated by prominent Irish psychiatrists and the 
Commission on the Relief of the Sick and the Destitute Poor, including the Insane Poor 1927 
for some time.
221
 For example, Dr Connolly Norman of Grangegorman Mental Hospital 
Dublin, had repeatedly promoted the idea of ‗boarding out‘ for patients with mental illness.222 
In addition the need for voluntary admission status had been highlighted as urgently required 
by many different bodies including the Commission and psychiatrists alike.
223
 Medicalism 
was again reflected in these new approaches as it was believed that easier access to and less 
formality in receiving medical treatment would result in more cures and less burden on the 
State. Importantly, psychiatry retained ultimate control in the treatment of mental illness 
despite the change in detention status or location of those being treated.  These provisions 
significantly extended psychiatry‘s control by broadening its subjects of treatment. Psychiatry 
was no longer restricted to treating people in mental hospitals, now they could treat persons 
on an out-patient basis and voluntarily. The provisions also further aligned psychiatry with 
medicine through the use of ‗consulting rooms‘ and ‗outpatient clinics‘, sites and terms that 
are medical in nature.  
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v. Medical Immunity from Litigation 
Importantly, the 1945 Act went further than providing doctors with maximum discretion in 
the detention process but it also protected them from litigation arising from their conduct 
under the 1945 Act. Where a person wished to take civil proceedings against anybody 
involved in the operation of the 1945 Act, for example a doctor who carried out the 
examination, the person had to get permission from the High Court to do so. In granting this 
permission the High Court had to be satisifed that there were substantial grounds for 
contending that the person against whom the proceedings were to be brought acted in bad 
faith or without reasonable care.
224
 The provision was worded in an expansive manner and 
covered all acts in respect of involuntary and voluntary patients. It was believed by those 
involved in the drafting of the 1945 Act, that due to the nature of the work carried out by the 
medical profession- detention of the mentally ill- they needed special protection from 
unfounded claims of unwarranted detention and similar issues to enable them to carry out 
their duties effectively.
225
 The aim of the provision was to discourage ―vexatious or frivolous 
action or one based on imaginary complaints‖.226 Nevertheless, it ensured that medical 
involvement in the detention process was protected not only from unfounded claims but 
possibly from well-founded claims also. This provision truly provided doctors with maximum 
discretion and authority as there was little chance of being held legally negligent for acts 
committed under the 1945 Act. 
b. Influence of Medicalism in the Detention Specific Provisions of the Mental Treatment 
Act 1945 
This section considers the influence of medicalism in the detention specific provisions of the 
1945 Act including the detention process and the provisions established to prevent arbitrary 
detention. 
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i. The Detention Process 
Under the 1945 Act detained patients were divided into two categories: temporary patients 
and permanent patients. Temporary patients were diagnosed as ―suffering from a mental 
illness‖ that was curable, permanent patients were diagnosed as ―persons of unsound mind‖ 
whose condition was thought to be incurable.
227
 In both cases applications for detention were 
normally made by a spouse or relative who had to be over 21 years of age, aside from this, 
different detention procedures applied to each category and were also dependent on whether 
the patient was public or private.
228
 However, applications could also be made an authorised 
officer, a police officer or any other person over the age of 21. Where the application was not 
made by a spouse or relative, or a person authorised on their behalf, it had to include a 
statement of the reasons why it was not made by the spouse or relative, of the connection of 
the applicant with the proposed patient, and of the circumstances in which the application 
was made.
229
  
Temporary Detention 
Applications for the temporary detention of a relative would be made to the person in charge 
of the hospital. In the public mental hospitals this was always a psychiatrist-the resident 
medical superintendent. This application had to be accompanied by a medical 
recommendation from a doctor to the effect that, following their examination on a date not 
earlier than seven days, in his/her opinion the person was suffering from a mental illness 
requiring not more than six months treatment for recovery.
230
 Temporary detention was for a 
specified period of time; six months, which could be extended by a maximum of eighteen 
months. An application for the extension of the temporary detention of both private and 
public patients had to be made to the Minister of Health after each six month period.
231
  
Permanent Detention 
Alternatively an application could be made by the same persons to any doctor (usually a GP) 
to have the person detained as a ‗person of unsound mind‘, unlikely to recover within six 
months. The applicant must have seen the proposed patient within the previous fourteen days.  
The doctor had to then visit and examine the proposed patient within 24 hours and either 
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make a recommendation for detention or refuse to do so. Where the recommendation was 
made upon arrival at the mental hospital, the proposed patient would be examined by the 
medical superintendent.
232
 Detention as a person of unsound mind was of indefinite duration. 
This contrasts sharply with the detention of temporary patients whereby extensions of 
detention had to be approved by the Minister of Health.  
Private Patients 
For private patients, both temporary and permanent, given the fact that the hospital may not 
be run by a doctor, the application had to be accompanied by two medical 
recommendations.
233
The differing certification processes for private and public patients again 
attracted criticism on the grounds of class discrimination as public patients had less 
protection from arbitrary detention.
 234
 This provision was reflective of the belief that there 
was no benefit to gain from the detention of public patients. Alternatively, there was a belief 
that due to the financial benefit that could accrue to the owner of a private mental hospital, 
private patients required further protection from arbitrary detention. Consequently, the 
persons who could apply for private detention were restricted and could not include those 
who had any relationship with the person who owned or worked in the private mental 
hospital. No similar provisions existed for public detention.
235
  
Detention based on medical recommendation(s) was seen as the most appropriate way to 
determine if a person required detention and is obviously an enunciation of medicalism by 
providing minimum legal control and maximising medical discretion in the detention process. 
Despite the fact that the requirement for two medical examinations for private patients was an 
attempt to control medical discretion and prevent arbitrary detention, in reality there was no 
sacrifice of medical power or discretion, rather, it was re-distributed to other doctors. 
Therefore this protection was consistent with medicalism.  However, there are several reasons 
why the protective quality of the medical recommendation was diminished. Significantly, for 
temporary public patients there was only the requirement of one medical examination. A 
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number of detentions therefore would have been on the basis of one medical examination 
alone. There was also no definition of examination for the purposes of the 1945 Act. 
Therefore the type, duration and method of examination varied from case to case based on the 
subjective criteria applied by each doctor, an issue which was to come to the fore in the case 
law. Reluctance to provide a definition of examination was also reflective of medicalism and 
the minimum control of and maximisation of medical judgement. Similarly, there was no 
requirement for recourse to any judicial consideration of the case as required previously 
under the 1867 Act, now medical recommendation was sufficient in itself. Furthermore, any 
defects in a detention order could be remedied within twenty one days with the consent of the 
Minister for Health, an obvious rejection of legalism.
236
 
ii. Protections against Arbitrary Detention 
Several provisions were included in the 1945 Act to protect against arbitrary detention. The 
1945 Act stipulated that the doctors‘ recommendation for detention had to include a 
statement of the facts upon which the doctor had formed his/her opinion, distinguishing facts 
personally observed and facts communicated by others. This presumably was to ensure a 
person was not detained purely on the basis of second-hand information and is consistent 
with legalism in that it attempts to require the doctors to justify their decision to detain and 
ensure that they had observed the patient personally. If the doctor did not believe the 
proposed patient to be a person of unsound mind or suffering from a mental illness then they 
had to refuse to make the recommendation for detention.
237
 If, following the refusal to make a 
recommendation for detention another request was made for the examination of a person, 
then the person requesting the examination had to disclose the fact that a prior request had 
been made and why it was refused.
238
 Again, this resonates with legalism by attempting to 
prevent multiple applications to different doctors in cases where one refuses.  
Once a person was detained the medical superintendent possessed the power, at any time 
during the detention to grant conditional leave
239
 or discharge the patient completely.
240
 Any 
relative or friend could apply to the medical superintendent in a mental hospital to allow them 
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to take care of the patient.
241
 If the medical superintendent thought this proper he/she could 
discharge the patient, however, he/she reserved the right to refuse discharge if he/she 
considered the patient unfit thereto. Objections to this decision could be sent to the Minister, 
who could then order the Inspector of Mental Hospitals to examine whether the patient was 
fit to be discharged.
242
 The President of the High Court also had the power to order and 
authorise the Inspector to visit and examine any person detained as a person of unsound mind 
and report to them on the condition of such person.
243
  
Alternatively, any person could apply to the Minister for an examination of the detained 
patient. This examination had to be carried out by two independent physicians. If they both 
certified that the patient was fit for discharge, the Minister could direct an order to this 
effect.
244
 The only option the patient had to seek a review of their detention under the 1945 
Act was to send an unopened letter to the Inspector of Mental Hospitals or the Minister for 
Health (or whomever he/she wanted) concerning matters to do with their care, treatment or 
detention. The Inspector of Mental Hospitals also had a duty to examine every temporary 
patient received since their last visit and a duty to visit each mental hospital at least once a 
year.
245
 If the Inspector felt that a patient was fit for discharge he/she reported this to the 
Minister who could then take appropriate steps.
246
 The Inspector also had a general duty to 
see every patient who he/she had been requested to examine or whose detention was in 
doubt.
247
  
Therefore, once a person was detained, their detention and options to seek release were 
dominated by medicalism. The medical superintendent had maximum discretion in 
determining when a person should be released, but even where this judgement was 
challenged, it would be reviewed by other psychiatrists or physicians, further maximising 
medical discretion. Moreover, the detention of persons of unsound mind under the 1945 Act 
significantly restricted the rights of those detained; significantly, detention could be indefinite 
and was not subject to any automatic, personal or in-depth review. While the Inspector of 
Mental Hospitals was required to provide an annual review of all mental hospital patients, it 
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would not have been possible to provide a personal or detailed review of each patient‘s case. 
The only provisions provided under the 1945 Act for the patient to seek a review of their 
detention was to send an unopened letter to the Inspector of Mental Hospitals or the Minister 
for Health but this often did not happen as there was no obligation under the 1945 Act to 
inform the patient or anyone else that this right existed.
248
 The only right to information 
concerned extensions of temporary detention orders. Here, the patient or the applicant had to 
be told they could make an objection to the Inspector of Mental Hospitals and the Minister 
for Health. An investigation could then be carried out by the former and a recommendation 
would be made thereon.
249
  
c. Conclusion 
The provisions included in the 1945 Act bear analogy to the therapeutic rules described by 
Bean, the primary object of which is to help or treat the patient.
250
 In re-casting rules in this 
manner, particular features emerge, all of which were evident in the 1945 Act. Firstly, as 
highlighted, there was minimum control of and a maximisation of psychiatric judgement. 
There were also no secondary rules to inhibit professional decisions.  Therefore, psychiatrists 
could rely on whatever information they thought appropriate and there was no cross 
examination or rules of evidence. This allowed for wide variation in medical practice and 
legitimised the use of different styles of examination or interview. Furthermore, physicians 
were rarely questioned about the criteria they used to admit persons. Even where this was 
questioned they were provided with immunity from suit. Importantly, the usual legal rights of 
the citizen were absent. Thus, the right of access to the Courts was curtailed. There was no 
formal cautioning or provision of information regarding, for example, patient rights or even 
the length of stay. Where detention documentation was flawed this could be amended within 
21 days. In this way, cumulatively, the 1945 Act was an espousal of medicalism. 
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3.04 Influence of Medicalism in the Operation & Interpretation of the Mental 
Treatment Act 1945 
Despite the fact that medicalism was enshrined in the 1945 Act, the operation of the 1945 Act 
by doctors and others or the judicial interpretation and application of the 1945 Act could 
reduce the impact of this medicalism. This section necessarily considers these issues. 
a. Operation of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 from 1945 to 1980 
In the aftermath of the 1945 Act‘s enactment several issues came to be highlighted by those 
entrusted with its operation, and some of them were subsequently amended. 
i. Defining Mental Illness 
The 1945 Act had provided for the detention of a wide variety of persons and correlatively 
provided for the control a variety of social issues. There was some concern expressed in the 
psychiatric literature about detaining alcoholics and addicts.
251
 Treatment of the ‗underlying 
psychopathic state‘ was difficult and it was believed that the six months temporary detention 
was really to the benefit of the patient‘s family rather than the cure of the patient. In detaining 
such persons, there was heavy reliance on the evidence of the applicant, usually a family 
member. It was recognised that this could permit possible abuse whereby the family could 
mislead doctors and convince them that the patient needed treatment, so that an unwanted or 
inconvenient relative was removed while perhaps some financial or property readjustment 
was made in their absence.
 252
 Despite the fact that doctors had the power to release patients 
where they felt that the patient no longer suffered from a mental disorder, it seems that they 
felt constrained not to.
253
  
As the criteria for detention were so loose, mental hospitals also came to be used as a 
substitute for the lack of provision of appropriate services elsewhere. In this manner the 
elderly were regularly admitted, in 1960 20% of all admissions were over the age of 65.
254
 
Some of these persons were transferred from poor law and other institutions; alternatively 
they were admitted not because of mental illness, but rather, their poor living conditions.
255
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Furthermore, in 1958 11% of people in mental hospitals did not have a mental illness but had 
intellectual disabilities. Anecdotal reports from medical superintendents confirmed that these 
people were being referred from a variety of sources, often at very young ages.
256
 The 
population of the mental hospitals also included persons who were inconvenient, defiant or 
deviant and in this manner admissions came from homes for unmarried mothers and other 
similar institutions.
257
 Those detained in the mental hospitals thus came to include children, 
unmarried mothers, the elderly, the intellectually disabled and the socially marginalised with 
no other options. The lack of specific definitions of mental illness and the wide discretion 
provided to the psychiatric profession in determining who could be detained enabled the 
development of this situation.  
ii. Inspector of Mental Hospitals 
Despite the Inspectors role in considering the legal propriety of detention in the mental 
hospitals the Annual Reports do not contain any consideration of these issues. In general they 
primarily focused on: the number of admissions, discharges and deaths; expenditure; and the 
general conditions of the institutions. In this respect the Reports continued to draw attention 
to overcrowding and the poor quality of accommodation in the mental hospitals.
258
 
iii. Amendments 
The 1945 Act had provided that detention orders could only be signed by the person in charge 
of the hospital, in the case of public hospitals this was the resident medical superintendent. 
However, given the large populations of the institutions and the wide range of duties assigned 
to the medical superintendent, it had become regular practice that some of these duties would 
be assigned to medical officers other than the person in charge.
259
  The Mental Treatment Act 
1953 was introduced in the wake of a High Court decision which held that a temporary 
detention order was invalid where it had been signed by a medical officer who was not the 
resident mental superintendent.
260
 The 1953 Act was therefore enacted to:  
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“correct technical omissions in the Mental Treatment Act, 1945, which have created serious 
difficulties in the machinery for the provision of institutional treatment for mental 
patients.”261 
It provided that any a power or duty under the 1945 Act of the resident medical 
superintendent, the chief medical officer or the person in charge of a district mental hospital 
may be exercised or performed by any other medical officer of the institution authorised on 
that behalf by the mental hospital authority maintaining the institution. However, as the 
power of detention could now be operated by any medical officer it was believed that there 
needed to be some control of this discretion.
262
 The 1953 Act thus also provided that the 
person the subject of a temporary public detention order may request a second medical 
examination, however, this was not automatic.
263
This amendment further enshrines 
medicalism. The initial purpose of the provision was an attempt to ensure only the most 
senior psychiatrist in the mental hospital could approve detention, as a result of the 1953 Act 
this was broadened to any of the medical officers in the hospital and significantly increased 
the discretion of those tasked with its operation. 
A further amendment to the 1945 Act was made as a result of another administrative burden 
that had been created by requiring the Minister of Health to approve extensions to temporary 
detention orders. The Mental Treatment Act 1961 amended this and provided that such 
extension would be made rather by the medical superintendent.
264
 When considering whether 
this would be a subjugation of the previous safeguard, it was concluded that the Minister was 
responsible for extending over 3,000 detention orders annually and was already relying on 
advisors who in turn were relying on chief medical officers to do this.
265
 Thus, in reality this 
protection that was consistent with legalism, had never really provided the intended 
protection against unwarranted detention for patients and its removal was consistent with 
medicalism. 
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b. Influence of Medicalism on the Judicial Interpretation of the Mental Treatment Act 
1945 from 1945 to 1980 
Given the significant powers of detention provided to doctors under the 1945 Act one might 
assume that such detention would have been readily challengeable in the courts. The 1937 
Constitution reinforced the personal rights of the Irish citizen under Article 40, including the 
right to liberty under Article 40.4. Indeed, these personal rights represented one of the most 
unique developments of the 1937 Constitution by comparison with that of the 1922 
Constitution which devoted little space to such rights and in reality played almost no part on 
the maintenance of those rights.
266
 The right to liberty was expanded under the 1937 
Constitution and a legal process by which persons could challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention was established. The habeas corpus provision in Article 40.4.2⁰ provides that a 
complaint may be made by or on behalf of any person to the High Court alleging that such 
person is being unlawfully detained. The Court is required to directly enquire into the 
complaint and order the release of such person from detention unless satisfied that he or she 
is being detained in accordance with the law.
267
 Alternatively, if the High Court finds that 
said person is detained in accordance with the law but that the law is unconstitutional it must 
refer the case to the Supreme Court and allow the person to be at liberty in accordance with 
such conditions of the High Court, until the Supreme Court has determined the question 
referred to it.
268
  
i. Challenging Detention by way of Habeas Corpus  
Consequently, aside from the provisions in the 1945 Act the primary method by which one 
could challenge the legality of their detention was through the use of the habeas corpus 
provision under Article 40.4.2⁰ of the 1937 Constitution. Indeed within five years of the 
enactment of the 1945 Act, the significant provisions of detention were challenged in a 
habeas corpus application in In Re Philip Clarke.
269
 Philip Clarke challenged the 
constitutionality of Section 165 of the 1945 Act which allowed a police officer to detain a 
person at a police station where the officer was of the opinion that the person was of unsound 
mind and should be detained for their personal or public safety. The police officer must then 
contact an authorised medical officer who was required to examine the person and make a 
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recommendation for detention if he/she believed the person was of unsound mind. Philip 
Clarke challenged the constitutionality of this provision on the basis that there were 
insufficient safeguards in the 1945 Act to protect the right to liberty. Comparison was made 
to the previous legislation where there was an element of judicial review or examination prior 
to detention. The argument was a plea for increased legalism. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 1945 Act failed to protect the 
patient from unlawful detention and held that the requirement that a person alleged to be of 
unsound mind must be examined by two medical professionals with the least possible delay 
satisfied every reasonable requirement of legality under the Constitution and provided 
sufficient safeguards. Moreover, O‘Byrne J stated: 
“the impugned legislation is of a paternal character, clearly intended for the care and 
custody of persons suspected to be suffering from mental infirmity and for the safety and 
well-being of the public generally.”270  
The judicial interpretation of the 1945 Act in the first case challenging its constitutionality 
was representative of the judiciary‘s adherence and endorsement of medicalism. In a similar 
vein to the legislature, the judiciary was of the belief that the solution to the problem of 
mental illness in the country was psychiatric treatment. In this manner the Supreme Court 
held that when persons were detained under it, their rights were not restricted but 
vindicated.
271
 The 1945 Act provided citizens with the treatment they needed and protected 
them from harm: it was paternalistic in nature. The Court believed that as detention under the 
1945 Act was not an administration of justice there was no need for judicial intervention. 
Furthermore, the constitutional rights of those detained were adequately upheld by the 
periodical review of their medical condition by the medical professionals responsible for their 
initial detention and subsequent care. Thus, there was an absence of any notion that such 
medical decision making could be incorrect or even arbitrary at times. This case, as decided 
by the Supreme Court, was to have a determinative effect on the manner in which other cases 
were decided on the 1945 Act from this point to date.
272
  
Significantly, there were no other cases which challenged the constitutionality of the 1945 
Act until 1994, meaning there were only two constitutional challenges in a 50 year period. 
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This is significant given the vast powers of detention under the 1945 Act, the extent to which 
they curtailed the constitutional right to liberty and the number of people detained thereunder. 
Between 1950 and 1980 there was also only one other written decision concerning a habeas 
corpus application challenging detention on a specific procedural violation (rather than 
constitutionality) under the 1945 Act; In re J Donnelly.
273
 In this case, however, the High 
Court held that the applicant‘s detention was unlawful as it was signed by a medical officer 
who was not the superintendent of the hospital and this resulted in the 1953 amendment of 
the 1945 Act. The High Court held that the provision requiring the reception order to be made 
by the resident medical superintendent was clear and unambiguous. The Court disregarded 
the argument that the lack of a provision that would allow for another consultant psychiatrist 
on the staff of a district hospital to make such reception order where the resident medical 
superintendent was unable to was an oversight of the legislature. Davitt P stated that it was of 
no relevance to the Court whether the lack of such a provision was an oversight or a 
deliberate policy, but he was of the opinion that the omission was most likely deliberate. The 
reception order in this case was accordingly made without any statutory authority and was 
legally void and of no effect. The detention of Donnelly thereunder was, therefore, illegal.
274
 
It is interesting that the High Court found the detention unlawful in this case and one can only 
postulate as to the reasons; perhaps the Court was more comfortable with finding detention 
unlawful based on the clear failure to comply with a specific provision of the 1945 Act. In 
this case there was no challenge to the constitutionality of the 1945 Act and the Court was not 
drawn into a consideration of the purpose of the 1945 Act or the lack of adequate safeguards 
for those detained. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Court found the detention unlawful 
on this ground and is a clear enunciation of legalism. 
 
Keys conducted research into unreported habeas corpus applications. She has found that 
between 1923 and 1999 only 111 habeas corpus applications were made by or on behalf of 
psychiatric patients.
275
 This compares with 113 habeas corpus applications made between 
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1998 and 1999 by prisoners. During this time period no habeas corpus applications were 
received from over 60% of the mental hospitals in the country.
276
 The higher numbers of 
habeas corpus applications from prisons has been attributed to a certain ―rights culture‖ in 
the criminal justice system. Moreover, prisoners have lawyers who have defended them at 
trial and this goes some way to explaining the fact that 44% of the prison applications had 
legal representation compared with 31% of the applicants in psychiatric detention. To 
substantiate the point further, 63% of the psychiatric detention applications came from the 
Central Mental Hospital: 75% of the population in the Central Mental Hospital had come 
through the criminal justice system, having been found not guilty by reason of insanity or 
unfit for trial. These patients would have had access to legal representation. Furthermore, 
patients detained in mental hospitals may not have been aware of their right to make an 
application, they may not have had family or friends who could make an application on their 
behalf or they may not have had the ability to initiate the necessary written or verbal 
communications required to begin such a process. The failure to provide sufficient 
information about options to challenge one‘s detention under the 1945 Act could be 
considered as a barrier to patients‘ access to the courts.277  
The lack of cases must be considered within the courts‘ overall approach to the personal 
rights in the 1937 Constitution. In the first 25 years of the Constitution‘s existence there was 
almost no exploration of the general phrase ‗personal rights‘.278 Indeed, In re Philip Clarke, 
was one of the only cases that considered personal rights in general prior to 1980 and the 
Supreme Court had stated that: 
“The [impugned] section cannot, in our opinion, be construed as an attack upon the personal 
rights of the citizen. On the contrary it seems to us to be designed for the protection of the 
citizen and for the promotion of the common good.”279 
It is likely that, in light of this strong ruling by the Supreme Court, lawyers were reluctant to 
make claims about the lack of legal protections under the 1945 Act as they were likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                                     
most applications came from the CMH so the 1945 Act was unlikely to have had an influence although it may 
have had in relation to the small numbers transferred from ordinary psychiatric hospitals…it was miniscule. 
Most occurred after the 1970s when information on rights etc was growing The major finding was the  greater 
awareness of rights and representation due to being involved in the criminal justice system‖.  
276
 Mary Keys, ―Challenging the Lawfulness of Psychiatric Detention under Habeas Corpus in Ireland‖ (2002) 1 
Dublin University Law Journal 26. 
277
 Ibid. 
278
 G Hogan & G Whyte, J.M. Kelly: The Irish Constitution (4
th
 Ed, Butterworths 2003) 1389-1390. 
279
 In re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235 at 248. 
64 
 
unsuccessful. When Re Philip Clarke was decided in 1951, there was no real rights 
consciousness or rights culture and therefore there was no belief on the part of the Supreme 
Court that legislation in general could restrict the rights of Irish citizens. 
c. Conclusion 
Between 1945 and 1980, the operation of the 1945 Act was consistent with medicalism and, 
based on the lack of legal controls on medical discretion, a wide range of persons came to be 
detained in mental hospitals. Similarly, where amendments were made to the 1945 Act, these 
increased medical power in the detention process. In terms of the judicial interpretation of the 
1945 Act only two cases were heard during this period. In the seminal In re Philip Clarke
280
 
case, the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of the powers of detention, consistent with 
medicalism, came to have an overarching influence on subsequent jurisprudence. 
Interestingly, however, the only other case during this period was In re J Donnelly
281
 
concerning procedural violation and this was decided in line with legalism. Such precedents 
were to have an influence on subsequent case law after the 1980s. 
3.05 Challenges to the Dominance of Medicalism 
Despite the complete acceptance of medicalism in the 1945 Act, between the 1950s and the 
1970s dissatisfaction with psychiatry‘s role in the detention of the mentally ill emerged out of 
simultaneous developments in a number of disciplines internationally. While the 
development of psychiatry‘s legal powers of detention were initially considered as reforms, 
as a result of these developments, psychiatry‘s powers of detention came to be dominated by 
a social control interpretation that asserted that the state used welfare agencies, institutions 
and various reform measures to control and direct the control of society.
282
 It is necessary to 
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examine these developments and determine the extent to which they affected the operation of 
the 1945 Act.  
a. Anti-Psychiatry Movement 
The academic literature concerning the role of psychiatry in the detention of the mentally ill 
has had a contentious evolution. Initially the field comprised clinicians and historians who 
had traditionally upheld psychiatry‘s expanding role in the detention of the mentally ill as 
‗reforms‘.283 By the 1960s, however, the altruistic nature of the psychiatric profession came 
under significant scrutiny. The resulting ‗anti-psychiatry‘ movement questioned the very 
basis of psychiatry: the claim that mental disorder is an illness. Significantly, it was instigated 
by dissident psychiatrists such as Szasz in the US and Laing and Cooper in Britain.
284
 As the 
movement evolved, psychiatry‘s role in the detention and treatment of the mentally ill was re-
cast in terms of its social control and moral regulation of society.
285
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b. De-Institutionalisation Movement 
This anti-psychiatry work influenced and coincided with the deinstitutionalisation movement 
which launched a sustained analysis and critique of the mental hospital system during the 
1950s and 1960s.
 286
  During this time growing concern was publicly expressed about the 
conditions of large public mental hospitals. Notably, Goffman‘s work analysed the adverse 
effects of detention in mental hospitals which had the effect of institutionalising both patients 
and staff.
287
 Mental hospitals were dehumanising places whereby the ‗inmate‘ experienced 
obvious abuses such as unwarranted or disproportionate detention, forced treatment and 
degrading living conditions. Less obvious but equally affecting were the power imbalances, 
the lack of pleasure and comfort, the monotony of everyday scheduled life and the increased 
inability to live an independent life outside the mental hospital.
288
 Other studies into the 
effects of mental hospitals reinforced Goffman‘s theory of institutionalisation.289 Wing 
highlighted the social withdrawal and passivity of patients that was unconnected to their 
particular diagnosis but correlated to their length of stay in mental hospital.
290
 The impacts of 
institutionalisation continued to be studied throughout the latter half of the twentieth century 
and to this day remain relevant.
291
 
Simultaneously, in England revelations of serious institutional malpractice in a series of 
inquiries into abuses in psychiatric hospitals were emerging.
292
 These inquiries found that 
patients were neglected, severely ill-treated and provided with inadequate medical and 
nursing care by incompetent staff. There was poor administration, defective management and 
a suppression of complaints. Allegations of cruelty and the issue of consent to 
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electroconvulsive therapy were the focus of one inquiry. In another, the report on the 
Normansfield Hospital, described the consultant psychiatrist there as intolerant, abusive and 
tyrannical.
293
Martin reviewed the failures of caring in British mental institutions during this 
period and attributed it to the isolation that is associated with institutionalisation.
294
 
The critique of mental hospitals as total institutions began to impact upon psychiatric 
ideology and thus began the deinstitutionalisation movement, starting in the US in the 1960s. 
Significantly, the legal sphere changed to accommodate this deinstitutionalisation. American 
President John F. Kennedy signed the Community Mental Health Centres Act in 1963 as a 
means of facilitating the transition from inpatient psychiatric care to community care. In 1966 
it was held by the US Supreme Court in Lake v Cameron
295
 that all psychiatric treatment 
must be carried out in the least restrictive setting possible. What initially began in the US 
then spread to Europe about a decade later. The most successful of these movements was in 
Italy. Here Basaglia, an Italian psychiatrist, became the main proponent of a very successful 
anti-psychiatry movement that culminated in the 1978 Italian National Reform Bill that 
banned all asylums and compulsory admissions and established community hospital 
psychiatric units, which were restricted to 15 beds. 
At the same time there was a revolution in pharmacology in the 1950s with the discovery of 
major tranquillisers that facilitated the treatment of psychotic disorders outside of the mental 
hospital system.
296
 The theory that the pharmacological revolution instigated the de-
institutionalisation of the mental hospitals has been contested on numerous grounds. A 
number of studies demonstrate that an increased level of discharges occurred prior to the 
widespread use of tranquillisers and the introduction of psychotropic drugs did not appear to 
accelerate the rate of discharges.
297
 While the pharmacological revolution may not have 
instigated the de-institutionalisation movement, according to Scull it did help manage 
deviance post-deinstitutionalisation through the control of symptoms.
298
 Importantly, 
however, the development and use of psychotropic drugs allowed psychiatry to maintain their 
                                                     
293
 J R Hamilton, ―The Mental Health Act 1983‖ (1983) 286 (6379) British Medical Journal 1720, 1721.  
294
 See generally James Purdon Martin, Hospitals in Trouble (Blackwell 1985). 
295
 64 F.2d 657 (1966). 
296
 Phil Fennell, Treatment Without Consent; Law, Psychiatry and the Treatment of Mentally Disordered People 
since 1845 (Routledge 1996) 148-167. 
297
 Anne Rogers & David Pilgrim, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness (3
rd
 Ed, Open University Press 
2005) 177. 
298
 Andrew Scull, Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant-A Radical View (Prentice-Hall 1977). 
68 
 
control in the treatment of mental illness and therefore the shift to community care did not 
undermine their jurisdiction.
299
  
c. Mental Health Rights Movement 
The anti-psychiatry and de-institutionalisation movements provided an ideological platform 
for the rejection of medicalism and the emergence of legalism. A significant contributing 
factor to the development of legalism was that this sociological work emerged at a time when 
mass civil rights movements saw a worldwide resistance to all forms of political, racial and 
sexual oppression in the 1960s. In the US, alliances were formed between anti-psychiatry and 
gay activists. In 1970 and 1971 they prevented psychiatrists from entering the American 
Psychiatric Association‘s (APA) annual meeting on account of its classification of 
homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder. In 1973 homosexuality was removed from the DSM 
manual as a mental illness by the APA.
300
 By the 1980s the international human rights sphere 
had significantly developed since the initial creation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1950.
301
 
It was against this backdrop that Gostin, the legal director of MIND, a voluntary organisation 
situated in England published two books; A Human Condition Vols I and II.
302
 In these books 
he criticised the operation of the English Mental Health Act 1959 which was seen as overly 
paternalistic in that it conferred wide discretionary power on doctors and state authorities to 
treat the mentally ill. Gostin, an American lawyer, was influenced by the recent sociological 
thought
303
and came to play a prominent role in what was termed the pendulum swing 
between medicalism and legalism.
304
 He urged the introduction of more effective procedural 
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safeguards and regulation of psychiatry, describing reform proposals which he had drafted for 
MIND as based on a ‗new legalism‘.305Gostin‘s new legalism was built on a rights based 
approach and drew heavily from the ECHR.
306
 
i. The Council of Europe and the Legal Powers of Detention 
At the same time the Council of Europe was moving towards a view of mental health 
detention that was consistent with legalism. The Council of Europe is the continents leading 
human rights organisation and provides a framework of rules and widespread guarantees on 
the subject of human rights in general.
307
 Given what was occurring via the anti-psychiatry 
and de-institutionalisation movements in the 1970s, the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe turned their attention to the situation of persons in psychiatric detention in 
Recommendation 818 (1977); Relating to the situation of the mentally ill (12
th
 Meeting, 
October 8, 1977) and Recommendation No R (83) 2; On the legal protection for people 
suffering mental illnesses and admitted as involuntary patients (356
th
 Meeting, February 
1983).
308
 The Recommendations represent an overwhelming acceptance of legalism. 
Reference is made to how profound changes have taken place in Europe in attitudes towards 
mental illness from both the medical and social points of view. Subsequently, the 
Recommendations suggest that member states‘ mental health legislation should be re-cast in 
terms of rights protection. Mental health detention should restrict rights for as short a time 
period as possible and in the least restrictive manner. Significantly, the Recommendations, 
suggest removing sole authority in the detention process from psychiatry and transferring this 
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to the courts in addition to introducing external oversight through independent tribunals or 
courts.
 309
  
ii. European Court of Human Rights & the Legal Powers of Detention 
There was also an increase in cases brought to the ECtHR concerning mental health detention 
and it is becomes apparent that when deciding these cases the ECtHR was similarly 
influenced by the movements. Unlike the Committee of Ministers Recommendations, ECtHR 
decisions are legally binding and therefore have greater weight. While in some countries 
ECHR law cannot be relied on in domestic courts, citizens can sue the State through the 
ECtHR. It is a breach of the State‘s international obligations if a violation of the ECHR is 
found. Since the late 1970s decisions of the ECtHR on cases concerning the psychiatric 
detention of persons have defined member states‘ obligations in line with legalism.310 
In these cases the ECtHR developed features of legalism similar to those outlined in the 
Recommendations by introducing specific requirements for psychiatric detention. The 
principal instrument for these developments was Article 5 of the ECHR. Article 5 expressly 
allows the lawful detention of ‗persons of unsound mind‘ yet sets out safeguards for persons 
who have been detained.
311
 It states that no one can be detained except by a procedure 
defined by law and that a person must be informed of the reasons for the detention and must 
be able to appeal against the lawfulness of detention. Article 5(4) specifically outlines the 
right of detained persons to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of the detention shall 
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be decided speedily by a court, and his or her release ordered if the detention is held not to be 
lawful. 
The ECtHR has continued to build on the terms of Article 5 to create a number of clear 
requirements for lawful detention that are in line with legalism. In the cases concerning 
psychiatric detention the ECtHR has established that the detention process should not be one 
which is based on arbitrary decisions and therefore mental health detention must be in 
accordance with a specific procedure prescribed in law.
312
 Domestic law must also be 
sufficiently accessible and precise to ensure the law itself is foreseeable in its application
313
 
and to avoid all risk of arbitrariness.
314
 Furthermore, these domestic legal procedures must 
conform with the ECHR
315
 and there is a positive obligation on states to protect the liberty of 
its citizens, including those detained in private institutions.
316
 The legal regulation of the 
detention process is a primary tenet of legalism whereby legal controls are required to limit 
medical discretion in the process and protect the rights of those detained. All legal and 
administrative processes outlined in this legislation must be adhered to and any discrepancies 
render the detention unlawful. 
Given that the role of psychiatry in the detention process was no longer unquestioned the 
ECtHR further refined the grounds upon which a person could be detained. It held that having 
a mental disorder is not enough in itself to warrant detention, rather the nature or degree of 
the mental disorder must be such as to justify the deprivation of liberty and continued 
detention is only valid so long as the disorder persists. The approach to the severity question 
is normally based on an individual‘s dangerousness, or his or her need for treatment, or 
both.
317
A detailed definition of mental disorder was not provided by the ECtHR on the 
grounds that it is a term that is constantly evolving with medical science.
318
 However, it did 
outline that Article 5(1)(e) cannot be used to detain an individual just because his view or 
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behaviour deviates from the norms prevailing in a particular society.
319
 Reflective of legalism 
this requirement was aimed at ensuring psychiatric detention was not used as a form of social 
control, a real life example of which was seen in the USSR.
320
  Similarly, as detention is such 
a serious infringement on rights, in order to ensure the patient‘s rights are protected, such 
detention is only justified where other less severe measures have been considered and found 
to be insufficient to safeguard the individual or public interest.
321
 However, when a person is 
detained on these grounds to ensure the protection of their rights the detention must take 
place in a caring and therapeutic rather than punishing environment such as a hospital, clinic 
or other appropriate institution for the mentally ill.
322
 
One of the most important articulations of legalism is the manner in which the ECtHR built 
on the right under Article 5(4) to have the lawfulness of one‘s detention reviewed speedily by 
a court.
323
 Furthermore, as mental illness is subject to amelioration or cure, to ensure that the 
continuing decision to detain is valid, the patient also has the right to have this reviewed 
periodically by an independent court.
324
 The attributes of such a court are discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 5.
325
 It was in this manner that Gostin and MIND utilised the ECHR and 
brought a series of test cases before the European Commission and the ECtHR, highlighting 
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the absence of possibilities for legal review of detention for many patients.
326
 The most 
successful case brought was X v United Kingdom.
327
 The ECtHR held that the independent 
review of detention must not be a mere formality, but must provide a serious examination of 
the merits of the case. Moreover, review by way of habeas corpus was not sufficient to fulfil 
the requirements of the ECHR.
328
 As a result of the work of Gostin and MIND and the X v 
United Kingdom case, the Mental Health Act 1983 was enacted in England and Wales. The 
1983 Act represented Gostin‘s new legalism and established procedural safeguards and 
external reviews that were to protect civil rights and limit psychiatric discretion in the 
detention of the mentally ill.
329
 In time, the 1983 Act and the ECtHR decision in X v United 
Kingdom, were to have a significant impact on the legal powers to detain in Ireland.
330
 
Cumulatively, in terms of mental health detention it can be said that the ECtHR‘s approach 
enshrined legalism and as a result of these developments it is interesting to note the number 
of countries in which mental health legislation was enacted or amended; Switzerland (1980), 
Scotland (1984), Northern Ireland (1986), the Former USSR (1988), Denmark (1989), 
Belgium (1990) and France (1990). However, once we stray from the specific procedural 
aspects of mental health detention and review, the case becomes less clear and it cannot be 
said that the ECtHR accepted legalism completely. In an influential case concerning 
psychiatric detention and treatment, the applicant argued that he had been unnecessarily and 
involuntarily given sedatives, force-fed, and restrained with handcuffs to a hospital bed for 
weeks which amount to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment under Article 3 of the 
ECHR. The ECtHR rejected this argument and held where such psychiatric treatment is in 
line with: 
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“established principles of medicine…as a general rule, a measure which is a therapeutic 
necessity cannot be regarded as inhuman or degrading.”331 
Furthermore, while member states are required to meet the standards established by the 
ECHR, the ECtHR allows them a ‗margin of appreciation‘ as to how they do so.  It must also 
be remembered that the ECtHR prescribes minimum criteria. Individual member states have 
the ultimate responsibility for regulating this area through domestic legislation and may 
prescribe in greater detail the requirements for lawful psychiatric detention and treatment. 
d. Conclusion 
By the 1980s, at the international level, the anti-psychiatry and de-institutionalisation 
movements had initiated the significant shift in the approach to legal powers of detention 
from medicalism to legalism that continued to dominate mental health detention through to 
the twenty first century.  
3.06 Impact of Challenges to the Dominance of Medicalism in Ireland 1980 to 2001 
Given the significance of these developments it is necessary to consider their impact in the 
Irish context in terms of their influence on the operation of the 1945 Act, mental health policy 
and legislation and the interpretation of the 1945 by the judiciary from the 1980s to 2001. 
a. Impact on Operation of the Mental Treatment Act 1945 
The 1945 Act had been introduced on a wave of optimism that predicted reduction in the use 
of mental hospitals through the treatment and cure of mental illness by psychiatry. By the 
1960s, however, despite the fact that the numbers in detention were slowly starting to decline, 
Ireland‘s mental hospital system remained in a state of crisis. Relative to the size of its 
population, Ireland had the highest number of persons detained in mental hospitals in the 
world. In Ireland, approximately 7.3 psychiatric beds were provided per 1,000 of the 
population compared with 4.5 in Northern Ireland, 4.6 in England and Wales, 4.3 in Scotland, 
2.1 in France and 4.3 in U.S.A in 1961.
332
 The 1945 Act had ensured that once a person was 
directed towards a mental hospital, no bar to treatment or admission was to be put in their 
way. Notably, senior staff members were remunerated in accordance with the number of beds 
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under their control; therefore it became essential in larger hospitals that this number did not 
dip below 1,000.
333
  
As a result, a Commission of Inquiry on Mental Illness was established in 1961.
334
 The 
Commission‘s Report found that there was little or no alternative to hospitalisation for 
patients. The Report recommended a policy shift from institutionalised, custodial care to 
community-based treatment and the establishment of smaller psychiatric units in general 
hospitals. The Commission suggested that if its recommendations were implemented the 
number of beds necessary to deal with mental illness would fall by over half to 8,000 in 1981. 
The Report did not advise how these new policies might be implemented and the result was 
that no formal processes for implementation were introduced. Nevertheless some individual 
initiatives appeared sporadically and geographically unevenly throughout the country and 
community care and outpatient treatment did increase. From the 1960s onwards, hostels, 
group homes, day hospitals, day centres, sheltered workshops, rehabilitation and retraining 
centres were developed. Outpatient clinics were also provided in some general hospitals and 
health centres. In 1965, the first psychiatric unit in a general hospital was opened in Ardkeen 
Hospital in Waterford.
335
 However, the extent to which these developments took place varied 
greatly from area to area throughout the country.
336
Therefore, contrary to the forecast, the 
number of psychiatric beds in use in 1981 was approximately twice the projected 8,000 and 
the mental hospital was far from redundant.  
As a result a further Commission was established in 1981 with the aim of examining the 
components of both institutional and community care in Ireland and making 
recommendations for the future.
337
 The Commission‘s 1984 Report similarly recommended 
an overhaul of the psychiatric services that should be community oriented. Where in-patient 
treatment was required this should be provided in psychiatric units in general hospitals. All 
long stay patients were to be rehabilitated with the view to relocation in the 
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community.
338
The Report had some success and the network of out-patient services 
increased, as too did the number of psychiatric units in general hospitals.
339
Furthermore, the 
numbers of voluntary patients steadily increased and this category came to be the 
predominant mode of admission to mental hospitals. The numbers in detention accordingly 
decreased from a high of 21,720 in 1956 to 4,321 in 2001.
340
 By 2001, 83% of mental 
hospital residents were voluntary patients.
341
 In this manner the institutional approach 
remained the primary approach to mental health care. 
A significant obstacle to the creation of a comprehensive community care service was that 
there was no legal backing for it; such legal backing has been seen to be an integral part of 
the development of the mental health services.
342
 In this manner the move to community care 
in Britain had been provided for in the Mental Treatment Act 1959. This move was also 
facilitated by the expansion of the welfare state.
343
 However, the late development of a 
welfare system in Ireland meant that the mental hospital system based on detention in large 
institutions was retained for a longer period and similar levels of community care were never 
realised. Even considering the increase in outpatient treatment, numbers in detention 
remained high and patients continued to be detained in aging and dilapidated institutions.
344
  
b. Impact on Mental Health Legislation 
While the de-institutionalisation movement was limited in Ireland, the legislature were 
influenced by the anti-psychiatry movement and sought to provide for this in 
legislation.
345
The resulting Health (Mental Services) Act 1981 saw a move towards legalism. 
It provided specific legal controls to limit medical discretion and protect patient‘s rights. It 
provided new criteria for detention and new detention processes. It also established a form of 
appeal against detention and an automatic review of long term detention by an independent 
and multi-disciplinary tribunal. Despite its passing the 1981 Act was not brought into force 
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for two reasons. Firstly, the general purpose of the 1981 Act failed to provide a legal 
framework for developing community care services advocated by the Commission of Inquiry 
in 1966 and restated in 1984.
346
 Secondly, the 1981 Act was overtaken by developments in 
the ECtHR which required states to provide an independent judicial review of the decision to 
detain. The review boards established under the 1981 Act were not intended to do this in 
every case and furthermore their decisions could be appealed to the Minister for Health. This 
meant that decisions could be overturned by the executive, thereby failing one of the primary 
tenets of independence as established by the ECtHR.
347
 No further attempts were made by the 
legislature during the period to amend the 1945 Act and therefore the medicalism enshrined 
therein monopolised the legal powers of detention until 2001 when new legislation was 
enacted. 
c. Impact on Judicial Interpretation 1980 to 2006
348
 
Prior to 1980 there was a dearth of cases challenging detention under the 1945 Act. As stated, 
when In re Philip Clarke
349
 was decided the Courts approach to personal rights was 
extremely conservative. However, the period between 1965 and 1980 was the most fruitful 
era of judicial activism in the history of the Constitution and the Courts recognised a panoply 
of unenumerated rights under Article 40.
350
 Thereafter, the rate of expansion slowed down 
but three new rights were established in the 1980s and another three during the 1990s.
351
 This 
judicial activism and newfound rights consciousness may explain the modest increase in 
cases challenging detention under the 1945 Act. However, most of these cases were brought 
in the 1990s and as stated the period of judicial activism had subsided. Nevertheless, the 
detention provisions came under scrutiny in thirteen (six of these were initiated by the same 
person) High Court cases which considered whether to grant leave to persons seeking to 
institute civil proceedings in respect of an act purporting to have been done in pursuance of 
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the 1945 Act.
352
 During this period six habeas corpus applications were also made 
challenging the lawfulness of detention under the 1945 Act.
353
   
i. Judicial Interpretation of Medical Examination & Diagnosis of Mental Illness 
One of the ways by which detention under the 1945 Act came under judicial scrutiny was in 
the cases where leave was sought to initiate civil proceedings against those involved in the 
detention process.
354
 In order to do so the High Court had to be satisfied that there were 
substantial grounds for contending that the person against whom the proceedings are to be 
brought acted in bad faith or without reasonable care. The aim of this requirement was to 
discourage vexatious or frivolous action or one based on imaginary complaints and thus the 
requirement placed the burden of proof on the person bringing the claim, requiring him or her 
to show substantial grounds for it.
355
 The Supreme Court did recognise that the requirement 
imposed a limitation on the constitutional right of access to the courts and therefore must be 
strictly construed.
356
 However, it held that because the 1945 Act was dealing with the 
mentally ill, there was a greater risk that those working with them would be subject to 
imagined complaints. According to the Court it was an unfortunate feature of mental illness 
that those afflicted resent treatment because, like children, they do not know what is for their 
own good and can have delusional obsessions about their unlawful detention.
357
 In 1985 the 
ECtHR held in Ashingdane v United Kingdom that the then English version of this provision 
did not breach the ECHR Article 6(1) right to a fair trial.
358
 The ECtHR held the right of 
access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to limitations and Member States enjoy 
a certain margin of appreciation in this regard. Despite this, any limitations must not impair 
the essence of the right and they must be proportionate.
359
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Thirteen section 260 cases were brought in the lifetime of the 1945 Act.
360
 In only three cases 
leave was granted and was either because a time limit had been breached,
361
 a doctor did not 
examine the plaintiff at all, or a relative who applied for a recommendation for admission had 
failed to notify the plaintiff of the nature of the detention and the right to a second medical 
examination.
362
 The primary issues in the remaining cases concerned the medical 
examination and diagnosis of mental illness.  
In these cases no, or indeed a very brief initial medical examination had been carried out 
prior to the recommendation for detention.
363
 From this case law, an examination in the form 
of an observation from a car at a 12-15 yard distance sufficed, similarly, reliance on medical 
history and second-hand information in the absence of any examination was found 
acceptable.
364
 The Supreme Court held that while these examinations might be criticised for 
being too general, this was to be excused because when a doctor is called on to deal with 
these situations the law does not require a standard of precision such as might be appropriate 
to other aspects of medical practice. Due to the urgency and the danger to others, protection 
must be afforded to doctors working under the 1945 Act.
365
 Where the validity of the 
diagnosis was challenged, on the basis that the plaintiff was released very shortly after they 
were detained,
366
 it was held that psychiatrists especially were not to be found negligent if 
they made a wrong diagnosis and they were entitled to rely on second-hand information. This 
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was because the human psyche is so complex and susceptible to different interpretations and 
clinical tests are so apt to mislead.
367
  
To substantiate the issue concerning the subjugation of patients‘ rights further, a peculiar 
feature of this case law is that in five of the thirteen cases, marital or family discord was a 
prominent factor.
368
 Boland has therefore seriously questioned the extent to which GPs and 
the initial medical examination actually provided protection against unlawful detention.
369
 By 
1996, however, the Supreme Court was aware of the controversy surrounding such 
detentions. In Bailey v Gallagher
370
 leave was granted to allow Bailey bring a civil case 
against a GP who had made a recommendation for detention outside of the permitted time 
limit. As the detention was: 
 “taking place against a background of marital discord…[it] indicated the need for even 
greater caution than the care which the law expects in every case of doctors exercising their 
far reaching powers under this legislation”.371 
Cumulatively, this provision created a significant obstacle for those wishing to bring a case 
against those who they believed acted in bad faith or without reasonable care in their 
detention. From the case law it appears to have been almost impossible to show that the 
doctors acted in bad faith or without reasonable care if they had made any attempt to comply 
with the provisions of the 1945 Act, even if they were seriously sub-standard. The absence of 
any definition for examination and mental illness in the 1945 Act meant that there could be 
huge discretion and variation which may have led to inconsistency in the application of the 
law by doctors. The lack of definition for examination meant that the responsibility was upon 
the courts to determine the extent to which such examination could act as a protection for 
those the subject of a detention order. This it failed to do by deferring to the medical 
profession and protecting their interests over the interests of those detained. In concluding 
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that such tenuous forms of examination and diagnosis were valid the Courts unquestionably 
endorsed medicalism; medical diagnosis was unquestioned, variation of practice was 
accepted, subjugation of patient‘s rights was endorsed and the profession were insulated from 
legal challenge. In 2004 this provision was found unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held 
that while the aim of the 1945 Act was legitimate, the limitation of the rights of the plaintiff 
should not be overbroad, should be proportionate and should be necessary to secure the 
legitimate aim. By prescribing only two grounds (that the person acted in bad faith or without 
reasonable care) the provision was not proportionate, was arbitrary and hence unfair.
372
 
ii. Challenging the Legality of Detention  
Between the period of 1980 and 2006, only one of the six habeas corpus cases challenging 
the lawfulness of detention under the 1945 Act resulted in a finding of unlawful detention.
373
 
In cases where the Courts were required to examine straight-forward procedural violations in 
the detention process, the cases were decided in line with legalism. In these cases the primary 
concern of the Courts was whether the legislation had been complied with not whether 
detention was required for the treatment of the patient. Therefore in Croke v Smith an expired 
detention order resulted in unlawful detention.
374
 Where the Courts found in two similar cases 
that there was evidence that the provisions had been complied and the patients had been 
informed of their right to a second medical opinion prior to detention the detention was found 
lawful.
375
  
However, where the Courts were asked to decide upon cases where the violation was less 
straight-forward, they relied on medicalism. Therefore, in Gooden v St Otteran‟s Hospital376 
the operation of the legal powers of detention by psychiatrists involved in the detention of a 
patient were called into question. Here a voluntary patient gave written notice that he wished 
to leave hospital, the medical evidence provided to the Court was that the applicant remained 
seriously ill and not fit for discharge. The doctors involved changed his status to involuntary, 
in circumstances where he had never left the hospital and thus was not strictly provided for in 
the legislation. Consistent with medicalism, despite the failure to comply with the law the 
Supreme Court deferred to the medical staff in their attempt to care for the patient in his best 
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interests and used a purposive interpretation to find the detention lawful. In doing so 
Hardiman J opined: 
“I do not know that I would have been prepared to go as far as we have in this direction were 
it not for the essentially paternal character of the legislation in question here, as outlined in 
In re Philip Clarke. The nature of the legislation, perhaps, renders less complicated the 
application of a purposive construction than would be the case with a statute affecting the 
right to personal freedom in another context.”377 
The remaining two habeas corpus applications challenged the legality of the powers of 
detention and the absence of any non-medical review on legalism grounds. In RT v Central 
Mental Hospital
378
 it was argued that section 207, which provided that based on the Inspector 
of Mental Hospitals recommendation a person could be transferred from a district mental 
hospital to the Central Mental Hospital, was unconstitutional as there were no procedures for 
patients to review the Inspector‘s opinion, to procure their re-transfer or release or to review 
their continued detention.
379
 Significantly, Costello P held that the section was 
unconstitutional because the 1945 Act did not contain adequate protections against abuse and 
error in the interests of those whose welfare the legislation is designed to support. 
Furthermore, the State's duty to protect the citizen's rights was more exacting in the case of 
weak and vulnerable citizens such as those suffering from mental disorder. Once the High 
Court found section 207 unconstitutional it was required to refer the question of the validity 
of the section to the Supreme Court by way of case stated. However, by the time the case 
reached the Supreme Court, the patient had been transferred back to a district mental hospital. 
The case stated lapsed and therefore section 207 remained on the statute books until the new 
legislation came into effect in 2006.  
In Croke v Smith(No 2) the legal powers of detention were again at issue.
380
 Consistent with 
legalism it was argued that the provisions under section 172 were unconstitutional as they 
granted powers of indefinite detention without sufficient safeguards in the absence of any 
judicial adjudication or the opportunity to challenge before a court or tribunal the diagnosis of 
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mental illness or the legality of the detention. The High Court concurred and found section 
172 unconstitutional. Significantly, Budd J‘s decision was consistent with legalism. He 
referenced the ECHR and the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (adopted by the General Assembly, 17 
December, 1991)
381
 and opined that: 
“The certainties implicit in the judgement in Clarke‟s case in 1949 may be diluted by now 
with increasing knowledge about psyche, changing patterns of behaviour, conflicts between 
psychiatrists as to the nature of mental illness and awareness of the abuses of psychiatric 
treatment in other countries”.382 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Supreme Court relied heavily on 
the paternal nature of the 1945 Act as espoused in In re Philip Clarke.
383
Significantly it 
pointed out that section 172 of the 1945 Act enjoyed a presumption of constitutionality and 
that the doctors and others who issue decisions under the 1945 Act will act in accordance 
with constitutional justice. In addition, it held that there were sufficient protections in the 
1945 Act to prevent unlawful detention. These protections were viewed uncritically without 
any regard to the possibility that they might be of little use in practice, for example for a 
person that did not have the capacity to make a habeas corpus application or write a letter to 
the Minister for Health or the Inspector of Mental Hospitals.
384
 It further stated that there was 
no need for periodic review because the doctors involved were required to consistently 
review the medical condition of the patient and release them if they were no longer suffering 
from a mental illness.
385
  
The adherence of the Supreme Court to the paternalistic nature of the 1945 Act right up to 
2006 is evidence of the strength of medicalism.
386
 The judiciary continued to believe that 
doctors should have ultimate discretion and authority in detaining and treating persons with 
mental illness. Restrictions on this power were unnecessary and unhelpful in ensuring 
persons received the treatment they needed. As opposed to finding that patient‘s rights were 
                                                     
381
 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 at 103. 
382
 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 at 124. 
383
 In re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235; Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 at 119-120. 
384
 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6. 
385
 Croke v Smith (No 2) [1995] IEHC 6 at 114. 
386
 See Gooden v St Otteran‟s Hospital [2001] IESC 14 where the Supreme Court relied on the paternalistic 
intent of the legislation as espoused in In re Philip Clarke [1950] IR 235 to interpret the detention of voluntary 
patients under section 184 and 194 of the 1945 Act. 
84 
 
restricted the Courts actually found that they were vindicated as it enabled persons with 
mental illness to receive the care and treatment they needed.  
d. Conclusion 
The anti-psychiatry and deinstitutionalisation movements had little impact in the Irish 
context. While there was some movement to community care, the full migration from 
institutionalised detention was frustrated by the lack of legislative provision for such. This 
was proffered as one of the reasons the 1981 Act was not commenced and as such the 
legislative transition from medicalism to legalism was never realised. Additionally, judicial 
support for this transition was lacking and aside from the two High Court cases
387
 mentioned, 
which were ultimately overruled or lapsed, and the cases which concerned clear cut 
procedural violations of the law there was a continued adherence to medicalism. 
3.07 Conclusion 
The 1945 Act was an overwhelming espousal of medicalism in that it provided minimum 
legal control over the medical profession and permitted the maximum use of discretion upon 
therapeutic and social responsibilities and expectations, principally for the treatment of the 
patient. Treatment and cure of mental illness was the priority, if necessary at the expense of 
other considerations, such as the civil rights of the patient or the procedural requirements of 
law. The subjugation of patient rights and weakening of protections was borne out in the case 
law under the 1945 Act whereby the Courts refused to find the vast powers of detention 
granted to the medical profession under the 1945 Act unconstitutional or render detention 
unlawful where doctors failed to comply with legislative provisions. 
The end of the twentieth century had witnessed a radical shift in the perception of 
psychiatry‘s role in the detention of the mentally ill. The anti-psychiatry, 
deinstitutionalisation and mental health rights movements had tarnished the altruistic image 
of mental health legislation that endorsed medicalism. A critical and questioning approach to 
psychiatry had emerged and this resulted in the transition to legalism. This shift had occurred 
in Britain and the burgeoning legalism was evident in the Mental Health Act 1983. The shift 
to legalism in Britain had drawn from the ECHR. At this international level too a shift had 
occurred; legalism pervaded the Council of Europe Recommendations and the case law 
decided by the ECtHR. Although there were some developments in Ireland that entertained 
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such a transition towards legalism ultimately these developments amounted to nothing and 
therefore had little impact in the Irish context or on the medicalism enshrined in the 1945 
Act. A core strength of these movements in Britain, that was absent in Ireland, was the 
alliance between academics, mental health service users and the voluntary sector, reinforced 
by members of the psychiatric profession. Most of the voluntary bodies working in mental 
health in Ireland were actually led by medical professionals
388
 and there were no other bodies 
or individuals, on par with Gostin for example, advocating any change.   
In the meantime the jurisprudence of the ECtHR continued to endorse legalism and expand 
the legal requirements for detaining persons suffering from mental illness. However, due to 
the dualistic nature of the Irish Constitution, the ECHR had limited affect in Ireland. 
However, under the ECHR Irish citizens could take a case to the ECtHR if they believed their 
rights had been infringed, having first exhausted all domestic remedies.
389
 It was in this 
manner that a case was brought against Ireland concerning the legality of detention under the 
1945 Act which resulted in a seismic shift in the legislation.
390
This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER4 
 
INFLUENCE OF LEGALISM IN THE 
MENTAL HEALTH ACT 2001 
 
4.01 Introduction 
By 2001 the case law of the ECtHR concerning the right to liberty of persons detained in 
mental hospitals had evolved significantly and had established numerous requirements for the 
lawful detention of the mentally ill in Council of Europe Member States. This jurisprudence 
and the anti-psychiatry, deinstitutionalisation and mental health rights movements discussed 
in the previous chapter were to play a pivotal role in the twentieth first century when new 
mental health legislation was considered in Ireland. 
The subsequent analysis of the 2001 Act measures the influence of legalism in the creation, 
operation and interpretation of the 2001 Act by the legislature, psychiatry and the judiciary. 
In examining the operation of the 2001 Act the chapter relies on three significant reports 
conducted by the Department of Health and the Mental Health Commission (MHC),
391
 in 
addition to Annual Reports of the MHC and the Inspector of Mental Services and academic 
literature produced by those tasked with its operation- psychiatrists. In determining the 
judicial response to legalism the chapter provides an analysis of the case law concerning 
detention under the 2001 Act to date. The operation of the provisions concerning the MHT is 
discussed in Chapter 5 and is therefore excluded from more than a cursory analysis in this 
chapter. 
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4.02 The Influence of Legalism on the Mental Health Act 2001 
The 2001 Act was passed following a protracted legal and political process which included 
the drafting of a Green Paper in 1992 and a White Paper in 1995 on a new Mental Health 
Act.
392
 In the Green and White Papers it was noted how the 1981 Act was intended to give 
patients greater protection against unnecessary detention in psychiatric hospitals and that this 
must now be incorporated in new mental health legislation.
393
 The government highlighted 
how: 
 “As involuntary admission restricts the liberty of the patient it is important that there 
are safeguards in law to protect the person‟s interests.”394 
It is evident from the Green and White Papers that the Irish government was also very aware 
of its international legal and political obligations concerning mental health detention. 
Frequently, the Papers referred to Ireland‘s obligations under the Council of Europe 
Recommendations, the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness
395
 and 
the case law of the ECtHR. They also regularly noted how the current 1945 Act failed to meet 
these obligations and how it failed to safeguard the rights of those detained.
396
 The manner by 
which the resulting 2001 Act protects these rights is discussed below. 
a. Legalism in the General Provisions  
The legal powers of detention are the focal point of the thesis, however, the provisions 
concerning detention do not exist in isolation and therefore it is necessary to analyse the 
general provisions of the 2001 Act to determine the extent to which they bolster legalism. 
Therefore, this section considers the influence of legalism in the aim of the 2001 Act, the 
guiding principle of best interests, the definition of mental disorder, the establishment of the 
MHC and the Inspector of Mental Services and the provision of medical immunity from suit. 
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i. Aim of the Mental Health Act 2001 
The purpose of the 2001 Act was to provide protections for the rights of those subject to 
mental health detention.
397
 Upon introducing the Mental Health Bill, the Minister for Health 
and Children at the time, Mícheál Martin stated:  
“The Bill will bring our legislation on the detention of mentally disordered patients into 
conformity with the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms… At the core of the Bill is the need to address the civil and human 
rights of persons receiving care and treatment in our psychiatric services. The Bill focuses 
on: improving and modernising the criteria and mechanisms for the involuntary detention of 
persons for psychiatric care and treatment; establishing a system of automatic and 
independent review of all detentions, including the provision of legal aid to all those who are 
detained; and putting in place a framework by which the standards of care and treatment 
provided in our in-patient mental health facilities can be supervised and regulated.‖398 
However, from the publication of the Green Paper it took nine years for the Mental Health 
Act 2001 to be put on the statute books and it was not until 2006 that the 2001 Act came into 
force. Ultimately, the Bill and subsequently the 2001 Act primarily focused on the 
involuntary detention procedure and the establishment of a MHC. It was argued that while 
the Bill addressed the position of 10% of those who are detained every year, it did nothing for 
the 90% who are voluntary psychiatric patients. It was highlighted that the Bill missed the 
opportunity to address the totality of the psychiatric service in the context of the obligations 
of the State and the prescription of patients' rights and failed to regulate mental health 
services in a comprehensive manner. Certainly, there was no legislative provision for the 
establishment of a comprehensive system of community care that had been a major focus of 
the Commissions established in 1961 and 1981 and the Green Paper.
399
 Other issues, 
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including some that had been highlighted in the White Paper were omitted from the Bill, such 
as funding for multidisciplinary community care teams, provisions regarding the capacity and 
consent of voluntary patients, provisions concerning the needs of mentally disordered 
offenders and provisions concerning community treatment orders.
400
 
The resulting focus of the 2001 Act on detention procedures has been attributed to the fact 
that the Irish government was forced to produce a Bill following a case brought against it to 
the ECtHR for a violation of an individual's rights as a result of its failure to put in place 
protections for mental health detention; namely a review of the decision to detain by an 
independent body. There was a friendly settlement in the case, part of which the Irish 
government pledged to enact legislation that would ensure compliance with the ECHR 
provisions concerning the review of the detention
.401
 In introducing the Mental Health Bill 
1999, the Minister for Health and Children, Micheál Martin outlined how,  
“the necessity to provide urgently for a reform of our legislation regarding detention, in 
order to bring this country into line with the European Convention on Human Rights, has 
resulted in my bringing forward a Bill which is shorter than originally envisaged.”402  
According to Alan Shatter TD (member of parliament) the other proposals were omitted “for 
no reason other than the work and preparation had not been done properly over the period of 
the Government's term of office”.403 
Given the haste with which the 2001 Act was enacted, included in its provisions is a 
requirement that the Minister for Health reviews the operation of the Act and makes a report 
on it no later than five years after its commencement.
404
 This provision demonstrates the 
awareness on the part of the government that the significant transformation of the legal 
powers of detention, which the 2001 Act sought to enshrine, would be challenging and the 
Act may have some difficulties in the early years of its operation. Therefore, in order to 
ensure the successful transition to legalism the government provided for this review. 
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ii. Defining Mental Disorder 
The term mental disorder is used throughout the 2001 Act and includes ‗mental illness, 
severe dementia and significant intellectual disability‘.405 The 2001 Act also introduces 
dangerousness and treatment grounds that are necessary for detention. Thus, the existence of 
a mental disorder is not enough, in order to detain the person there must be a serious 
likelihood of the person concerned causing immediate and serious harm to him or herself or 
to other persons. Alternatively, persons can be detained if failure to do so would be likely to 
lead to a serious deterioration in their condition or would prevent the administration of 
appropriate treatment that could only be given in detention and this detention and treatment 
would be likely to benefit or alleviate the condition of that person to a material extent.
406
  
Defining ‗mental disorder‘ in more specificity was a significant legislative choice, reflective 
of legalism and an attempt to limit psychiatry‘s discretion in determining who could be 
detained. Given that the decision to detain a person can often be based on subjective 
psychiatric diagnosis, the legal definition of mental disorder aims to circumscribe 
psychiatry‘s discretion in making this determination.  Specifically, the definition of mental 
illness refers to serious impairment, the dangerousness ground requires a serious likelihood 
of immediate and serious harm and the treatment ground refers to a serious deterioration in 
the person‘s condition if not admitted (emphasis added).407 The exclusion of personality 
disorders, addictions to drugs or intoxicants and social deviance also narrow the scope of 
detention. There was much debate and lack of consensus over the inclusion or exclusion of 
personality disorder in the Green Paper and it was ultimately removed in the White Paper.
408
 
It is significant that it was excluded in an attempt to further narrow the categories of persons 
subject to detention. This was especially so considering personality disorder is specifically 
provided for in England‘s Mental Health Act 1983.409  
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 iii. Guiding Principle of Best Interests  
Despite the stated purpose of the 2001 Act in terms of providing rights protection, specific 
provisions of the Act created significant obstacles for legalism, in particular the best interests 
provision. The 2001 Act provides in its guiding principles that in making a decision under 
this Act concerning the detention, care or treatment of a person, the best interests of the 
person shall be the paramount consideration.  The section further states that in establishing 
the best interests of a person due regard shall be given to the need to respect the personal 
right to dignity, bodily integrity, privacy and autonomy.
 410
  At the same time however, the 
2001 Act states that in doing this due regard must also be given to the interests of other 
persons who may be at risk of serious harm if the decision is not made. The term best 
interests was not defined in the 2001 Act, thus, it was left to the Courts to balance best 
interests with the rights outlined. The best interests standard is widely used in a medical 
context,
411
 therefore its incorporation in the 2001 Act is representative of a continued 
adherence medicalism and allowed for a significant weakening of the rights protection that 
was the driving force behind the 2001 Act‘s creation, and for the rejection of legalism. The 
extent to which this has occurred will be discussed further when considering the Courts 
interpretation of the 2001 Act. 
iv. Mental Health Commission & the Inspector of Mental Health Services 
Another attempt to safeguard the rights of those detained and limit the discretion of 
psychiatry in line with legalism was the establishment of the MHC which the 2001 Act stated 
was to be independent of the government in exercising its functions. The MHC is composed 
of a multi-disciplinary board which includes physicians, nurses, a barrister, a social worker 
and persons representing relevant voluntary groups including two who have or have had 
mental illness. Its principal function is to promote, encourage and foster the establishment 
and maintenance of high standards and good practices in the delivery of mental health 
services and take all reasonable steps to protect the interests of persons detained in approved 
centres.
412
 More specifically it appoints persons to serve on MHTs; establishes a panel of 
psychiatrists to perform independent examinations; assists in organising legal aid for those 
detained; undertakes research on mental health services; and prepares and reviews a code of 
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practice and rules for the guidance of persons working in the mental health services.
413
 The 
MHC has issued six codes of practice concerning: admission of children; notification of 
deaths; admission, transfer and discharge to and from approved centres; use of ECT for 
voluntary patients; and use of physical restraint.
414
 It has also issued two sets of statutory 
rules concerning the use of seclusion and the use of ECT.
415
  
The MHC is also responsible for the appointment of a consultant psychiatrist to act as the 
Inspector of Mental Health Services, and any Assistant Inspectors and other staff as it 
considers necessary to assist the Inspector.
416
 The Inspector inspects every approved unit at 
least once a year and these visits can be both scheduled and unannounced to ensure 
appropriate standards in care and treatment are being upheld. They must assess the degree 
and extent to which the approved centre complies with the 2001 Act; the Mental Health Act 
(Approved Centres) Regulations 2006, which contain legal requirements that set out the 
minimum standards that all approved centres must adhere to;
417
 MHC rules; and MHC codes 
of practice. They are also required to see every patient whom they have been requested to see, 
either by the patient themselves or any other person. The Inspector is required to see every 
patient the propriety of whose detention they have reason to doubt.
418
 
In comparison with the Inspector of Mental Hospitals under the 1945 Act, the MHC and the 
Inspector of Mental Services‘ functions are more specific and detailed; they provide a more 
thorough oversight of approved centres‘ compliance with the law, regulations and rules 
concerning the detention, treatment and care of patients under the 2001 Act in a considerable 
strengthening of legalism. 
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v. Medical Immunity from Litigation  
As with the 1945 Act, the 2001 Act requires the leave of the High Court before proceedings 
can be commenced in respect of an act purporting to have been done in pursuance of the 2001 
Act.
419
 The main change from the 1945 Act is that instead of proving ‗substantial grounds‘ 
for the claim that the person acted in bad faith or without reasonable care, the 2001 Act 
requires ‗reasonable grounds‘ stating that leave shall not be refused unless the court is 
satisfied either (a) that the proceedings are frivolous and vexatious or (b) that there are no 
reasonable grounds for contending that the defendant acted in bad faith or without reasonable 
care.
420
 Although this provision is not as restrictive as that that went before it remains 
consistent with medicalism, albeit somewhat weakened. This provision continues to limit the 
rights of patients in terms of their access to court. In line with medicalism it significantly 
protects the medical profession from challenge in the detention process.  
b. Legalism in the Detention Provisions of the Mental Health Act 2001 
This section considers the influence of legalism in the detention provisions of the 2001 Act, 
including the detention process and the independent review of detention. 
i. The Detention Process 
Applications for detention can be made by a spouse or relative of the person, an authorised 
officer, or a member of the Garda Síochána.
 421
 For the purpose of making an application for 
involuntary detention, the term spouse ‗does not include a spouse of a person who is living 
separately and apart from the person or in respect of whom an application or order has been 
made under the Domestic Violence Act 1996‘.422 This provision was included as a result of 
the considerable public concern that had developed relating to the role of the spouse and 
relatives in such applications under the 1945 Act.
423
 The application can also be made by any 
other person over the age of 18 but must include a statement of why the application is being 
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made, of the connection of the applicant with the proposed patient, and of the circumstances 
in which the application was made.
424
   
This application is made to a doctor, usually a GP, who is required to examine the proposed 
patient within 24 hours and if they make a ‗recommendation‘ for detention it will remain in 
force for seven days.
425
 Examination is defined in the 2001 Act as a personal examination of 
the process and content of thought, the mood and the behaviour of the person concerned.
426
 
This definition was included as a result of a number of cases under the 1945 Act where it was 
found that there was no physical examination of the person detained.
427
 The doctor must also 
inform the person of the ‗purpose of the examination unless in his or her view the provision 
of such information might be prejudicial to the person‘s mental health, well-being or 
emotional condition‘.428 The prescription of the form of examination is again consistent with 
legalism. 
The person responsible for making the application is required to transport the proposed 
patient to an approved centre within 7 days, if they are unable to do so the doctor can arrange 
appropriate transportation. Once the person arrives at the approved centre they must be 
examined by a consultant psychiatrist within 24 hours and a detention order can be made. If a 
detention order is made it remains in force for 21 days which can subsequently be extended 
by periods of 3, 6 and 12 months. The patient must be provided with information about any 
and all detention orders. This is provided in the Patient Notification Form which includes 
information about the grounds for detention, the proposed treatment and the patient‘s 
rights.
429
  
Significantly, if a voluntary patient whom a psychiatrist, doctor or nurse believes is suffering 
from a mental disorder indicates a wish to leave the approved centre, they may be detained 
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for 24 hours.
430
 During this time the treating psychiatrist can either discharge them or arrange 
for another psychiatrist to examine them and, subsequently, if the second psychiatrist is of the 
opinion that the person is suffering from a mental disorder a detention order can be made.
431
 
Despite the fact that a MHT is then organised in the normal manner, the process of detaining 
a voluntary patient contains significantly fewer protections than the process of detaining a 
person who is not a voluntary patient. Furthermore, Fennell has questioned for whom the 
second opinion doctor acts as a safeguard-patients or physicians who desire a ‗flak jacket‘ 
against potential legal liability.
432
 
In the aggregate, however, the 2001 Act has provided stricter procedural requirements in the 
detention process and significantly shorter periods of detention than the 1945 Act. As such, it 
further reduced medical discretion and through these legal controls was consistent with 
legalism. 
ii. Independent Review of Detention 
One of the central functions of the MHC is to appoint MHTs. The primary role of the MHT is 
to review the detention of persons involuntarily detained in approved centres under the 2001 
Act. It has been stated that the establishment of the MHT represents a ―significant medico-
legal change‖.433 These MHTs represent the first time that lawyers, doctors and others have 
sat together in three-person tribunals to issue legally binding decisions concerning medico-
legal issues. In line with legalism they introduce a multidisciplinary oversight of the medical 
decision to detain. Notably, after the enactment of the 2001 Act there was a five year delay 
until the commencement of all its provisions in 2006. This delay has been attributed mostly to 
the psychiatric profession who refused to work on the MHTs which they believed were 
under-resourced, operationally and logistically unmanageable and would place too many 
demands on the limited number of psychiatrists in the country.
434
 From the outset this delay 
serves to highlight the continuing power of the psychiatric profession in Ireland. 
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Nevertheless, the MHTs became operational in 2006 and the process by which they review a 
detention order is outlined presently. 
Following the making of a detention order, the consultant psychiatrist must inform the MHC. 
It will then (a) refer the matter to a MHT; (b) assign a legal representative to the person, 
unless they propose to engage one; and (c) direct an independent psychiatrist to examine the 
person, interview their consultant psychiatrist and review their records. Within 21 days the 
MHT shall review the detention of the person and, if satisfied that the person is suffering 
from a mental disorder and that the procedural requirements of detention have been followed, 
shall affirm the order. Significantly, however, the 2001 Act allows the MHT to ignore 
failures to comply with the procedural aspects of detention where it does not affect the 
substance of the order or cause injustice to the patient.
435
 The 2001 Act does not define the 
type of procedural failures that would affect the substance of the order or cause an injustice 
and therefore it has been left to the Courts to determine what is required for a lawful 
detention. The inclusion of this provision in the 2001 Act has created a hierarchy of 
importance in determining the legality of detention. As a result it is a significant weakening 
of legalism by providing a mechanism by which failures to comply with the legal procedures 
of detention will not invalidate a detention. Furthermore, where the MHT upholds the 
detention, the patient may only appeal the decision to the Circuit Court on the grounds that 
they have a mental disorder, again reinforcing this hierarchy.
436
  
c. Conclusion 
Many of the general provisions of the 2001 Act are consistent with legalism. However, as 
outlined, there remain some provisions where the adherence to legalism is questionable, in 
particular, the best interests principle and the MHT‘s power to ignore procedural 
irregularities in the detention. The application and interpretation of these provisions could 
undermine the legalism which the 2001 Act sought to enshrine. The next two sections assess 
the extent to which this has happened. 
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4.03 Influence of Legalism in the Operation of the Mental Health Act 2001 
The 2001 Act has been in operation for eight years and therefore it could be said that it is still 
in the early stages of its development. Nevertheless it is possible to determine at this point the 
extent to which the operation of most of the provisions of the 2001 Act are consistent with 
legalism. In doing so this section relies on three substantial reports conducted on the 
operation of the 2001 Act. The Department of Health and Children, Review of the Operation 
of the Mental Health Act 2001; Findings and Conclusions was published in 2007. Since then, 
two further reviews of the 2001 Act have been conducted in 2008 and 2012.
437
 In addition to 
an examination of these Reports, this section relies on material from the Annual Reports of 
the MHC and the Inspector and academic literature on the operation of various aspects of the 
2001 Act.  
a. Defining Mental Disorder 
Notwithstanding the narrowing of the detention criteria in the 2001 Act, the MHC has 
reported that the diagnoses of those detained involuntarily have not changed significantly 
since its enactment with the two most common diagnoses being primary psychotic disorders 
and bipolar affective disorder/schizoaffective disorder.
438
 Other research examining 
involuntary detention under the 2001 Act also did not find any change in the demographic 
and clinical characteristics of those admitted compared with the previous legislation, the 1945 
Act.
439
 Other than an increase in the mean age of individuals admitted since 2006, there was 
no difference in gender, employment status, nationality, diagnosis or the 
dangerousness/treatment ground for detention since the implementation of the 2001 Act.
440
 
Furthermore despite the specific exclusion of persons with personality disorder or addiction 
in the 2001 Act, persons with these diagnoses continue to be detained involuntarily, making 
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up almost 6% of involuntary detentions in 2012.
441
 In a survey of consultant psychiatrists 
78% agreed that individuals should not be involuntarily detained solely on the grounds that 
they suffer from personality disorder or substance addiction. However, 58% felt this led to a 
risk that such persons would not be admitted in situations where it was clinically necessary. 
The authors of this survey state that this highlights the complex area of risk and responsibility 
faced by consultant psychiatrists in dealing with such persons. They also hypothesise that 
there may be higher rates of persons being detained on these grounds but with a diagnosis of 
psychiatric illness of an acute nature, such as ―adjustment disorders‖ or ―brief depressive 
episode‖.442 
While the provisions attempt to narrow the grounds on which persons can be detained, this in 
reality is an extremely difficult task. It is an attempt to circumscribe a subjective judgement, a 
judgement that can alter to suit its parameters of operation. Rose has also cast doubt on the 
extent to which such definitions provide a safeguard for those detained. The grounds for 
detention tend to be defined ambiguously, and the terms on which detention must be 
justified-the interests of the persons own health or safety or for the protection of others- 
allows enormous scope for discretionary judgment.
443
 Bean has found that the added 
requirement that the person must be a danger to themselves does not necessarily add anything 
to the definition. He found that doctors will automatically assume that a danger exists if the 
mental disorder is severe. In this manner they can rely on a medical definition in order to 
cover any additional social requirements.
444
 Therefore, while the definition of the mental 
disorder in the 2001 Act is an articulation of legalism, the extent to which it has been 
successful in circumscribing psychiatry‘s power in determining who to detain is unproven. 
b. Guiding Principle of Best Interests  
From the outset the term best interests has caused difficulties in the operation of the 2001 
Act. In this manner, in the 2007 Report, the Minister of Health stated that best interests is a 
difficult concept to define.
445
 Since 2007 the difficulty in defining best interests has come to 
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the fore and the 2012 Report stated that the inclusion of the principle and the failure to define 
it has resulted in an:  
“undermining of the significant advances in mental health law which the 2001 Act intended 
to enshrine and has given rise to concerns that the human rights aspects of the legislation 
have been diluted and diminished.”446 
Both the 2008 and the 2012 Reports highlighted how the Courts have come to interpret best 
interests as medical best interests and in this manner they have incorporated a paternalistic 
approach to detention under 2001 Act that was evident under the 1945 Act (this is discussed 
further below).
447
 The 2012 Report recommended that the guiding principles of the 2001 Act 
should be revised and should focus on human rights and refocused away from best interests. 
Furthermore, there should be a hierarchy of rights upon which to guide decision-making 
under the 2001 Act.
448
 Therefore, the inclusion of the best interests principle has resulted in a 
significant undermining of legalism and a perpetuation of medicalism in all aspects of the 
2001 Act, and in particular the legal powers of detention. 
c. Mental Health Commission & the Inspector of Mental Health Services 
The MHC has actually established an Inspectorate, which is comprised of a multi-disciplinary 
team including a psychiatrist (the Inspector), an occupational therapist, a clinical 
psychologist, a social worker, a nurse and a service user to assist the Inspector in the carrying 
out of their functions. This is a significant difference from the Inspector established under the 
1945 Act, whom was only assisted by other psychiatrists in the exercise of his functions. 
Such a move has greatly assisted the Inspector in its role as is evidenced by the vast 
improvement in the standard of the Annual Report compiled by the office. In comparison 
with the Annual Reports published by the Inspector under the 1945 Act, the Reports 
published since 2003 are more exacting, specific, detailed and in a way, more considered; 
they are also nearly twice as long as before. The Reports detail the specifics of compliance 
with the law, regulations, rules and codes of practice. In doing so the most recent Annual 
Report of the Inspector found that only 6% (4 out of the 63) of the approved centres were 
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fully compliant with the 2006 Regulations and the MHC Rules and Codes of Practice. In 
particular, there was only 30% compliance with the Code of Practice concerning admission, 
transfer and discharge to and from approved centres. Given the low levels of compliance, the 
Inspector has recently established a follow up procedure with approved centres in an attempt 
to increase compliance on specific issues in a structured manner.
449
 The Reports also provide 
detailed statistics concerning admissions, discharges and reviews to name but a few. 
Interestingly, however, the Reports go much further than detailing specifics; they offer a 
critical commentary on the state and future of Irish mental health services as a whole, 
including commentary on the roles of those tasked with its operation and the barriers to 
compliance, rights protection and an adequate mental health system for the country. In the 
aggregate the work of the MHC and the Inspectorate of Mental Health Services is consistent 
with legalism. Firstly, in terms of its composition it removes the exclusivity of doctors in the 
inspection of mental health services. Secondly, the Inspectorate provides a comprehensive 
examination of approved centres compliance with the legal requirements, in doing so their 
Reports are thorough and often critical of practice in different centres. However, in a similar 
manner to the Reports under the 1945 Act there is no discussion about specific cases where 
the Inspectorate questioned the propriety of a patient‘s detention. It is likely, however, that 
this role has been subsumed by the operation of the MHTs. Nevertheless, for some persons in 
long term detention, their case may only be reviewed by a MHT once a year and therefore the 
Inspector would be an important protection.  
d. The Detention Process 
Since 2007 there has been a gradual change in the identity of applicants in the detention 
process, with spouses and relatives having fallen from 69% to 57% of applications and Garda 
Síochána having risen from 16% to 19%. The use of an authorised officer has remained 
constant at 7-8%.
450
 This is in line with the study by Murray et al., who found the proportion 
of family applicants for involuntary admission to their service had fallen from 85% to 54% 
following the implementation of the 2001 Act. One can hypothesise that if there are fewer 
applications from relatives or spouses there are probably less applications for detention on the 
basis of family disharmony. This is a positive effect of the legalism in operation. However, 
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the increase in applications by the Garda Síochána is less positive and is reminiscent of the 
process that had great stigma attached to it and which the 1945 Act sought to remedy.
451
 
The views of GPs on the legislative changes were assessed by Jabbar et al.
452
 They found that 
53% of GPs were experiencing difficulties with the 2001 Act; 85% reported an increase in 
workload and 63% reported that the legislation was not user friendly.
453
 GPs also complained 
that those receiving patients were more concerned with correct paperwork than with patient 
wellbeing.
454
 On this point, an audit in the Longford and Westmeath catchment area found 
that involuntary detention orders were sometimes not concluded due to incorrectly completed 
forms.
455
 Another audit in Dublin found that approximately 30% of persons referred for 
involuntary detention did not have their order concluded when they reached the approved 
psychiatric centre.
456
 The failure to complete paperwork correctly and the subsequent refusal 
of approved psychiatric centres to detain persons based on this faulty paperwork raises 
several issues. The level of incorrect detention orders is concerning, one can only hypothesise 
as to the reasoning. Perhaps, as one study has shown there is not enough training for GPs in 
the 2001 Act, fewer GPs with training seemed to have difficulties with its operation.
457
This 
also raises the question as to whether medical practitioners without specialist knowledge of 
psychiatry should be the first port of call for detention. In line with medicalism, it allows for 
broad medical discretion. Another possible reason for the high level of incorrect form filling 
by GPs is that there is now a realisation within the psychiatric profession that an incorrectly 
completed detention order may lead to the discharge of a patient by a MHT or a court case 
being brought against them. However, this same realisation may not have occurred within the 
broader medical profession as they are not dealing with these issues on a daily basis. 
Nevertheless, legalism appears to be having an effect and there is evidence that where 
paperwork is flawed, psychiatrists will refuse to detain. 
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e. Conclusion 
In many ways the operation of the specific provisions of the 2001 Act is consistent with 
legalism and there is a belief among a majority of the stake-holders in mental health services 
(service users, service providers and others) that the introduction of the 2001 Act has 
supported the protection of human rights.
458
 Despite this, the best interests principle is 
undermining legalism in the 2001 Act.  
4.04 The Influence of Legalism on the Judicial Interpretation of the Mental Health Act 
2001  
The fact that the impact of legalism is dependent on those operating it aptly demonstrates 
how law does not exist in a vacuum. It is therefore also necessary to look beyond the mere 
statutory provisions and to consider the role of those charged with interpreting legislation- the 
judiciary. This is so important because the judiciary‘s interpretation of the 2001 Act will also 
affect the MHTs interpretation of the 2001 Act. Following the enactment of the 2001 Act, but 
before the commencement of its substantive provisions, the ECHR was incorporated into 
Irish law in the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. Gledhill believed that the 
2003 Act would further the protections enshrined in the 2001 Act by emphasising the need 
for public bodies to live up to the requirements of the ECHR.
459
 In reality however, the 2003 
Act has had less of an impact on Irish litigation and on the legal processes of the State than 
Gledhill and others might have anticipated or hoped for.
460
 Furthermore, the extent to which 
it has advanced the human rights aspects of the 2001 Act has been negligible, as will become 
apparent in the following analysis.  
a. Interpretation of the Purpose of the 2001 Act 
i. Purpose & Best Interests 
When introducing the 2001 Act, the government stated that its purpose was to provide for the 
protection of the rights of those detained and ensure that Irish legislation was compliant with 
the ECHR, consistent with legalism. Therefore in its guiding principles, the 2001 Act states 
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that when making decisions due regard should be had to the rights to dignity, autonomy, 
bodily integrity and privacy. It has been surmised that the articulation of these rights sought 
to introduce a human rights ethos into the legislation and that the introduction of statutory 
‗best interests‘ would lead to a new emphasis on the rights of the patient.461 The interpretation 
of the 2001 Act by the Irish Courts, however, have endorsed medicalism by determining that 
the primary purpose of the 2001 Act is the paternalistic care and treatment of the mentally ill, 
similar to that established under the Mental Treatment Act 1945.
462
 The High Court has made 
this explicit: 
―… having regard to the nature and purpose of the Act of 2001 as expressed in its preamble 
and indeed throughout its provisions, it is appropriate that it is regarded in the same way as 
the Mental Treatment Act 1945, as of a paternal character, clearly intended for the care and 
custody of persons suffering from mental disorder”.463 
The Supreme Court has endorsed this interpretation and in EH v St Vincent‟s Hospital464 
Kearns J approved the judgement in the Gooden v Otteran‟s case,465 and stated that: 
“I do not see why any different approach should be adopted in relation to the Mental Health 
Act 2001, nor, having regard to the Convention, do I believe that any different approach is 
mandated or required by Article 5”.466 
In interpreting the 2001 Act in this manner, the Courts have used the best interests principle 
to provide a purposive interpretation which is consistent with medicalism.
467
 Thus, in the 
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above Supreme Court case, Kearns J held that the paternalistic intent of the 2001 Act is 
exemplified by the best interests principle.
468
 In MR v Byrne and Flynn, O'Neill J found that:  
“Section 4 of the Act … in my opinion gives statutory expression to the kind of paternalistic 
approach mandated in the case of Philip Clarke and approved in the case of Croke v 
Smith…‖469  
From the jurisprudence that has developed it is clear that the term ‗best interests‘ has come to 
mean medical best interests.
470
 For example, in a recent case, GF v Tallaght Hospital, the 
High Court stated that the continuing detention of a person was lawful and in his best 
interests based on his mental condition as determined by the MHT who had heard the 
evidence of the treating psychiatrist and seen the report by the independent psychiatrist.
471
 In 
another case it was stated that doctors must be permitted a wide margin of appreciation in 
how they might consider that the best interests of the patient are served.
472
  
Additionally, the Courts regularly defer to the psychiatrists involved in the cases and attribute 
great weight and respect to their opinions.
473
 In MX v HSE, for example, MacMenamin J 
opined that ―In this jurisdiction, we are fortunate that we can place a high degree of trust in 
our doctors. This is based on both tradition and modern day experience‖. He continued by 
stating that “It is important to remember that it is doctors, not lawyers, who can cure 
patients‖.474 Psychiatrists and the medical staff involved in detaining and subsequently 
treating persons are routinely congratulated on the manner in which they care for and treat 
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their patients to ensure that their best interests, that being medical best interests, are 
protected.
475
  
The interpretation of best interests in this manner and the deference to the medical profession 
suggests that the judiciary have not accepted the legislature‘s move to legalism which 
advocates the establishment of legal controls on the medical power of detention and the 
limitation and overview of medical discretion in the process.  
b. Protection against Arbitrary Detention 
i. Defining Mental Disorder 
The Courts have rarely had occasion to interpret the substantive requirements for detention. 
In the only case considering this issue, O‘Neill J opined that the harm criterion and the need 
for treatment criterion are not to be considered only as alternatives but that both grounds can 
exist simultaneously.
476
 He stated that the threshold for detention under the harm ground is 
set high, as there must be a serious likelihood of the person causing immediate and serious 
harm to themselves or others.
477
 Furthermore, the standard of ‗serious likelihood‘ was higher 
than the ordinary standard of proof in civil actions, namely the balance of probability, but 
somewhat short of certainty.
478
 Various statutory forms were subsequently amended and 
current versions specifically permit it to be certified that a person either satisfies the danger 
ground or the treatment ground, or both. 
However, in analysing the criteria for detention O‘Neill J was keen to state that he was 
merely setting out the legal framework of the operation of the statutory provisions. In a 
conspicuous adherence to medicalism, O‘Neill J emphasised that on a daily basis these 
provisions will have to be operated by ‗clinical experts‘ who within the broad framework set 
out have to make clinical judgements and it was not intended in this judgement to interfere in 
the proper realm of clinical judgement or to cut down or limit the proper scope of clinical 
judgement.
479
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ii. Medical Examinations 
The 2001 Act defines examination for the purpose of detention as a personal examination of 
the process and content of thought and the mood and behaviour of the person. In deciding 
these cases, the Courts have failed to endorse legalism and in a similar manner to the case law 
decided under the 1945 Act concerning the issue of examination they have endorsed 
medicalism. In doing so, they have found that a brief conversation without disclosing the 
purposes of that conversation or discussing the mental state of the person concerned, sufficed 
as an examination, so too did an observation without any personal conversation with the 
person.
480
 The only instance where detention was found unlawful on the basis of an 
examination was where no attempt at all was made to examine or observe the person; the 
doctor had simply signed the recommendation for detention when presented with it by a 
family member without having seen the person at all.
481
  
iii. Procedural Requirements for Lawful Detention 
There is a lot of paperwork connected with detention that requires various individuals to fill 
out specific forms in a precise manner, especially when compared with the previous detention 
process under the 1945 Act.
482
 Furthermore there are specific time limits for the carrying out 
of examinations, the making of recommendations, the dating of detention orders and the 
review of the decision to detain by the MHT. In the initial years following the 
commencement of the 2001 Act, these issues were heard before the courts quite regularly and 
have continued to arise sporadically.  
Cases which relate to procedural irregularities have generally been interpreted in a literal or a 
purposive manner. Where the Court decides to use a literal interpretation, they have found 
that the procedures laid down in the 2001 Act must be followed correctly or the detention will 
be found unlawful, in line with legalism. Thus, in AM v Kennedy, Peart J stated that: 
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 “The greatest care must be taken to ensure that procedures are properly followed, and it ill-
serves those whose liberty is involved to say that the formalities laid down by statute do not 
matter and need not be scrupulously observed.”483  
Alternatively, where the Courts use a purposive interpretation of the 2001 Act, consistent 
with medicalism, they have been willing to permit procedural irregularities. Peart J opined in 
PMcG v Medical Director of the Mater Hospital: 
“It cannot have been the intention of the Oireachtas when it enacted this piece of legislation 
that its provisions would have to be acted upon in such a literal way that the best interests of 
the patient would take second place.”484 
The fact that the same judge came to two different conclusions about procedural irregularities 
serves to highlight the complexity of the area and the lack of a consensus in the case law.  
Matters are further complicated by the fact that MHTs are given the express power in the 
2001 Act to ignore procedural irregularities, and this has also led to conflicting case law. The 
2001 Act provides that the MHT must be satisfied that certain procedures have been 
complied with or if there has been a failure to comply with these procedures, that the failure 
does not affect the substance of the order and does not cause an injustice.
485
  
In 2007, Gledhill believed that the case law from the High Court on what procedural 
irregularities a MHT could cure ensured that there was no arbitrariness in the detention and 
that this was compliant with the ECHR.
486
 Since then the Irish Courts have had further 
opportunity to consider what procedural irregularities result in unlawful detention. From the 
case law two different viewpoints have developed. The first viewpoint, in line with legalism, 
is that the MHT can only be used to excuse minor failures of an insubstantial nature.
487
 The 
second viewpoint, in line with medicalism, is that the Section 18 can excuse nearly any 
procedural defect, unless it is in reckless disregard of the legislation.
488
  
These cases have focused primarily on the manner in which detention orders are completed. 
At issue has been compliance with time limits in conjunction with the proper dating of the 
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orders,
489
 the completion and signature of the orders by the appropriate person
490
 and the 
ticking of the box which indicates the grounds upon which a person is detained.
491
 A related 
issue here is that the Courts have repeatedly held that a previous flaw in a detention order will 
not have a domino effect on subsequent properly made detention orders and will not result in 
unlawful detention. Therefore, if there is unlawfulness at an earlier stage of detention it may 
be ―cured‖ by a subsequent lawful detention.492 
However, in EH v St Vincent‟s Hospital in the Supreme Court, Kearns J stated that a legal 
challenge to a patient‘s detention is only warranted where their best interests, appearing to 
mean medical best interests, so demand.
493
 In this case Kearns J opined that the proceedings 
that resulted from an incorrect date on a renewal order, were initiated and maintained on:  
―purely technical and unmeritorious grounds [,and that,] mere technical defects, without 
more, in a patient's detention should not give rise to a rush to court, notably where any such 
defect can be, or has been, cured - as in the present case.‖494  
Kearns J went on to state that it was difficult to see in what way the case advanced the 
interests of the applicant who was ―patently in need of psychiatric care.‖495 This is a 
significant judgement and one which considerably undermines legalism. It seems to imply 
that only where the person is not suffering from a mental illness or where there has been a 
gross abuse of the legislation should a legal representative challenge the legality of the 
detention. This approach would require a legal representative to consider whether release is 
appropriate, not whether it is legal or not. Ultimately, if legal representatives feel they are 
required to act in their client‘s best interests, the extent to which they can question the 
legality of such detention will be reduced. Consequently, this would significantly increase 
medical discretion in detention and fail to comply with legalism. Darius Whelan hoped that 
the statement was meant merely to advise legal representatives to exercise constraint when 
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bringing cases where there is settled law to the effect that the case is likely fail.
496
 However, 
given the lack of consistency in the case law, it would be difficult for any legal representative 
to determine whether an issue has been settled by the Courts or not.
497
 
Thus, the most recent case considering this issue is PD v Connolly Hospital, where it was 
held that the wrong section filled out on a detention order in conjunction with an incorrect 
date thereon, caused the detention to be unlawful.
498
 In the High Court, Hogan J opined that 
such flaws affected the substance of the detention because the detention order failed on its 
face to recite clearly either the proper legal basis for the detention or the correct date on 
which the renewal order will expire. This he held could potentially have further implications 
for when one‘s detention was reviewed.499This case has ramifications for the other issues 
upon which cases have been brought to date. The case law up to this point has yet to find that 
the failure to tick the box indicating the grounds on which a person is detained (for treatment 
or risk, or both) will result in unlawful detention. In terms of whom signs forms the Courts 
have decided several cases on this issue.  In WQ v Mental Health Commission it was held that 
a MHT could not affirm a renewal order where it was made by ―the wrong person‖-a 
psychiatrist who was not involved in the treatment and was from a different hospital.
500
 
Subsequent cases have upheld this decision yet relaxed it depending on the level of 
involvement in the patient‘s care and treatment.501In light of PD v Connolly Hospital, similar 
cases in future may yield different results. Despite the PD v Connolly Hospital judgement the 
case law may continue to be divided as has been seen with the cases concerning time limits 
and the dating of orders.
502
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The High Court has held that procedural flaws may in some cases result in leave being 
granted to initiate civil proceedings against those involved in the detention.
503
 In two out of 
four cases where leave was granted the High Court held that reasonable care does not just 
relate to medical matters but that those involved in detention are required to ensure the 
procedural requirements are also fulfilled.
504
 So in AM v Kennedy
505
, the Court allowed leave 
on the basis that three separate renewal orders had actually been sent to the MHC, all with 
different dates thereon which had subsequently led to a finding of unlawful detention.
506
 The 
other case where leave was granted was a case wherein the MHC had failed to organise a 
MHT which resulted in the patient‘s detention not being reviewed for six months. The Court 
held that both the MHC and the physicians involved in the patient‘s care should have realised 
that there had been no review and therefore there was a want of reasonable care.
507
 From the 
few cases that have sought leave to initiate proceedings under Section 73, there seems to be 
more willingness from the High Court to grant such leave when compared with the situation 
under Section 260 of the 1945 Act. Therefore, despite the medicalist nature of the provision, 
the Court has interpreted the provision in a legalist manner and granted leave to initiate 
proceedings where there is any evidence of a lack of reasonable care. 
c. Conclusion 
When the cases concerning procedural irregularities are considered chronologically it can be 
seen that there is no definitive position of the Courts on this issue. However, both in terms of 
chronology and quantity, the Courts have tended towards finding that anything more than an 
insubstantial flaw will result in unlawful detention. Given the most recent case on the issue, it 
is unclear what these minor flaws could include as the wrong date, which the court stated was 
an easy mistake to make (the order was made at the start of a new year and the previous year 
was written), was held to affect the substance of the detention. A strict interpretation like this 
where only minor failures that do not cause any injustice to the person being detained 
remains consistent with legalism, alternatively a broad interpretation would not as it would 
dilute the protections provided in the 2001 Act. Having said that, in almost half of the cases 
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concerning procedural irregularities the Courts, and in particular the Supreme Court has, 
consistent with medicalism, used a purposive interpretation to find that, in line with 
medicalism, the flaw does not affect the substance of the detention because this detention is 
needed in the best interests of the patient. Although not directly relevant to detention, it must 
also be highlighted that the Courts have more recently heard cases concerning the treatment 
of persons lacking capacity detained under the 2001 Act. In these cases too, the Courts have 
relied on a purposive interpretation of best interests and found that in line with medicalism, if 
such treatment is determined to be therapeutically necessary, it will not be unlawful.
508
 
Therefore, when the case law is considered in its totality and not restricted to the detention 
cases, the Courts paternalistic interpretation of best interests has ensured the perpetuation of 
medicalism in the 2001 Act. 
4.05 Conclusion 
The 2001 Act had the potential to enshrine legalism in the legal powers of detention, 
however, the extent to which this has occurred is questionable. While the 2001 Act reflects 
the weakened credibility of the medical profession in the detention of the mentally ill, it does 
not really threaten its hegemony. Doctors remain involved in every aspect of the detention 
process, from examination and diagnosis to second opinion safeguards and the MHT review 
of the decision to detain. Furthermore, through the best interests principle, the 2001 Act has 
actually ensured that what is deemed optimally therapeutic by medical professionals will take 
priority in decisions concerning detention. 
The existing research also shows that there has been little change in the types of persons 
being detained. However, the numbers in detention have continued to decline since the 
introduction of the 2001 Act; in 2001 there were 4,321 people in detention,
509
 in 2013 there 
were 2,132.
510
Significantly, however, there is evidence that there is non-compliance with 
aspects of the 2001 Act with respect to detention. Some of this has been attributed to the fact 
that doctors are operating in conditions where administrative staff has been reduced and some 
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have failed to proactively ensure that their legal responsibilities are met.
511
 In other areas 
there seems to be a lack of knowledge of the 2001 Act on the part of those charged with its 
implementation, this is particularly true for GPs. 
In the aggregate, the judiciary‘s approach to the 2001 Act has been mixed and has provided 
interpretations that are consistent with both legalism and medicalism in different cases. 
However, there is a strong line of case law from both the High and Supreme Court where 
legalism has been rejected and medicalism has been endorsed. In conclusion, any further 
move to enshrine legalism may require an amendment to the best interests principle and the 
power of the MHT to ignore procedural flaws in detention, but this will also require 
acceptance by the judiciary and those responsible for the 2001 Act‘s operation. This has not 
yet occurred. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE NATURE OF MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL 
OPERATION: MEDICALISM OR LEGALISM? 
 
5.01 Introduction 
The imposition of a legal requirement that provides an independent non-medical review of 
the medical decision to detain a person on the grounds of mental illness is a clear articulation 
of legalism. In line with this the ECtHR has built on the terms of Article 5(4) of the ECHR 
and held that for mental health detention to be lawful there must be an independent review by 
a court of the medical decision to detain. Consequently, in Ireland, the 2001 Act was enacted 
to provide for this independent review and ensure compliance with the ECHR. The 2001 Act 
established MHTs for this purpose.  
However, the previous chapter concluded that there is a discrepancy between the aim and the 
operation and interpretation of the 2001 Act in Ireland. In particular, the Irish Courts‘ 
interpretation of the 2001 Act has maintained the medicalism that was apparent in the 1945 
Act, which it is claimed is frustrating the purpose of the 2001 Act. Yet, the Irish Courts have 
heard no more than 60 of such detention cases. When this is compared with approximately 
13,400 MHT hearings, the ramifications of the MHTs acting in a similar manner are put in 
perspective.  
The first part of this chapter analyses the manner by which the ECtHR has incorporated 
legalism in the requirements for reviewing mental health detention. The 2001 Act is 
subsequently analysed to determine the extent to which the MHT provisions and their 
interpretation by the Courts endorse legalism and the framework designed by the ECtHR. The 
second part of this chapter examines the operation of the MHTs utilising academic literature, 
material from several reviews on the operation of the 2001 Act
512
 and original interviews 
with treating psychiatrists and service users whom have had experience of MHTs. A tentative 
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conclusion as to the prevalence of medicalism and legalism in the legal structure and 
operation of the MHTs is provided. 
5.02 Legalism & Reviewing the Decision to Detain under the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR states that: 
Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and 
his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
In its interpretation of the ECHR, the ECtHR has built on the terms of Article 5(4) and 
created a number of clear requirements for the review of the detention of those detained on 
the grounds of mental illness.
513
 Consistent with legalism this independent review is 
supposed to provide an essential check on psychiatry‘s power to detain people against their 
will. The ECtHR has therefore established that this must involve a substantive review of the 
grounds and reasons for detention.
514
 The primary purpose of the review is to ensure no one 
should be dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary fashion.
515
 
a. Independence & Impartiality 
In its case law the ECtHR has explained in more detail the attributes of this ―court‖. Article 
5(4) does not only signify a court of law of the classic kind that is integrated within the 
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judicial arm of the country. Rather it must be a body with a judicial character that affords 
procedural guarantees to the parties.
516
 Despite the fact that Article 5(4) does not mention the 
requirement of independence or impartiality and thus differs from Article 6(1) which requires 
an independent and impartial review, the ECtHR has held that it would be inconceivable that 
Article 5(4) of the ECHR, relating to such a sensitive issue as the deprivation of liberty of 
‗persons of unsound mind‘ within the meaning of Article 5(1)(e), should not equally 
envisage, as a fundamental requisite, the impartiality of that court.
517
 Therefore, the court 
must be independent from the executive and the parties involved to ensure there are no 
conflicts of interest.
518
 As the executive branch of government is responsible for the detention 
of persons, the court must reside within either the judicial branch of government or it may be 
independent of both the executive and the judicial branches. 
b. Procedural Fairness 
In the first case considering mental health detention, Winterwerp v Netherlands, the ECtHR 
outlined the essential requirements of such a review under Article 5(4): 
“The judicial proceeding referred to in Article 5(4) need not, it is true, always be attended by 
the same guarantees as those required under Article 6(1) for civil or criminal litigation. 
Nonetheless, it is essential that the person concerned should have access to a court and the 
opportunity to be heard in person or, where necessary, through some form of representation, 
failing which he will not have been afforded the „fundamental guarantees of procedure 
applied in matters of deprivation of liberty.” 519 
The ECtHR has held that the court must follow a procedure of a judicial character and ensure 
adherence to ‗equality of arms‘, which is a component of a fair hearing.520 Equality of arms 
connotes the idea that in hearings concerning mental health detention, the detained person 
should be allowed the same opportunity to present their case under conditions that do not put 
them at a substantial disadvantage vis- á- vis  their opponent, in this case the State.
521
 Mental 
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disorder may entail restricting or modifying the manner of exercise of the right to review of 
detention but the essence of this right cannot be impaired and this is where the equality of 
arms concept comes into play.
522
 In line with legalism and the protection of civil rights, 
special procedural safeguards may be necessary to protect the interests of persons who on 
account of mental illness are not fully capable of acting for themselves in the review. This 
may require the provision of legal representation by the government.
523
 In certain instances, 
the failure to provide an applicant with legal representation may result in a breach of Article 
5(4).
524
 The ECtHR has explained that the importance of what is at stake for the applicant, 
personal liberty, taken with the fact that they may have diminished mental capacity means 
that they should receive legal assistance in proceedings relating to their detention.
525
 
c. Powers of the Court  
The court must have the power to order the patient‘s release if the detention is not lawful. It 
therefore must not be a mere advisory body and must have the ultimate power to discharge 
the patient. The ECtHR in X v United Kingdom was prepared to regard a mental health 
review tribunal as a body with appropriate ―court like‘ attributes, provided that it enjoys the 
necessary independence and offers sufficient procedural safeguards appropriate to the 
category of deprivation of liberty being dealt with and has the power to order release from 
detention.
526
  
Detention must be in accordance with the law if it is to be free from arbitrariness. The ECtHR 
has held that the independent review of detention must firstly determine whether the 
authorities have complied fully with domestic law. Secondly, this domestic law must also be 
in line with the ECHR and therefore provide for the protection of the civil rights of those 
detained.
527
 The ECtHR has given effect to legalism and held that failure to comply with the 
law will result in unlawful detention. This entails the adherence to the standards established 
by the ECtHR under Article 5, as discussed, but importantly includes the requirement that the 
person is suffering from mental disorder as determined by objective medical expertise.
528
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Representative of legalism, Article 5(4) attempts to ensure a patient‘s rights are restricted for 
the shortest time possible by guaranteeing the right to a ‗speedy‘ review and judicial decision 
on the legality of the detention, and its termination if it proves unlawful.
529
 The ECtHR has 
further read into this provision the need for periodic review where there is continuing 
detention, on the ground that the original reasons justifying detention may change over time. 
As the review must be able to consider whether, on the facts, the criteria for lawful detention 
are still met, the patient must still be suffering from a mental disorder of a degree warranting 
detention at the time of the review. Mental disorder is subject to amelioration or cure and 
therefore reviews at reasonable intervals are necessary to ensure that the person‘s mental state 
continues to justify the detention.
530
  
The ECtHR, however, has not yet definitively stated how frequently a patient must be able to 
exercise his ‗periodic‘ right to review. The maximum permissible time remains undecided as 
each case concerning this issue has been decided on its own facts. The jurisprudence on this 
issue has found breaches of Article 5(4) where there have been delays of 24 days,
531
 5 
weeks,
532
 8 weeks
533
 and 5 months.
534
 In determining the urgency of cases the ECtHR has 
also drawn a distinction between first time applicants and those applying for subsequent 
reviews of their detention. In the latter situation less urgency is required.
535
It has held that 
pre-trial detention in criminal cases should only be of ―strictly limited duration‖, however, it 
noted that in other cases such as committals to mental hospitals, lengthier periods between 
reviews may be more appropriate.
 536
 Lengthy delays in a review or the making of a decision 
will only be excused in exceptional circumstances. Insufficient State resources, such as 
shortage of judicial manpower or judicial overload are not sufficient State excuses, even if 
the access or decision is as ―speedy‖ as is possible in the particular circumstances.537 
d. Conclusion 
Cumulatively, the ECtHR‘s interpretation of Article 5(4) establishes a review of mental 
health detention that is consistent with legalism. The ECtHR‘s requirement that a court that is 
                                                     
529
 Musial v Poland (1999) 31 EHRR 720 at 43. 
530
 Winterwerp v Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387 at 55. 
531
 LR v France (2002) App No 33395/96. 
532
 Laidin v France (2002) App No 43291/98. 
533
 E v Norway (1990) 17 EHRR 30. 
534
 Van der Leer v Netherlands (1990) 12 EHRR 567. 
535
 Koendjbiharie v Netherlands (1990) 13 EHRR 820. 
536
 Bezicheri v Italy (1989) 12 EHRR 210. 
537
 E v Norway (1990) 17 EHRR 30 at 66. 
118 
 
independent and has the power to review whether the person is suffering from a mental 
disorder and whether the legal processes concerning their detention have been complied with 
establishes a significant control over medical discretion. Furthermore, the primary purpose of 
this is to ensure the patient‘s civil rights as established under the ECHR are protected. 
Importantly, however, Article 5(4) and its interpretation by the ECtHR set down the 
minimum requirements for the review of mental health detention. It is open to States to 
provide greater protections than that established by the ECtHR which could enshrine a 
heightened version of legalism. 
5.03 Mental Health Tribunal Review of Detention 
Based on this jurisprudence, from the early 1980s Ireland‘s 1945 Act had been in 
contravention of the ECHR.
538
 When a case was taken to the ECtHR on this very issue, the 
Irish government agreed to a friendly settlement. The resulting settlement included a 
commitment to introduce legislation which gave effect to this type of independent review.
539
 
It is notable that the government chose to establish MHTs to provide this independent review 
instead of a court. It is necessary to determine why this is and the extent to which their 
development was influenced by legalism. 
a. The Evolution of the Irish Mental Health Tribunal 
The Health (Mental Services) Act 1981 provided for the establishment of a review board 
whose purpose was to safeguard the patient from unnecessary detention.
540
These boards 
largely followed the English model contained in the Mental Health Act 1959.
541
  They were 
composed of a legal member, a medical member and a member who was not a legal or 
medical professional.
542
 The Board would review the decision to detain on the basis of an 
application.
543
 The grounds of the review of the detention were not specified, however, it 
could not discharge a patient unless it was satisfied that detention and treatment were no 
longer necessary in the interests of the patient‘s health or safety or for the protection of other 
persons or property.
544
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The 1981 Act was passed but never brought into operation and the next consideration of the 
review of detention came with the Green Paper 1992 and the White Paper on a New Mental 
Health 1995. Here, two options were considered: the involvement of the courts in the 
decision to detain or a review by an independent body of the decision to detain. The Green 
Paper subsequently surmised that the Irish courts were not well suited to the investigatory 
process needed to confirm the legality of a detention. Additionally, in light of the volume of 
initial detention orders -3,300 in 1990- judicial confirmation would involve a substantial 
additional workload for the courts. It is also likely that the government were highly 
influenced by the tribunals established under the Mental Health Act 1983 in England and 
Wales. On balance the Government favoured a procedure whereby the decision to detain was 
taken by a medical practitioner but with an independent review.
545
 In line with legalism it was 
proposed that the Mental Health Review Board should have the “necessary degree of 
independence to carry out its functions in an impartial way”546 and its membership should be 
“competent to judge medico-legal issues involved in decisions to detain.”547The White Paper 
proposed that a review of the procedural legality of a person's detention would take place 
within seven days. A more substantive review of whether the person was suffering from a 
mental disorder that warranted detention would not have occurred until the person was 
detained continuously for over a year.
548
 
 
However, in June 1999 the ECtHR declared the admissibility of the Croke v Ireland case and 
found that it raised ―serious issues under Article 5(1) and (4) of the Convention which require 
determination on the merits.‖549 As a result, the Government agreed to a friendly settlement. 
The resulting settlement included a commitment to introduce legislation which gave effect to 
an independent review.
550
 The Government were consequently under significant pressure to 
ensure that this independent review was compliant with the ECHR and the jurisprudence on 
the review of detention.  
 
The proposals in the White Paper did not comply with the ECtHR‘s requirements as there 
would be no substantive review of the decision to detain until the patient was in detention for 
over a year. A new mental health tribunal (MHT) was put forward which would provide an 
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automatic substantive review of the decision to detain within 28 days.
551
 This time period was 
ultimately reduced as the 28 day period was seen as too long given that the majority of 
detained patients were released within a month, thus rendering such a review ineffective.
552
 
The composition of the MHT also changed over the course of the Bill‘s debate and passage 
into law. Initially, the Bill provided that there would only be a psychiatrist and a lawyer on 
the MHT; several TDs (Teachta Dála; Irish version of an MP) questioned this.
553
TD Liz 
McManus, in a clear articulation of legalism and her thinking concerning the professions, 
outlined the benefit of such lay representation:  
 
“It is not the role of politicians to perpetuate the power of the professions but to challenge it 
and to recognise the contribution of lay people. I urge the Minister not to become part of this 
potential conspiracy. If it is not challenged it will be perpetuated. The Courts Service is an 
example of how to do things right. The fact that lay people who are outside the judiciary 
participate in the new structures running our courts has improved the capability of the 
Courts Service in ways that would not have been dreamt of in the past. The Minister should 
move with the times and recognise the contribution of lay people. The lay perspective, the 
importance of which even professionals recognise, will be missing from the commission and 
from the decision making table.”554 
 
By the time the Bill was introduced the concept of a body that would provide an independent 
review of the decision to detain a person on the grounds of mental illness had been in 
circulation for twenty years.
555
 It had also been recognised by the Government in the early 
1990s that the 1945 Act failed to comply with international legal obligations in this regard.
556
 
Despite this, the introduction of the MHT under the 2001 Act was actually quite rushed as a 
result of the Croke v Ireland case.
557
 Several key features of a review body had emerged 
during the course of the Bill‘s debate including that the review body had to be independent, 
impartial and competent in terms of expertise. Furthermore, it had to provide a speedy and 
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substantive review of the decision to detain. The overriding purpose of these features was to 
ensure the human rights of those detained, as established in the ECHR were protected. Thus, 
from the outset the features of the MHT appeared to be consistent with legalism and the 
requirements under the ECHR. The final form of the MHT as established under the 2001 Act 
is discussed next.   
 
b. Characteristics of a Tribunal 
Although the term tribunal is not subject to precise definition it can generally be considered 
as a body that is independent of the executive and the judicial arms of the government that 
takes decisions affecting individual rights, according to some precise legal guidelines and 
through a somewhat regular and established procedure.
558
 Tribunals in general are thought to 
have several advantages over courts, especially in dealing with certain issues. These 
characteristics include their speed, economy, accessibility, flexibility, informality and expert 
knowledge of a particular subject.
559
  Indeed, the first detailed scrutiny of tribunals in Britain 
stated that they should be ―independent, accessible, prompt, expert, informal and cheap‖.560 
Whether these alleged advantages are always delivered in practice has, of course, been called 
into question.
561
 While tribunals are bound by some rules, to a large degree they are masters 
of their own procedure. They have considerable discretion concerning the conduct of the 
hearing, rules of evidence and the cross examination of witnesses. Another benefit is that 
many tribunals possess particular expertise. For example, having a medical expert as part of 
the tribunal panel is often seen as more advantageous than relying on the introduction of 
medical expertise through expert medical witnesses.
562
These characteristics in conjunction 
with, the hearing of disputes in private and a less formal setup are thought to make them a 
less intimidating experience than a court.
563
 However, it is questionable whether these 
characteristics are consistent with legalism and this is discussed in relation to the Irish MHT 
below. 
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Despite their differences, one similarity between tribunals and courts that is consistent with 
legalism is that both must adhere to ―natural justice‖. Natural justice has two principles: the 
decision maker must not be biased (nemo iudex in causa sua); and anyone who may be 
adversely affected by the decision must be allowed to be heard and have the best possible 
chance to put their side of the case forward (audi alterm partem).
564
 In Ireland the principle 
of natural justice is recognised as an unenumerated constitutional right.
565
 The natural justice 
principle is so important that tribunals must practice it if they are to function at all.
566
This is 
especially true for MHTs reviewing the decision to detain a person on the grounds of mental 
illness. 
 
5.04 The Influence of Medicalism & Legalism in the MHT Provisions & Judicial 
Interpretation of the Provisions  
The 2001 Act provides that within 21 days of detention, a three person MHT consisting of a 
lawyer as chair, a consultant psychiatrist and a lay person must review this decision to detain. 
Prior to the independent review, a legal representative is appointed by the MHC to represent 
the patient at the MHT, unless s/he proposes to engage one. An independent medical 
examination by a consultant psychiatrist, appointed by the MHC, will also have been 
completed and provided to the MHT for consideration. If the MHT is satisfied that the person 
is suffering from a mental disorder and that the detention provisions have been followed it 
can approve the detention order. If the MHT is not satisfied it must revoke the detention order 
and direct that the person be discharged from the approved centre. 
a. Independence & Impartiality 
In order to fulfil its purpose it is necessary that the MHT is independent and impartial, thus 
also correlating with the first principle of natural justice which requires a non-biased review 
of the case (nemo iudex in causa sua) and as required by Article 5(4) of the ECHR as 
discussed above.
567
 The MHC Procedural Guidance on MHT proceedings states that ―the 
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right to a fair hearing is a basic human rights requirement and is dependent on the MHT 
being independent and free from influence by any party in its decision making.‖568 It also 
states that members of the MHT must take reasonable steps to avoid any potential conflict of 
interest in a particular case. Members are also required to report to the MHC as soon as 
possible, any involvement with a particular approved centre or a particular organisation or 
individual which could be seen to constitute a potential conflict of interest in a particular case 
and to refrain from taking part in such a case.
569
  
b. Procedural Fairness 
i. MHT Procedure 
The 2001 Act sets out the powers of MHTs.
570
 In a similar manner to a court the MHT has 
the power to hear submissions and any evidence it requires in order to make a decision.
571
 In 
doing so it may direct any person to appear at a MHT to give evidence or direct any person to 
produce any documents relevant to the work of the MHT.
572
 The MHT must enable the 
examination and cross examination of witnesses, administration of oaths and the admission of 
written statements with the patient‘s consent.573 Failure to co-operate with any of the 
requirements of a MHT is an offence and where false evidence is given before a MHT the 
person giving such false evidence shall be guilty of perjury as if the evidence were given 
before a court.
574
 All witnesses, and the patient‘s legal representative, shall have the same 
privileges and immunities as if they were appearing in a court.
575
 The MHT is required to 
keep record of the MHT proceedings and it also produces a written decision, albeit one that is 
not made publically available.
576
 These MHT procedures appear to comply with the ECHR 
and legalism to ensure there is a fair hearing which also correlates with natural justice. 
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Other than these requirements, the MHTs are given the power to create their own procedures 
and give any directions for the purpose of proceedings that appear to it to be just and 
reasonable.
577
 This flexibility allows the MHT to respond to the exigencies of each particular 
case and make it more accessible, less formal and at times less adversarial than a typical court 
setting. Such an adversarial approach has been deemed inappropriate for the MHTs.
578
 In the 
adversarial system the judge plays the role of impartial arbiter between two identifiable 
parties with opposing interests. The two sides and their legal representatives play what has 
been described as a ‗mutually antagonistic role‘.579 By comparison with an inquisitorial 
system, there is often only one individual interest. On the other side is often the ―public‖ or 
―community‖ interest, which may consist of divergent concerns, some of which may 
converge with those of the individual. In this system the court is involved in establishing 
facts, collecting evidence and questioning witness. Such an inquisitorial approach is often 
used by tribunals
580
and the MHC emphasises in its Procedural Guidelines that MHTs should 
not be conducted in an adversarial manner.
581
  
ii. Privacy 
Significantly, however, unlike the courts, MHT hearings are held in private.
582
 Kris Gledhill 
has raised an issue with respect to Article 6 of the ECHR which presumes that hearings 
relating to the determination of civil rights (including the right to liberty) should be in public. 
This is subject to the interests of the private lives of the parties, which would naturally 
include information as to someone‘s mental health. However, the privacy right belongs to the 
patient and in cases where the patient would prefer to have a public hearing there is no 
provision for this in the legislation.
583
 In terms of legalism this privacy may have an impact 
on the extent to which the MHTs act as a control on clinical discretion and protect the civil 
rights of the patient. The oft quoted aphorism ‗justice must not only be done; it must also be 
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seen to be done‘ is apt here.584 As MHTs are held in private and they do not publish 
judgements, the latter part of the aphorism is not fulfilled.  
Given the nature of the issues being dealt with in the MHT a certain level of privacy is 
warranted, however, this should not be to the extent that it removes the MHT from any form 
of oversight or review. In the debating of the Mental Health Bill 1999, an amendment was 
proposed in relation to allowing ―bona fide members of the press and such other persons (if 
any) as the [tribunal] may in its discretion permit to remain.‖585 The amendment was 
proposed on the basis that MHTs should be responsible to society and not too secluded. 
However, it was subsequently withdrawn on the grounds that allowing members of the press 
or any other person to attend the MHT was seen to be an unwarranted intrusion of privacy.
586
 
However, this was a naïve and short-sighted conclusion; a simple legal provision in the 2001 
Act could have controlled the attendance of persons for bona fide purposes such as research 
or audit. Such a provision could have required the consent of the patient before any such 
attendance, therefore negating the concern raised about an unwarranted invasion of privacy.  
This provision has had an overarching impact on any research, review or oversight of the 
operation of the MHTs and as a result there has been no audit of their operation to date.
587
 
Even the MHC, whose responsibility it is to promote high standards in the delivery of mental 
health services and ensure the interests of those detained are protected, feel they are 
precluded from reviewing and auditing the operation of MHTs because of this privacy 
requirement. Indeed, the CEO of the MHC expressed concern at the fact that they have no 
idea what is going on within MHTs and how they are performing because of this.
588
 
Therefore, the extent to which this privacy furthers the protection of detained patients and 
correlatively whether it is consistent with legalism is questionable. A tentative answer to this 
question is provided in the consideration of the operation of the MHTs below. 
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iii. Legal Representative 
The second principle of natural justice also requires that anyone who may be adversely 
affected by the decision must be allowed to be heard and have the best possible chance to put 
their side of the case forward (audi alterm partem). A related concept required by the ECtHR 
is equality of arms, which provides that in the review of mental health detention, the patient 
must have legal representation.
589
 In furtherance of these principles, once the patient is 
detained under the 2001 Act they are provided with free legal representation for the MHT 
that is organised by the MHC. The provision of legal representation to each patient detained 
actually goes beyond the requirements of the ECtHR, which only requires the provision of 
legal representation to those that cannot afford it.
590
 By contrast, the treating psychiatrist is 
not represented which some have claimed fails to meet the natural justice requirements.
591
  
The courts have given mixed messages with respect to the role of the legal representative. 
The High Court has stated that the legal representative is supposed to advise the patient and 
act as an advocate on their behalf both at the MHT and in cases brought to the courts 
concerning their detention.
592
 Moreover, given the vulnerability of the patient who may not 
be in a position to instruct their legal representative to apply to the court for release, there is a 
duty on legal representatives to do this where a breach of statutory procedure has 
occurred.
593
However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Supreme Court has held that 
legal representatives should not bring cases concerning procedural flaws in the detention 
where it is not in the patient‘s medical best interests.594  
iv. Independent Psychiatric Evidence 
In order to ensure that the MHT does not only rely on the evidence from the treating 
psychiatrist the 2001 Act established the position of the independent psychiatrist whose role 
it is to provide an independent opinion to the MHT on whether the patient is suffering from a 
mental disorder that requires detention or not.
595
 In this manner the independent psychiatrist, 
consistent with legalism, is intended to be a form of control on the initial medical decision to 
detain. In practice, the independent psychiatrist is not called to give oral evidence at the MHT 
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hearing but they do provide it with a report on their findings, which is also disseminated to 
the patient‘s legal representative.596This report is based on a personal examination of the 
patient and a questioning of their treating psychiatrist and others that are involved in their 
care and treatment. The independent psychiatrist‘s report provides an account as to whether 
they believe the patient is suffering from a mental disorder or not and whether they require 
detention for their treatment, protection or both.  It provides a clinical description of the 
patient‘s current mental condition, their history, any change in their condition since 
admission, their treatment and any side effects, the patient‘s attitude to treatment and likely 
compliance with it in the future and any risk factors to the patient or others.
597
 Therefore, the 
report is only concerned with the medical aspects of the detention, not the patient‘s civil 
rights or compliance with the other legal detention provisions.The MHT is required to have 
regard to this report before making its decision.
598
  
c. Powers of the Mental Health Tribunal 
The MHT is required to provide an automatic review of the legality of the substantive and 
procedural aspects of detention.
599
 The 2001 Act makes provision for a MHT within 21 days 
of detention. The ECtHR has never explicitly ruled that automatic reviews are required and 
therefore the automatic review within 21 days is a heightened form of legalism in the 2001 
Act than that established by the ECtHR. If a patient‘s legal status is changed to voluntary 
within this time period the MHT can proceed, but only at the request of the patient. This acts 
as a control on medical power and is thereby consistent with legalism, and the ECtHR which 
has also established that for detention to be lawful it must be compliant with domestic 
legislation.
600
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i. Power to Ignore Detention Irregularities 
Notwithstanding this, the 2001 Act also specifically provides that MHTs can cure failures to 
comply with specific provisions in the detention process and affirm the detention provided 
that such failure does not affect the substance of the order or cause an injustice.
601
 These 
specific provisions include failures regarding: the persons who may apply for detention;
602
 
the making of a recommendation for detention by the first doctor;
603
 the powers of the Gardaí 
to take a person believed to be suffering from a mental disorder into custody;
604
 the 
admission order;
605
 the duration and renewal of detention orders;
606
 and the provision of 
information for persons detained.
607
 As can be seen these powers are far reaching. 
Furthermore, the 2001 Act does not define what failure will or will not affect the substance of 
the order or cause an injustice. The ECtHR requires compliance with the law for detention to 
be lawful; however, the 2001 Act provides both specific detention provisions and a power in 
the MHT to waive compliance with these provisions if it does not cause an injustice. It is 
questionable as to whether this is ECHR compliant and is a significant weakening of legalism 
in the 2001 Act. Essentially, it establishes a hierarchy of importance in terms of the medical 
and procedural requirements for detention. Absence of a medical disorder will result in 
unlawful detention, yet in certain circumstances, failure to comply with the detention 
provisions will not. Moreover, as discussed in the previous chapter, the inconsistency of the 
case law in determining what flaws will result in unlawful detention, and the judgements that 
have held that the MHT can cure nearly any procedural flaw, has added to the subjugation of 
legalism which requires compliance with all aspects of the law.
608
  
ii. Appeal to the Circuit Court 
The patient can appeal the decision of the MHT to the Circuit Court. However, legalism is 
further reduced in that the patient can only appeal this decision on the grounds that they are 
not suffering from a mental disorder. The Circuit Court cannot consider whether the 
procedural aspects of the detention have been complied with and it cannot vary the order of 
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the MHT, it can only affirm or revoke the detention order.
609
 In this manner the 2001 Act has 
reinforced the hierarchy between the medical and procedural aspects of the detention. 
d. Conclusion 
On its face the MHT provides an independent and speedy review of the medical decision to 
detain that is compliant with the ECHR and appears to be consistent with legalism. It is true 
that the provisions of the MHT do allow it to act as a control on medical discretion in the 
detention process by reviewing whether the person has a mental disorder. Furthermore, the 
MHT is also concerned with the patient‘s civil and statutory rights and must also determine 
whether they have been protected. However, upon analysis some of the provisions in the 
2001 Act concerning the MHT significantly weaken the impact of legalism and provide the 
opportunity for medicalism to prevail. These include the MHT‘s privacy, the continuing 
medical dominance in the process and the MHT‘s power to cure flaws in the detention where 
it believes it does not cause an injustice to the patient. The extent to which legalism has been 
realised or medicalism has prevailed in the operation of the MHTs is the focus of the next 
section. 
5.05 Influence of Medicalism & Legalism in the Operation of Mental Health Tribunals 
This section of the chapter focuses on the extent to which legalism or a perpetuation of 
medicalism has been realised in operation of the MHTs and the Courts interpretation of this. 
As with the previous section, the focus is on the extent to which the MHT provides an 
independent and fair review of the medical decision to detain. The following assessment of 
the extent to which legalism or medicalism are evident in the operation of the MHTs draws 
on information obtained in original interviews with treating psychiatrists and service users, 
findings from academic literature on the subject and research and data from the Department 
of Health and MHC Reports on the operation of the 2001 Act.
610
   
a. Difficulties with Conducting Qualitative Research on Irish MHTs 
As MHTs are held in private there were significant challenges in obtaining material to 
examine their operation. Following protracted consultation with the MHC which began in 
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2010, the MHC decided in late 2013 that it would not be possible to observe MHTs or 
interview or survey current or retired MHT members, independent psychiatrists or legal 
representatives on the basis that the 2001 Act requires MHTs to be held in private.
611
 The 
result was disappointing, surprising and extremely guarded considering the MHC, itself, had 
conducted research on ―stakeholders‖ views.612 Their research involved inviting these 
stakeholders to make submissions by letter, email or fax on a guidance template which 
provided a range of questions to elicit responses on the operation of the legislation.
613
 
b. Methodology 
As a result it was decided to conduct the research by interviewing consultant psychiatrists 
who had experience of MHTs in their capacity as the treating psychiatrist (TP) and service 
users (SUs) who had experience of MHTs. While the TP and the SU cannot provide 
information about the manner in which decisions are made by the MHT, they do have 
significant knowledge about how the MHT works, the roles of those involved and the issues 
that are considered; they can therefore provide some insight into the existence of legalism or 
medicalism. Furthermore, it is TPs who are charged with the operation of the 2001 Act and it 
is their medical discretion and professional judgement that the MHT is supposed to act as a 
control on, in line with legalism. Thus, it is essential to assess their attitudes towards this. 
TPs that the researcher knew had experience of MHTs were contacted personally. The 
researcher also utilised snowballing sampling which involved asking TPs who had already 
been interviewed to identify other consultant psychiatrists who fit the selection criteria. As 
some sample participants were generated through existing ones, there was clearly the danger 
that the diversity of the sample could be compromised.
614
 This was mitigated by contacting 
45% independently and contacting 55% on the recommendation of another participant. A 
total of 11 interviews were conducted with TPs working in the Dublin region. Only one of 
these worked in the private sector. Cumulatively, the TPs had attended approximately 469 
MHTs, ranging from 6MHTs for TP6 to 100 MHTs for TP2 and TP11.  
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It was decided to only interview SUs whom were no longer in in-patient care. This was 
because interviewing SUs in detention raised a host of problems that could not be resolved 
within the significant time constraints. These problems primarily revolved around the 
capacity of service users in detention to consent to such interviews and obtaining access to 
them through the approved centres and their legal representatives.
615
Ethical approval was 
subsequently granted by DCU Research Ethics Committee which also determined the manner 
by which service users were to be recruited.
616
Recruiting these service users was a more 
difficult task. Mr Paddy McGowan, Head of Service User, Family Member and Carer 
Engagement on the HSE National Mental Health Management Team, was contacted and 
agreed to inform service users about the research at the series of nationwide mental health 
public meetings held by the HSE. Mental health organisations operating in Ireland were 
contacted and asked to inform their members of the research being conducted.
617
 Some 
organisations advertised the research on their websites or in their centres with an 
advertisement provided. The research was also presented at the members‘ meetings of several 
mental health organisations. This was done in an attempt to meet possible participants face to 
face and perhaps allay any anxieties concerning participation in the research. When 
discussing the research with service users, they were urged to bring along a person with 
whom they felt comfortable with to the interview if they so wished. Furthermore, the 
independence and confidentiality of the research was emphasised.  A total of 4 interviews 
were conducted with SUs from the Dublin region. The low response rate is attributed to the 
sensitive nature of the subject to be discussed in the interviews, something which persons 
who are no longer in detention may not wish to recount with a relative stranger. Similar 
service user response rates were also seen in the MHC Consultation on the Operation of Part 
2 of the 2001 Act.
618
 This highlights the difficulty in recruiting SUs for this type of research; 
the MHC also has significantly better resources and access to service users to secure such 
recruitment than was available for this research. 
Having provided informed consent, all participants underwent a semi-structured interview 
covering their knowledge of the purpose of the MHT, the MHT process, the roles of those 
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involved, the evidence provided and the extent to which the MHT protects the SU‘s rights.619 
The following assessment of the extent to which legalism or medicalism is evident in the 
operation of the MHTs draws heavily from these interviews.   
c. Introduction & Purpose of the Mental Health Tribunal 
TPs were initially asked about why the 2001 Act was introduced and what was its purpose in 
order to get an overview of their feelings and some sense of whether they were supportive of 
or opposed to legalism. TPs stated that the 2001 Act was introduced to ensure compliance 
with the ECHR and provide a review of their decision to detain the patient.
620
 Many 
highlighted the inadequacies of the 1945 Act which they said was completely out of date and 
failed to protect the rights of those detained. Primarily, because many people were detained 
unnecessarily for long periods of time with no real right of appeal, except to the courts, and 
psychiatrists had no real oversight on what they did.
621
 TP2 stated that in addition to 
providing the patient with a review, the 2001 Act served a societal purpose by introducing 
transparency into the system. Although not perfect, the 2001 Act was seen as a huge 
improvement on the 1945 Act.
622
 However, a continuing issue that must be highlighted is that 
TP2 and TP8 believed that if there were more comprehensive community services, or more 
funding for supported housing, they would detain less people.
623
 The 2001 Act, as 
highlighted, did not provide legislatively for this. 
However, despite knowing that the 2001 Act was needed to comply with the ECHR, the 
extent to which TPs truly endorsed the MHTs role in the protection of patients‘ civil rights 
was variable. Overall, each TP stated that the MHT was a good thing.
624
 While several TPs 
believed the MHT was in the best interests of the patient,
625
 TP2 believed the MHT was in 
the legal best interests of the patient but remarked that the therapeutic effect was less clear. 
All of the TPs highlighted how the MHT was often a stressful and upsetting experience for 
patients, but could not think of a better way to do it. However, for TP1, the MHT was just a 
legal process needed to comply with the ECHR but not to the real benefit of or in the best 
interests of the patient.
626
 Three of the SUs also appeared to believe that the MHT was more 
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of a ‗box ticking‘ exercise, a formality, that did not protect their rights.627SU2, alternatively, 
was extremely positive about the MHT process and believed it was an essential human rights 
protection for those in detention.  
Significantly, TPs believed the MHT was beneficial for them, as it often provided validation 
of their decision to detain.
628
 This was especially important where there where societal 
pressures from family members or the Gardaí pushing for a person‘s detention, but whom the 
TP did not believe satisfied the criteria of mental disorder.
629
TP7, particularly, highlighted 
how the 2001 Act prohibition on detaining alcoholics is essential in that it prevents families 
from having people detained where it is to no benefit in terms of their treatment. It also, in 
some cases, removes from the TP the risk attached to revoking a detention order where they 
are unsure whether to continue the detention.
630
 Additionally, the MHT was seen in a positive 
light in that it ―keeps you on your toes‖ and acts as a quality control in making detention 
decisions.
631
 
Therefore, from the outset it is unclear the extent to which the TPs embraced the legalistic 
intention of the MHT which was to provide an independent control on the medical decision to 
detain, for the protection of the patient‘s civil rights. While many accepted that this system 
did protect the rights of the patients, it was cumulatively seen as a body that often provided 
them with some protection and a validation of their decision to detain. This is perhaps an 
inescapable consequence of the MHT, and as such the extent to which it provides for the 
maximisation of medical discretion, consistent with medicalism, is examined presently.  
d. Revocation of Detention Prior to the Mental Health Tribunal Hearing 
A significant issue that must be highlighted at the outset is the high percentage of detention 
orders that are revoked prior to the MHT sitting. In cases where the detention order is 
revoked prior to a MHT hearing, the MHT hearing only proceeds at the request of the person 
who was detained. The MHT is usually held toward the end of the 21 days provided and 
concern has been expressed at government level of the high numbers of detention orders that 
are revoked prior to the MHT hearing resulting in no review of the decision to detain.
632
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When asked about this some TPs believed 21 days was too long and questioned whether it 
complied with the speediness requirement under the ECHR.
633
 They thought MHTs could 
probably be held earlier but that it was cheaper to have it this way, on the basis that many 
detention orders would be revoked.
634
 Others thought 21 days was appropriate
635
and TP6 
thought the MHTs should be as late as possible because patients should be given as long as 
they can to recover.  
In 2013 only 56% of people who were detained and due to have a MHT review actually had 
one; 44% (1,455 of 3,325) of detention orders were revoked prior to the MHT hearing.
636
 In 
2007, 42% (1,444 of 3,244) of detention orders were revoked prior to detention and there 
were 16 requests for such a review; unfortunately there are no similar statistics for subsequent 
years.
637
 Significantly, revoking the detention order does not mean the patient is released 
from the approved centre; it can mean that they are re-graded as voluntary patients.
638
 
Unfortunately, the MHC has not produced statistics on the frequency with which this 
happens. In a study of a mental health service in Galway, 68% of SUs had their status 
changed to voluntary prior to the review by the MHT and none of these requested their MHT 
to proceed.
639
  
These statistics are compelling. The establishment of the MHT to review the medical decision 
to detain is a clear espousal of legalism. In practice however, only 56% of those who should 
have a review of this decision to detain actually have one. Of course, some of those who were 
initially detained may have recovered sufficiently to agree or want to stay in hospital on a 
voluntary basis by the time the MHT sits. Indeed, all of the TPs who were asked to explain 
the high number of revocations prior to a MHT hearing stated that this was the reason for the 
high rate of revocation.
640
 Significantly, however, in a national study it was acknowledged by 
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consultant psychiatrists that detention orders may be revoked early to avoid a MHT.
641
 
Therefore consultant psychiatrists sometimes change a person‘s status in order to circumvent 
the process. If this is still the case then TPs are avoiding the review of their decision to detain 
and denying those who were detained an opportunity to have the legality of their detention 
assessed and in turn circumventing legalism. 
e. Independence & Impartiality of the Mental Health Tribunal 
i. Roles of MHT Members 
The composition of the MHT was intended to provide a multi-disciplinary control on the 
medical decision to detain. Rose, however, has stated that there is no evidence that the 
involvement of legal and lay members on tribunals makes them more competent, objective or 
rational in making decisions concerning detention than psychiatrists are.
642
 Information was 
gathered from the interviews to determine the extent to which the MHT does provide an 
independent, competent and fair review of the medical decision to detain. 
The legal member in the MHT acts as the Chairperson.  The legal member provides legal 
expertise to the MHT. In doing so they ensure that the legal processes for detention have been 
complied with.
643
 Additionally, at the outset of the MHT hearing, they ask the legal 
representative, whether the forms have been completed correctly and if there are any 
anomalies with the detention.
644
 The chairperson will also question the TP about the detention 
or for clarification on issues that were raised during the hearing.
645
 Despite the fact that all 
MHT members have an equal vote, TP7 thought the chairperson was the most important 
member on the MHT and would have the deciding vote if there was no consensus. TP5 
thought the chairperson, as a lawyer, would hold disproportionate weight with the MHT 
members: 
 “Lawyers see themselves as the dominant figure – I‟m just being realistic, there is a sense 
amongst the legal Chairs that they are the ones in charge and the rest are passengers.”646 
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The medical member forms their own medical opinion of the patient. This is based on the 
evidence provided by and questioning of the patient and the TP and an examination of the 
medical reports including the independent psychiatrist‘s report.647 They will ask the TPs 
about the reasons for detention, the history, family involvement, GP involvement, diagnosis, 
medication, current situation, treatment plan and anything else they feel relevant.
648
 It was 
also believed that the medical member was an information resource for the other MHT 
members and could explain to them the various aspects of the medical evidence.
649
 For TP6, 
the medical member was the most important member, and the one that made him most 
nervous and as colleagues they may,  
“look at what you have done and say, this is a load of rubbish.”650 
The lay member provides a common sense view of the case in conjunction with forming their 
own opinions about whether the patient suffers from a mental disorder that requires detention 
and whether the provisions concerning detention have been complied with.
651
 The questions 
asked by lay members are quite variable and some ask a lot more questions than others, but 
they are always involved.
652
It is important that the process is transparent to the patient and the 
lay member plays an important role in this.
653
 Therefore, they may seek clarification about 
something the TP has said about diagnosis or treatment. They also ask practical questions 
about where the patient would live if they were released, family involvement and supports.
654
  
In terms of independence, the same MHT members do not usually sit on the same MHT 
together.
655
 However, TP6 did have one patient whose detention was reviewed by the same 
legal member twice. This he found helpful as he did not have to go over his same concerns 
again and the chairperson knew what he was trying to achieve. However, with a different 
MHT panel each time “you don‟t know what they think and what you can say to them.”656 
This raises questions about the independence of this review as it is unlikely that a legal 
member whom had previously upheld the detention would decide differently where no 
circumstances had changed. This might introduce some prejudice into the review. The usual 
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mixture of MHT members provides a greater control on the medical decision to detain and is 
consistent with legalism. 
Cumulatively, from the interviews the MHTs do provide a comprehensive and seemingly 
independent review of the decision to detain. The review is not solely concerned with the 
medical issues and each member questions the TP and the patient from a legal, medical and 
lay perspective. It does not appear that the MHT members automatically accept what the TP 
decided and they were definitely not seen by TPs as somebody who merely accepted their 
decision to detain without question. In the aggregate, the composition of the MHT provides 
for a review of the medical decision to detain that is consistent with legalism. 
ii. Familiarity of the Irish Psychiatric Profession 
Having said this, there are some factors that may affect the independence and impartiality of 
the MHT. Psychiatric familiarity is a serious issue for the MHT in Ireland and the 
independence of Irish psychiatrists in the process is questionable. In this small jurisdiction 
there are only 353 consultant psychiatrists working in the public sector,
657
 therefore there is a 
distinct possibility that any of the psychiatrists may know the other psychiatrists involved in 
the process.
658
 This was attested to in the interviews, where most of the TPs recognised that 
all Irish psychiatrists are colleagues and know each other, at least in passing and by name.
659
 
TP6 thought that this must cause an issue that would affect the Medical Member and 
Independent Psychiatrist‘s decision, as no psychiatrist is ever going to damn another. TP5 
further stated Ireland is too small to effectively inspect or govern itself. Some thought that, 
while it could be a problem, they have never personally seen it cause an issue.
660
 Others again 
did not think it was a problem at all because psychiatrists are required to be independent and 
objective and, in reality, regularly give second opinions and disagree with each other.
661
 In 
practice the independent psychiatrist is not employed by the hospital in which the patient is 
detained. Whether this is enough to constitute independence is highly questionable.
662
 There 
are some precedents which govern these situations. If two of the psychiatrists were in the 
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same class in university, this would not be an issue. However, if one of them is in a position 
of seniority over another then this would not be appropriate.
663
  
Three of the four SUs did not see the independent psychiatrist as a safeguard or control on the 
decision to detain and believed that they simply agreed with the TP. In particular SU1 
highlighted how she requested her legal representative to get a different independent 
psychiatrist to provide evidence, but the legal representative failed to do so. TP1 believed that 
many patients do not appreciate the role of the independent psychiatrist as a protection; they 
just see it as another psychiatrist coming to examine them.
664
This may have something to do 
with the way in which they are informed on the day about the independent exam. While some 
TPs inform them personally,
665
 in other cases it would usually be ward staff informing 
them
666
 and this may give the impression that it is simply another psychiatrist involved in 
their care.
667
For TPs 7 and 8 this was an issue because the independent psychiatrist should 
not only be independent but also be seen to be independent from the patients‘ perspective to 
ensure transparency and confidence in the system. 
f. Fair Procedures 
For the MHT to provide a review of the decision to detain that is compliant with the ECHR 
and legalism it must ensure that there is fairness in the proceedings. Natural justice and 
equality of arms requires that the patient is able to put their side of the case forward and is not 
put at a disadvantage in the proceedings concerning their detention. 
i. Mental Health Tribunal Format; Evidence & Cross-Examination 
Prior to a MHT taking place, in line with the requirement to provide patients with 
information, most TPs personally inform patient of MHT and the process when they are first 
detained. They will tell them what to expect about the process and what the TPs are likely to 
say during it.
668
Most TPs felt they had to prepare their patients for what they may have to say 
at the MHT, as it may be upsetting or stressful, in order to minimise the effect on the 
therapeutic relationship.
669
Where MHTs do occur they are generally quite formal in that that 
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are quiet, respectful, sensible and people are addressed by their titles and surnames.
670
 There 
may be some variety in the format of the MHT hearing and this is dependent on the legal 
member who is at all times responsible for its orderly running.
671
  
The MHT usually starts with the legal member asking the patient‘s legal representative if 
they have any submissions to make.  This can concern procedural errors in terms of the 
paperwork. The MHT may then decide to use the s18 power to cure a failure in the detention 
process. Then the legal member usually gets the TP to summarise the case and why they 
believe the patient needs to be detained. This would usually require the TP to give account of 
the patient‘s past history, current position, the treatment plan and perhaps the individual care 
plan. It varies from this point but usually the legal representative is given the opportunity to 
present the patient‘s case and cross examine the TP. The patient is also given the opportunity 
to talk and question the TP. Thereafter the MHT members question the TP.
672
 The length of 
the MHT hearing is extremely variable, they were much longer in the beginning but are now 
approximately 1-1.5 hours.
673
 
ii. Legal Representation 
Consistent with legalism, the legal representative must ascertain the legality of the patient‘s 
detention. Therefore, it is necessary that they have adequate knowledge of the 2001 Act and 
can provide representation of a high quality. In this manner training is mandatory for legal 
representatives to ensure that a patient is not represented by a lawyer who knows very little 
about the 2001 Act.
674
 TPs were asked what made a good or a bad legal representative; they 
believed that a good legal representative establishes the legal and factual circumstances of the 
case and the wishes of the patient.
675
 All SUs stated that they had a good relationship with 
their legal representatives: they met with them prior to the MHT; were understanding and 
compassionate; took instructions; and represented the SU to their best ability.
676
  
The legal representative determines whether the legal processes have been complied with 
through an examination of the paperwork and medical records attached to the detention and 
perhaps questioning of the patient and others involved in the detention. On this point all of 
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the TPs said that the legal representative is consistently excellent at raising such procedural 
issues. Establishing the legality of detention also requires the legal representative to question 
the TP on the grounds upon which they are detaining the patient. From the interviews it 
appears that the legal representative will question the TP about the diagnosis, treatment, risk 
and continuing reasons for detention.
677
 The legal representative‘s approach to the 
questioning of the TP during the MHT has often been highlighted by psychiatrists involved in 
the operation of the 2001 Act and the Department of Health and MHC Reports reviewing the 
2001 Act.
678
  
In general the approach to questioning seems to be inquisitorial, although several TPs 
indicated that they had experienced some adversarial approaches, more so in the early years 
of the MHT but still apparent.
679
 Some TPs stated that legal representatives seemed to believe 
they had to win the case and get the patient out of hospital, without considering what was in 
the best interests of the patient.
680
While some recognised that the TP was required to take 
instructions from their client and do what they could to get them released if that is what they 
wanted.
681
 TP1 stated that ―the legal representatives are the ones that we have had issues with 
since it started and I think some of them had to be removed from the Panels… because they 
acted in a very adversarial way.‖ Where there was adversarial questioning it seemed to make 
the TPs very uncomfortable. They did not want to be seen as a detainer who was restricting 
the rights of the patient and were averse to questioning that intimated that.
682
 Some TPs 
referred to emotional legal arguments made by the legal representative about the repression 
of their client‘s rights. This they believed was unnecessary and somewhat ridiculous.683 
Rather, TPs emphasised their role in the treatment and care of the patient, they did not see 
themselves as being in opposition to the patient but instead ‗on their side‘. Therefore, they 
found an adversarial approach inappropriate. Furthermore, they thought it was unproductive 
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and at times detrimental to the therapeutic relationship as it undermined their credibility
684
or 
forced them to say things that were likely to humiliate, upset or anger their patients.
685
 This 
damage to the therapeutic relationship by adversarial questioning has been highlighted in 
several studies.
686
 Others thought it did not have an effect on the therapeutic relationship and, 
if it did, it was only short term.
687
  
Adversarial approaches by the legal representatives are no longer as common and three TPs 
believed this was because they have become more accustomed to how mental health 
detention works whereby the psychiatrist should not be seen as a detainer who is trying to 
deprive the patient of their rights, rather they are trying to help the patient.
688
 Despite this, 
and the possible effect on the therapeutic relationship, the role of the legal representative, 
consistent with legalism is to challenge the detention and have the patient released where it is 
not lawful. This remark seems to suggest that legal representatives may be taking into 
account the medical aspects of whether the patient requires detention as opposed to simply 
arguing the law. Two TPs mentioned how recently legal representatives have said ―these are 
the instructions I have been given‖ and the TPs believed they were ―dropping a hint‖ that 
they understood that release may not be in the patient‘s best interests but they were obliged to 
represent their client‘s wish.689 
There is some evidence that legal representatives may feel constrained to consider the 
medical best interests of their clients which may result in a subjugation of legalism. In 2009, 
judicial review applications were filed by solicitors whose membership of the MHC‘s legal 
representative panel was not renewed. According to an article in the Sunday Times, the MHC 
conducted interviews with its panel of solicitors and marked them out of 25. Some solicitors 
whom were considered well-respected experts on mental health were marked poorly for their 
interpretation of ―best interests‖ and told that they had insufficient knowledge of the law.690 
However, in line with legalism, as a matter of statutory construction the best interests 
principle in the 2001 Act does not apply to legal representatives as it only applies to those 
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involved in ―in making a decision under the Act concerning the care or treatment of a 
person.‖691 Furthermore, the Law Society‘s guidance for legal representatives states that it is 
the patient‘s views or wishes that should be presented at the MHT. A legal representative 
should act in accordance with their instructions and act in their best interests in terms of legal 
representation.
692
 
A lack of acceptance of legalism is highlighted in the belief of several of the TPs that some 
solicitors took too many High Court actions against detentions.
693
 This point was raised 
several times in the interviews and it was believed that these cases were brought primarily for 
the financial gain to legal representatives as opposed to the interests of the patient.
694
One TP, 
whom has had experience of several such cases, explained that they had a significant impact 
on the patient in that they were told that their TP is in effect abusing their human rights. 
Where these cases are not successful it is the TP who has to pick up the pieces and the legal 
representative washes their hands of it.
695
 While such motivations behind habeas corpus 
cases may be true, it must not be forgotten that the original wrong has been the failure of the 
TP to comply with the procedural requirements for a lawful detention. Legalism requires 
compliance with the law and these cases provide a greater potential for this. Therefore, the 
result of cases being brought on procedural issues is that now every effort is made to have the 
paperwork and the procedural aspects of the detention complied with fully and accurately.
 696
 
iii. Independent Psychiatric Evidence 
In line with legalism, the independent psychiatrist should provide an independent 
examination as to whether the TP‘s decision to detain was medically warranted. TPs believed 
that the purpose of the independent psychiatrist‘s exam is to empower the MHT by giving it 
access to clinically relevant information from an independent source.
697
 However, an issue 
concerning the timing of the independent psychiatrist‘s review was highlighted. If this is done 
early in the 21 days, it may be out of date by the time the MHT receives the report.
698
 For 
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some TPs, the independent psychiatrist and the MHT also had an indirect quality control role 
in that it made them think more deeply about detaining a person as they knew this decision 
would be reviewed by psychiatric colleagues.
699
Importantly, in terms of independence, where 
a patient has multiple reviews it will usually always be a different independent psychiatrist 
examining them.
700
As outlined above, the independent psychiatrist carries out a 
comprehensive medical exam of the patient. SU2 stated that this exam was very thorough and 
the independent psychiatrist made sure he verified everything that was in the medical notes 
by questioning the SU about them.
701
The independent psychiatrist is also required to question 
the TP and they generally ask about the diagnosis, the treatment plan, current views about the 
detention and whether it remains relevant.
702
 
However, there is the possibility that the independent psychiatrist may be deferential to the 
TP. There are no statistics available on the frequency with which the independent 
psychiatrist‘s opinion differs from TP‘s; the interviews indicate that it could occur 
approximately 15% of the time.
703
 Significantly, TP6 stated that “I‟m very lucky here in that 
none of the Independent Psychiatrists have experience of learning disability. So they all 
agree with everything we say.‖704 Furthermore, TPs welcomed the independent examination 
as it provided some reassurance about their decision to detain and an opportunity for a 
collegial discussion about the patient, different approaches, other treatment options and any 
possible alternatives to detention.
705
 
g. Powers of MHT 
The MHT is required to review the substantive basis for detention and whether the procedural 
requirements have been complied with. However, as stated the provisions of the 2001 Act 
concerning the MHT‘s powers to review the legality of detention have actually provided a 
significant potential for the subjugation of legalism. It is therefore necessary to consider 
whether this has occurred in practice. 
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i. Review of the Decision to Detain 
As seen above the MHT hears evidence about the substantive basis for detention from the TP 
and this is subject to questioning from all those present. Also the legal representative will 
always highlight any procedural flaws in the detention. In reality, however, the MHT very 
rarely revokes a detention order: from the MHC statistics for the last four years less than 10% 
of detention orders were revoked. The first two years of the 2001 Act‘s operation saw a 
slightly higher number of detention orders revoked; 11%. In an analysis of the MHT 
revocations in 2007, it was seen that in 60% of the cases where the MHT revoked the 
detention order it was based on the substantive issue of whether the patient had a mental 
disorder. Only 39% of the revocations were based on a failure to comply with the detention 
provisions of the 2001 Act.
706
 These statistics are somewhat surprising as it may have been 
assumed, based on the court cases, that the main issues arising at MHTs were procedural 
ones.  Unfortunately, there are no similar statistics for the following years.
707
 However, from 
the interviews TPs estimated that 77% of the revocations were on the basis of an absence of a 
mental disorder requiring detention.
708
 TP2 remarked that he had never seen a MHT even 
come close to revoking detention on a procedural issue. The absence of any published 
judgements also means that there is no ―case law‖ to guide MHT decisions which could lead 
to variations in approach and lack of consistency.
709
 TP6 stated that, in general, there was 
very little consistency in MHT decisions whereby two MHTs can determine almost identical 
cases completely differently.
710
 Such variance has also been found in other jurisdictions.
711
  
ii. Medical Dominance & Deference to the Treating Psychiatrist 
Despite the composition of the MHT, the process remains heavily influenced by clinicians in 
the form of the medical member, the independent psychiatrist and the TP.
712
 Additionally, the 
legal criteria for detention are defined in medical and therapeutic terms. The MHTs power to 
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ignore procedural flaws in the detention also indicates a hierarchy in terms of the importance 
of medical and legal issues. Therefore, as highlighted by Rose, it is possible that the legal and 
lay members will defer to psychiatric expertise in determining whether the patient requires 
detention or not.
713
 
There is a possibility that those involved in the MHT process may be over reliant on the 
opinion of the TP. There are understandable reasons as to why MHT members may be 
deferential to the TP. The TP has more knowledge of the patient and their particular case than 
anybody else involved in the MHT process. MHT members may also be conscious as to the 
potential realities of risk in revoking a detention order. While these factors can 
understandably result in deference to the TP, in line with legalism it is important that this is 
not excessive and is well founded. Compliance with legalism requires the MHT to go behind 
such assertions and critically assess whether the views formed by the TP are evidence-based 
and sound. SU1, SU3 and SU4 did not believe the MHT went beyond the assertions of the 
TP. SU4 thought this was because they did not want to bear that risk and would prefer to 
have the TP revoke the detention. However, SU4 had two MHTs, one of which revoked the 
detention order. When asked to explain how this correlated with the claim that the MHT 
members simply agreed with the TP, he could not. Without observing the MHTs it is difficult 
to determine the extent to which this happens, however, there is a feeling that, in the words of 
TP2 “the MHT does not take my opinion as gospel but they do take it very seriously.” 714 
In a study conducted in England it was found that discharge from detention was only 
successful in 13% of cases where the TP opposed it. However, 86% of applications for 
discharge were successful where the TP supported it. This suggests that tribunals may be 
―unduly passive‖.715 Another study has shown that tribunals agree with the opinion of the TP 
in 86% of cases and when they did conflict they usually provided a more cautious response 
and detention was recommended.
716
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From the interviews with the TPs, the percentage of MHTs that revoked a detention order of 
one of their patients was quite low at approximately 9%.
717
  This figure corresponds with 
statistics from the Mental Health Commission that show the percentage of detention orders 
that have been revoked by MHTs since 2007:
718
 
 
Year % of Detention Orders Revoked 
2007 11.5 
2008 11.7 
2009 9 
2010 8 
2011 8.2 
2012 7.9 
2013 9.1 
2014 (up to and including April) 7.9 
 
iii. Power to Ignore Detention Irregularities 
The MHC also does not publish data on the frequency with which the MHT cures procedural 
flaws. From the interviews it appears that they do so in approximately 3.8% of cases.
719
 At 
issue has been the incorrect completion of detention orders with respect to timing, dates, the 
spelling of names, addresses, dates of birth and the ticking of boxes.
720
 In one case the patient 
was not properly notified of their detention in the prescribed form within the appropriate time 
limit.
721
 When TPs were asked what they thought of the paperwork attached to a detention a 
minority thought it was excessive and complicated.
722
Others thought that while it could be 
repetitive and complicated, it was acceptable given the serious nature of detention, and that 
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this must be documented.
723
 In cases where there is a procedural flaw and the MHT does not 
feel it can cure it, the MHT will revoke the detention or the case may end up in the High 
Court.
724
 As a result of these Court cases many TPs have refused to detain a person on faulty 
paperwork received from a GP or the Gardaí, as ultimately it would be they who were held 
responsible.
725
 Thus, a positive aspect of legalism is that as a result of these cases many 
approved centres have established systems to check the paperwork prior to detention.
726
 It 
was also noted that in many cases that while the TP is responsible for signing off on these 
detention orders, in many cases it is a GP or the Gardaí who have incorrectly filled them 
out.
727
 There is no comprehensive training for GPs that is organised by the MHC despite the 
fact that they play a significant role in administering it.  
iv. Appeal to Circuit Court 
 In 2013 there were 121 Circuit Court appeals, which compares to 116 in 2012. Some of these 
cases did not proceed as the orders detaining the persons were revoked by the responsible 
consultant psychiatrist prior to the hearing of the appeal or the person did not wish to proceed 
for whatever reason. In the 21 cases that did go to hearing, all of the detention orders were 
affirmed by the Circuit Court. Similarly, in previous years no Circuit Court appeal has been 
successful. The person detained can only appeal the medical diagnosis of mental disorder, not 
whether the other detention provisions under the 2001 Act have been complied with. If one 
wanted to do so they would have to take a judicial review or habeas corpus case to the High 
Court. The burden of proof is also on the person detained to show that they are not suffering 
from a mental disorder. In many cases, the patient does not have independent evidence that 
they are not suffering from a mental disorder. Thus, the expert evidence of the consultant 
psychiatrist responsible for the patient, while subject to cross-examination, is uncontested by 
an opposing expert.
728
 This naturally puts them at a significant disadvantage and could 
potentially allow for medicalism to dominate. 
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h. Conclusion  
Legalism requires a review of the medical decision to detain for the purposes of controlling 
medical discretion and promoting the patient‘s civil rights. Naturally when no MHT occurs, 
as happens in 44% of cases, this purpose is negated resulting in a significant subjugation of 
legalism in the detention process. However, where they do occur, overall it appears that 
psychiatrists believe the MHT does provide an independent review of the decision to detain. 
Factors which could affect this, including the MHT‘s privacy and the psychiatric familiarity 
in Ireland have been highlighted. From the outset the inclusion of three psychiatrists in the 
MHT process provides the possibility for the maximisation of medical discretion and 
circumscription of the legalism in the MHT process. This has not been definitively 
determined from the interviews. However, it is possible to highlight how the MHT might be 
deferential to the TP, although it is acknowledged that this deference can be understandable. 
The MHT revoked less than 8% of detention orders contrary to the wishes of TPs in 2013. 
Furthermore, from the interview statistics, 15% of independent psychiatrists disagreed with 
the need to detain patients; however, only 9% of the MHTs revoked the detention order. 
Unfortunately, such a claim is difficult to substantiate without further information.  
Through the legal representative the patient is able to put their side of the case forward and is 
not put at a disadvantage in the proceedings concerning their detention. However, the TPs‘ 
issues with legal representatives acting in an adversarial manner and bringing cases to the 
High Court concerning procedural issues indicates a lack of acceptance of legalism and a 
continuing adherence to medicalism. The extent to which this objection impacts on the legal 
representatives has yet to be determined. It is possible that it could have the effect of 
weakening the protection of rights and compliance with the law in favour of a medicalist 
determination of illness and waiving of the law. 
Additionally, the MHTs power to cure procedural flaws in the detention and the Courts 
inconsistent approach to this serves to weaken the impact of legalism by introducing 
uncertainty and diminishing the foreseeability in the application of the law. From the 
interviews it appears that the MHT uses this power relatively rarely, approximately 3.8%, yet 
legalism prescribes that for detention to be lawful there must be complete compliance with 
the law, which would include procedural requirements. Without further statistics a definitive 
conclusion as to whether MHTs act in a legalist or medicalist fashion cannot be determined. 
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5.06 Conclusion 
From the outset, the MHT was intended to provide a control on the medical decision to detain 
that was consistent with legalism. Ultimately, however, some of the statutory provisions 
concerning the MHT in the 2001 Act had the power to undermine legalism and allow 
medicalism to prevail. In the examination of the operation of the MHT it is clear that this new 
system of review is still attempting to find its feet. Although in force for over seven years, the 
MHT review of the clinical decision to detain represents a momentous change from what 
went before, where TPs were rarely required to answer to anybody. The decision to have a 
MHT review detention, as opposed to a court, and the failure to define the roles of those 
involved -the MHT members and the legal representative- has resulted in some consternation. 
This consternation emanated from the TP interviews, yet it is possible that it might also exist 
within the legal representative panel also, although this cannot be determined without further 
research.  
What is apparent is that it is difficult, at times, for the MHT to balance the competing aims of 
medicine and law. The black and white approach of law has a difficult task in trying to 
control what are often the many shades of grey of psychiatric discretion. TPs understandably 
do not want to be seen as detainers who restrict the rights of their patients and are hostile 
towards adversarial questioning from the legal representative that intimates this. However, 
despite the intentions of the TPs, the unpleasant result of the decision to detain is a restriction 
of their patients‘ rights. The legality of their decision must be challenged and different legal 
representatives will naturally have different approaches in how they represent clients. Thus, 
while all of the TPs thought the MHTs were a good thing, in reality, their support was often 
left waning in the face of an adversarial legal representative who challenged their diagnosis 
of a patient or a High Court case concerning a faulty detention order.  
The power of the MHT to cure procedural flaws, the inconsistent approach of the Courts to 
this issue and the lack of information about the extent to which the MHT uses this power add 
to the uncertainty and consternation about the MHT process. These issues, in conjunction 
with the privacy of the MHT and the reliance on a small and exclusive psychiatric profession 
in Ireland, present significant challenges to legalism. In conclusion, the outright medicalism 
of the 1945 Act is no longer evident but remnants of it still remain in the 2001 Act provisions 
on the MHT and in its operation. Importantly, further research is needed on the MHTs to 
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determine how they operate and whether they are fulfilling the purpose for which they were 
created. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
6.01 Embedded Medicalism 
The law has played a definitive role in the development of the Irish mental health system as a 
whole. It was through an Act in 1817 that Ireland came to have one of the first public asylum 
systems in the world and subsequently one of the highest numbers of citizens in mental health 
detention in the world.
729
 The large institutions that were established under the Lunacy 
(Ireland) Act 1821 during the nineteenth century came to be one of the most enduring sources 
of social provision in the State, not only for the mentally ill but for an expanded form of 
social problems. In this manner institutionalised care became integrated in Irish culture and 
society and the institutions were relied on by society as a whole to manage not only the 
mentally ill but a plethora of social issues caused by those that were deemed to be socially 
problematic including the elderly, the intellectually disabled, unmarried mothers and 
children. Mental health detention in large institutions and subsequently smaller institutions 
and units in general hospitals has since then remained the government‘s primary approach to 
mental illness. This has been reflected in the law which has never provided for the 
establishment of any comprehensive system of community care. However, the government 
were not alone in favouring this approach. 
From the mid-1800s the psychiatric profession were entrusted with the detention, care and 
treatment of those in the institutions. Despite psychiatry‘s subjective role in establishing 
professional dominance over all issues concerning mental illness, Irish society willingly 
delegated this role and, in fact, ardently relied on psychiatry to manage the perceived social 
problem caused by mental illness. It was in this way that the psychiatric profession came to 
occupy a position of importance and expertise in Irish society and culture also. Therefore, 
since 1821 the legal powers of civil mental health detention have been solely entrusted to the 
psychiatric profession. Moreover, society‘s trust in psychiatry also explains why the 
legislation concerning mental health detention did not provide for any non-medical review of 
the decision to detain or continuing detention until 2006. As such, for close to two hundred 
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years medicalism dominated civil mental health detention in Ireland and became embedded in 
Irish society and culture. 
6.02 Challenges to Legalism 
The 2001 Act really came quite late in the day when compared to similar legislative 
provisions on the continent and again is demonstrative of the strength of medicalism.
730
 By 
2001 there was a wealth of information and research that contested and criticised the role of 
psychiatry in the detention of the mentally ill. Furthermore, there was well established 
international human rights law from the ECtHR that required Ireland to provide greater 
protections for the human rights of those in detention. Ultimately, it was the threat of being 
found in violation of the ECHR that finally forced the government to introduce legislation 
that would give effect to legalism. The resulting 2001 Act was definitely a move towards 
legalism, as seen in the various provisions that have been outlined throughout Chapters 4 and 
5 of the thesis. However, there was also a recognition on the part of the government that this 
transformative approach to the legal powers of detention was not something that could be 
achieved instantaneously. Specifically, for over 50 years the judicial interpretation of the 
1945 Act was avowedly medicalist, despite the developments that had occurred in terms of 
the anti-psychiatry movements and the ECtHR jurisprudence on mental health detention. 
Thus, the government included in the 2001 Act a requirement that the Minister for Health 
review its operation within five years of its establishment.
731
  
While the provisions in the 2001 Act therefore represented a substantial transition towards 
legalism, consistent with Unsworth‘s analysis that legalism has become a mode of medical 
power, many of the safeguards introduced in the 2001 Act are medical in nature.
732
 Medical 
discretion in the detention of patients is restricted, but it is restricted through the use of 
second or multiple medical opinions. Similarly, the mental health tribunal is dominated by 
psychiatrists. These new restrictions ensured that decisions would continue to be made in the 
medical best interests of the detained. Significantly, the 2001 Act specifically provided that 
best interests are to be guiding principle in detention decisions.
733
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When the 2001 Act was reviewed in 2007 there were problems with several of its provisions, 
in particular, the best interests principle, which the Minister said was a ‗difficult concept to 
define‘.734 Five years later when the 2001 Act was reviewed, again the same issues persisted, 
and instead of a maturation of legalism, medicalism has prevailed.
735
 The 2012 Report has 
attributed this to the Irish Courts interpretation of the term best interests and claimed that this 
is frustrating the aim of the 2001 Act which was intended to protect the human rights of those 
detained.
736
 This is no doubt a contributing factor, however, the specific safeguards 
established in the 2001 Act which are dominated by the medical profession have ensured that 
medicalism remains embedded in the Irish mental health system. 
6.03 The Need for Further Research 
Significantly, while the judicial attitude towards the powers of detention can be ascertained, 
further research is required to establish the extent to which the MHTs operate in accordance 
with legalism. A significant obstacle in ensuring the MHTs do act in line with legalism and 
provide protections for the rights of those detained, is that there is very little transparency in 
the process. There has been no real attempt to establish the inner-workings of the MHTs or 
determine whether they are fulfilling their purpose. In what could be history repeating itself, a 
system that appears to comply with the legal requirements of the ECHR has been established, 
Irish society has presumed it is working and subsequently has relinquished its responsibility 
in the protection of the rights of those in detention. Thus, there is a serious need for an on-
going and proper review of the MHTs operation as, despite the establishment of the MHT, 
there remains scant knowledge about how the review of detention is working and whether it 
provides an independent and impartial review of the decision to detain as required under the 
ECHR and in line with legalism. 
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6.04 Future Possibilities 
a. Legislative Amendment 
Moving forward, the 2012 Report recommended that many of the issues which have resulted 
in a rejection of legalism could be resolved by legislative amendment to establish a hierarchy 
of rights and a clarification or removal of the best interests provision.
737
 Added to these 
legislative amendments could be the requirement for greater transparency in the MHT 
process through a systematic review of their operation and perhaps the publication of 
anonymised written decisions to guide tribunals in decision making.  
However, as outlined above it is questionable as to whether such amendments would have the 
desired effect, particularly, in altering judicial attitude toward the legal powers of detention 
and therefore their interpretation of mental health legislation. Nevertheless, it is a necessary 
start. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that the 2001 Act has only been in force for 
seven years; the 1945 Act was in operation for over fifty years. Therefore, change in judicial 
attitude towards the legal powers of detention may take some time. 
b. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
A possible driving force for such societal and cultural change may be assisted by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which requires ratifying 
states to rethink their mental health laws and their legal powers of detention. The CRPD has 
been hailed as revolutionising the rights of persons with disabilities, including persons with 
psycho-social disabilities.
738
 The CRPD seeks to change society‘s conceptualisation of 
disability and states that disability is actually caused by the society and structures we live in, 
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not by a particular impairment. Thus, people with disabilities should no longer be considered 
objects of charity, social protection or medical treatment but as subjects of human rights and 
active members of society. From the case law on mental health detention, it is obvious that 
the Irish judiciary do not subscribe to this interpretation of mental illness and continue to see 
the purpose of mental health law as a means of ensuring the mentally ill are cared for and 
provided with medical treatment. Ireland was among the first group of countries to sign the 
CRPD but it has not yet ratified it. The delay has been attributed to the need to introduce 
capacity legislation which would establish a legal paradigm to assist and support people who 
have difficulties in exercising their decision-making ability. The Assisted Decision-Making 
(Capacity) Bill was published in July 2013, but has yet to be put on the statute books. The 
government has stated that this is the final barrier to ratification of the CRPD.
739
  
Ratification of the CRPD will not see an overnight change in Irish society or the judiciary‘s 
approach to mental health detention; however, it may assist in influencing a move away from 
the embedded medicalism and towards legalism. Furthermore, unlike before, where there was 
no collective alliance advocating reform, the formation of the Centre for Disability Law and 
Policy in NUI Galway under the Directorship of Professor Gerard Quinn is producing 
important research that is contributing to the implementation of the CRPD and reform of 
disability law on an international and Irish scale. 
There are indications that this may be already having some effect in Ireland. In 2013 a novel 
argument regarding the direct effect of the CRPD under EU law was made in a case 
challenging the constitutionality of the provisions which provided for the treatment without 
consent of a patient under the 2001 Act.
740
 The applicant claimed that her treatment without 
consent failed to have regard to her equal rights before the law as a citizen. She also claimed 
that she was entitled to have the decision that she lacked capacity to refuse treatment subject 
to an independent review by a tribunal or court.  
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The High Court did not find that the applicant's rights under the Constitution had been 
breached; however, it made important observations regarding the constitutional rights of 
persons in mental health detention and also about the applicability of the CRPD in Irish law. 
The Court held that the CRPD did not have direct effect in Ireland at this time, but that this 
did not mean it was immaterial. MacMenamin J opined that the CRPD is a guiding principle 
in the identification of standards of care and review of persons in mental health detention and 
that the judiciary must inform their thought and interpret the Constitution using prevailing 
ideas and concepts.
741
 Although the Court did not find the current absence of legislative 
provision for assisted decision making unconstitutional it did state that persons subjected to 
treatment under the 2001 Act must have access to the court concerning issues regarding 
decision making and be included in the decision making process.
742
 This decision represents a 
significant movement towards legalism whereby the High Court actually established further 
safeguards for the rights of those detained under the 2001 Act, that have not yet been 
provided for in legislation. Therefore, at this point it must be concluded that both medicalism 
and legalism are evident in the law concerning the legal powers of detention, its interpretation 
and its operation but going forward it is likely there will be an increased acceptance of 
legalism. 
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APPENDIX C 
CONCISE RESEARCH PROPOSAL  
SUBMITTED FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL 
8 NOVEMBER 2013 
 
PROJECT TITLE: An analysis of the extent to which mental health tribunals protect the 
rights of persons detained under the Mental Health Act 2001. 
PRINCIPLE INVESTIGATOR(S): Jennifer Brown (PhD Student) & Dr Adam McAuley 
(PhD Supervisor) 
START DATE: January 2014 
PROJECT OUTLINE:  
Introduction 
The Mental Health Act 2001 significantly changed the process of mental health detention and 
sought to introduce safeguards for service users detained thereunder. The most radical change 
in the law was the introduction of mental health tribunals (MHTs) which are composed of a 
legal, lay and medical member. The purpose of the MHT is to provide an independent review 
of the decision to detain a person under the 2001 Act. In deciding to approve or revoke a 
detention order the MHT will rely on an independent psychiatric report of the service user, 
evidence from the treating psychiatrist and submissions from the appointed legal 
representative and the service user themselves. The MHTs have been in operation since 2006 
with approximately 1,700 held each year. 
The aim of the research is to examine the MHT process and hearing to determine how it 
affects the detention of the mentally ill. The MHT process was intended to provide 
safeguards for service users to protect them from unlawful detention. In furtherance of this 
purpose, the members of the MHT are supposed to provide an independent assessment of the 
service user‘s need for detention based on whether they believe the service user has a mental 
disorder and whether the legal requirements for lawful detention have been complied with. 
The project aims to assess the influences on the legal, medical and lay members and their 
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subsequent input on the conduct and decision making of the MHT. The independent 
psychiatrist and the legal representative are intended to provide safeguards for the service 
user and they also have the potential to influence MHT members.The research aims to 
determine the extent to which this happens.  
Information on individual cases is not the object of the research, rather, general opinions on 
the whole MHT process and hearing is the purpose. The results will be used for the purposes 
of a PhD and possibly future academic articles on the topic. Participants will be informed as 
to the findings and results if they so wish. 
Methodology 
Following consultation with the Mental Health Commission it is not possible to observe 
MHTs or interview MHT members due to the fact that the Mental Health Act 2001 requires 
MHTs to be held in private. 
Therefore the research proposes to interview 30 treating psychiatrists who have experience of 
and have attended a MHT in the Dublin region. Treating psychiatrist that the researcher 
knows have experience of MHTs will be contacted personally. Snowballing sampling will 
subsequently be used to identify other consultant psychiatrists who fit the selection criteria 
and they will subsequently be contacted personally. Semi-structured interviews lasting 
approximately 40 minutes will be used to establish general opinions on the purpose and 
process of the MHT, the role of the various members and participants, the influence of 
evidence and the decision making therein.  
It is also proposed to interview 30 service users over the age of 18 who are no longer in 
inpatient care and have previously had a detention order reviewed by a MHT under the 
Mental Health Act 2001. Mr Paddy McGowan, Head of Service User, Family Member and 
Carer Engagement on the HSE National Mental Health Management Team, has been 
contacted and agreed that once Ethical Approval has been obtained he will inform service 
users about the research at the series of nationwide mental health public meetings to be held 
by the HSE in 2014. A recruitment advertisement will be disseminated to voluntary mental 
health organisations operating in Ireland who will also be contacted personally and asked to 
inform their members of the research being conducted. Additionally, with the permission of 
mental health organisations, the researcher will present the research to the organisation‘s 
members in an attempt to meet possible participants face to face and perhaps relay some of 
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their fears concerning participation in the research. The interview should take approximately 
40 minutes to conduct. All information concerning participants and information provided 
during the interview will be anonymised and kept completely confidential prior to its being 
disposed of. 
Participants and Consent 
MHTs are held in private and deal with serious and sensitive issues. Discussion about the 
MHT has the potential to cause upset or distress for service users.  
Informed consent will be sought from the service user first before the interview is carried out. 
They will be informed of the purpose of the interview, its benefits, their anonymity and how 
it will have no affect on their current status. Service users will be contacted initially by 
organisations with whom they are aware of and feel comfortable with. It is only after they 
have contacted me or agreed to take part in the study that I will obtain their informed consent.  
Participants will be asked to bring a friend or family member (with whom they feel 
comfortable discussing the topics included in the interview questions) to the interview, unless 
to do so would make them feel uncomfortable. If at any point during the interview it becomes 
clear that the service user is upset, the interview will be terminated immediately. The service 
user will be directed to contact one of the mental health or counselling services in their region 
that I will provide a list of. 
ANONYMITY OF THE PARTICIPANTS 
All information concerning participants involved in the interviews will be made anonymous 
and kept completely confidential. Any documentation relating to the research will be kept in 
a locked and secure unit in Dublin City University. 
No names or identifying information will be used in the research or shared with any person or 
organisation. All participants involved in the interviews will be given false names when using 
information in relation to them. As soon as the interviews have been transcribed, with all 
identifying information anonymised, the original audio tapes and any documentation with 
identifying information will be disposed of. 
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AIMS OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
Similar research has been commissioned by the Department of Health in the UK and used to 
inform reforms of the MHT process. No research has been conducted to date on the 
functioning of Irish MHTs, as such this research is now required for several reasons. In 
addition, it will have benefits for a range of actors including service users and legal 
representatives, the Mental Health Commission and MHT members and participants. 
MHTs were introduced under the 2001 Act to reform the previous paternalistic legislation 
and ensure the rights of persons with psycho-social disabilities were protected. It is necessary 
to determine their impact and whether the aims behind the reforms have been achieved. 
The Mental Health Commission is tasked with the promotion of high standards in the 
delivery of mental health services and ensuring the interests of those involuntarily detained. 
In pursuit of these standards the Commission has committed to utilise evidence based 
research. This research can assist the Commission in ascertaining how the MHT process 
operates, the conduct of MHT hearings and the factors that influence its decision making. 
This is necessary to ensure that the rights of the detained are protected and that the MHTs are 
conducted in a manner that promotes the highest standards possible. For example, this 
research could be essential in providing factual evidence of the role of the independent 
psychiatrist in the MHT process, a position that was questioned in the Interim Report of the 
Steering Group on the Review of the Mental Health Act 2001. 
The advantages in gaining a clearer understanding of the real functioning of MHTs for 
service users, their legal representatives and others involved are obvious and essential. It is 
also important that MHT members are informed about the practices of their colleagues. Any 
individual member will have only limited knowledge as to how other MHT members or 
MHTs work as a whole. A shared understanding of how MHTs operate can provide the basis 
for the development of best practice and consistency in decision making.  
Several decisions have been handed down by the High and Supreme Court which impact 
upon the operation of the MHT. These include decisions concerning the powers of MHTs. It 
is important to determine the impact, if any, of these decisions on the operation of MHTs. 
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APPENDIX D 
ORGANISATIONS/PERSONS CONTACTED TO 
RECRUIT INTERVIEWEES 
SERVICE USERS 
ORGANISATION DATE 
CONTACTED 
FOLLOW UP 
CONTACT 
OUTCOME 
HSE National 
Mental Health 
Management Team 
15/01/2014  Informed persons attending 
the nationwide meetings on 
mental health services 
organised by the HSE of the 
research. 
National Service 
Users Executive 
15/01/2014  Advertised research to 
members and on their 
website 
Mental Health 
Reform 
15/01/2014  Advertised research to 
members and on their 
website 
Shine Online 15/01/2014  Advertised research to 
members and on their 
website. 
Also presented research at 
members meeting on 9/04/14. 
Mental Health 
Ireland 
15/01/2014  Advertised research to 
members and on their 
website. 
St Patrick‘s 
Consumer Council 
15/01/2014  Members were informed of 
research by Ms Mary O‘Hara 
at a members meeting. 
HSE EVE 15/01/2014 30/01/2014 
16/04/2014 
Not in a position to advertise 
research. 
Amnesty 
International 
15/01/2014 30/01/2014 Not in a position to advertise 
research. 
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Inspire/Reachout 15/01/2014 30/01/2014 
16/04/2014 
No response. 
Pieta House 15/01/2014  Not in a position to advertise 
research. 
Aware 15/01/2014 30/01/2014 
16/04/2014 
No response. 
Grow 15/01/2014 30/01/2014 
16/04/2014 
No response. 
Refocus CPSYCHI 25/04/2014  Members were informed of 
research by Ms Sibéal Farrell 
at a members meeting. 
 
TREATING PSYCHIATRISTS 
ORGANISATION/ 
PERSON 
DATE 
CONTACTED 
FOLLOW UP OUTCOME 
20 treating 
psychiatrists were 
contacted 
personally 
Between 
28/01/2014 and 
09/06/2014 
Of the treating 
psychiatrists who did 
not respond to the 
initial contact they 
were contacted on a 
further two occasions 
between 28/01/2014 
and 09/06/2014. 
11 interviews secured. 
3 agreed to interview 
but failed to arrange 
interview after 
multiple attempts at 
organising this. 
5 did not respond for 
interview. 
1 did not meet the 
research criteria. 
 
College of 
Psychiatrists Ireland 
15/01/2014  Not in a position to 
advertise research. 
Medico-Legal 
Society 
15/01/2014  Not in a position to 
advertise research. 
RCSI Department 
of Psychiatry 
15/01/2014  Not in a position to 
advertise research. 
 9 
 
APPENDIX E 
RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENT 
HAVE YOU ATTENDED A MENTAL HEALTH TRIBUNAL? 
WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT YOUR 
EXPERIENCES? 
Jennifer Brown from DCU is doing research on mental health 
tribunals and is looking for volunteers to talk about their experiences. 
The aim of the research is to explore service users experience and 
opinions of mental health tribunals. Jennifer is seeking to interview 
volunteers who are over the age of 18, are no longer in inpatient care 
and have previously had a detention order reviewed by a mental 
health tribunal under the Mental Health Act 2001.  
The interview will involve questions about the MHT process, its 
purpose, those involved, what is discussed and its general positives or 
negatives. The interview should take approximately 40 minutes to 
complete. All information concerning participants and information 
provided during the interview will be anonymised and kept 
completely confidential.   
For more information or to participate in the interview 
please contact Jennifer at: 
Tel: 087 3343 848 
Email: mhtstudy@gmail.com 
Post: Jennifer Brown, School of Law and Government, DCU, 
Glasnevin, Dublin 9. 
 
This research has obtained ethical approval from DCU Research Ethics 
Committee. 
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APPENDIX F 
PLAIN LANGUAGE STATEMENT 
SERVICE USERS 
 
Researcher: 
Jennifer Brown, 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University 
Contact Details: mhtstudy@gmail.com / 0873343848 
 
Title: 
The Legal Powers to Detain the Mentally Ill in Ireland: Medicalism or Legalism? 
What is the research about? 
The aim of the research is to examine the MHT process and hearing to determine how it 
affects the detention of persons with mental illness. The purpose is to determine the extent to 
which the legal, lay and medical members provide an independent review of the need to 
detain the service user. The research will look at what influences the MHT members, 
including the independent psychiatrist and the legal representative. It will also assess the 
degree to which the independent psychiatrist and the legal representative protect the rights of 
the person detained. 
 
Why is this research being conducted? 
The research is being used as part of my PhD in Dublin City University.  
 
Independence of the Researcher 
I do not have any relationship with any of those involved in the mental health tribunal 
hearings, the Mental Health Commission, voluntary mental health organisations or the 
hospital in which you were resident. As a researcher I have no influence on your particular 
case. Therefore participating in the research study will do you no good or no harm. It will 
have no effect on your situation. 
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Voluntary mental health organisations have been contacted solely for the purpose of 
advertising the research I am conducting. They have no influence on or connection with the 
research. 
 
Who is funding the research? 
The research is being funded by the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. 
 
How will the information gathered be used and subsequently disposed of? 
The information will be used in my PhD and possibly future academic articles about 
the topic.  
As soon as the interviews have been transcribed, with all identifying information 
anonymised, the original audio tapes and any documentation with identifying 
information will be disposed of. 
 
What will happen if you decide to participate in the research study? 
Being included in the research study will require you to sign a form saying that you  
understand the purpose of the research, the independence of the researcher and you agree to 
answer honestly the questions that you are asked to the best of your ability. 
You will then be asked approximately 30 questions about the mental health tribunal process 
and hearing by the researcher. The interview should take about 40 minutes to complete. 
 
How will your privacy be protected? 
All information concerning you and others involved in the mental health tribunal process will 
be made anonymous and kept completely confidential. Any documentation relating to the 
research will be kept in a locked and secure unit in Dublin City University that only the 
researcher will have access to. 
 
No names or identifying information will be used in the research or shared with any person 
or organisation. You and all others mentioned in the interviews will be given false names 
when using information in relation to mental health tribunals which you participated in. 
 
What are the legal limitations to data confidentiality? 
In a similar manner to the doctor-patient relationship in very limited circumstances, 
disclosure of your information may be required by law. For example this could happen when 
 12 
 
ordered by a judge in a court. If this were to happen you would be informed of the disclosure 
and the reasons for it. 
 
What are the benefits of taking part in the research study? 
There may be some future indirect benefits to participants. 
 
 The research will provide information on the conduct and operation of mental health 
tribunals in general which may improve the operation of mental health tribunals and have an 
impact on the development of best practices and encourage consistency in their operation. In 
addition, this information could be used to help service users to understand what to expect 
from the mental health tribunal hearing. This information may also assist legal 
representatives in the preparation of service user‘s cases. 
 
What are the risks of taking part in this research study? 
Taking part in the study will require you to recall events that occurred during your mental 
health tribunal process and hearing. Recalling such events may cause you some distress or 
upset. 
Can participants change their mind at any stage and withdraw from the study? 
Yes, you may withdraw from the research study at any point. 
 
How will participants find out what happens with the project? 
At the time of the interview you will be asked whether you want to find out the results of the 
research study. When the study is completed you will be contacted and informed of the 
results if you have agreed to this. 
 
Contact details for further information: 
Jennifer Brown; mhtstudy@gmail.com/ 087 3343 848 
If participants have concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person,
 please contact: 
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and 
Innovation Support, Dublin City University, Dublin 9.  Tel 01-7008000 
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APPENDIX G 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
SERVICE USER 
Researcher: 
Jennifer Brown, 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University 
Contact Details: mhtstudy@gmail.com / 087 3343848 
 
Title and Purpose: 
The Legal Powers to Detain the Mentally Ill in Ireland: Medicalism or Legalism? 
 
The aim of the research is to examine the MHT process and hearing to determine how it 
affects the detention of the mentally ill. The purpose is to determine the extent to which the 
legal, lay and medical members provide an independent review of the need to detain the 
service user. The research will look at what influences the MHT members, including the 
independent psychiatrist and the legal representative. It will also assess the degree to which 
the independent psychiatrist and the legal representative protect the rights of the person 
detained. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
All information concerning you and others involved in the MHT hearings will be made 
anonymous and kept completely confidential. Any documentation relating to the research 
will be kept in a locked and secure unit in Dublin City University that only the researcher 
will have access to. 
 
No names or identifying information will be used in the research or shared with any person 
or organisation. You and all others mentioned in the interviews will be given false names 
when using information in relation to MHTs which you participated in. 
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Independence 
The research is to be used as part of my PhD. I do not have any relationship with any of those 
involved in the mental health tribunal hearings, the Mental Health Commission or any other 
organisation involved in the provision of mental health services. 
 
As a researcher I have no influence on your situation. Therefore participating in the research 
study will neither do you good nor harm. It will have no effect on your position.  
 
Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question) 
I have read the Plain Language Statement (or had it read to me)  Yes/No 
I understand the information provided               Yes/No 
I understand that this research study will have no impact on my situation  Yes/No 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study           Yes/No 
I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions             Yes/No 
I am aware that all information about me will be kept confidential and 
anonymous                      Yes/No 
I am aware that I may withdraw from the research study at any point    Yes/No 
  
Signature:I have read and understood the information in this form.  My questions and 
concerns have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form.  
Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project 
 Participants Signature:         
 Date:        
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APPENDIX H 
INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE  
SERVICE USERS 
Identifier 
Date 
Time 
1. Basic information: 
a. Gender 
b. Can you estimate the number of MHT hearings you have attended in? 
 
PURPOSE OF MHT  
2. In your opinion what is the purpose of the MHT process and hearing? 
a. Has any person ever explained the purpose of the MHT? 
i. Who explained the purpose of the MHT? 
b. What powers does the MHT have? 
 
PRE HEARING PROCESS 
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIST 
3. Who informs you that you will be examined by an independent psychiatrist? 
4. What is the purpose of the independent psychiatrist’s examination? 
5. Has anybody explained the purpose to you? 
a. Who? 
6. What is the difference between the independent psychiatrist and the treating 
psychiatrist? 
7. What does the examination by the independent psychiatrist entail? 
8. Would you normally see the report compiled by the independent psychiatrist? 
a. Did you understand what it said? 
b. What does it say? 
 
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
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9. Have you had the same legal representative for each MHT? 
10. Approximately how many times would you usually meet your legal representative? 
a. Before your hearing 
b. After your hearing 
11. In the meetings prior to the hearing what is discussed? 
12. Are you shown any documents prior to the MHT by your legal representative? 
a. Medical reports 
b. Independent psychiatrist‘s report 
c. Admission/renewal orders 
d. Other 
13. Can you answer the following questions about your legal representative? 
a. Did they explain the MHT process and hearing to you? 
b. Did you understand what they explained to you? 
c. Did they keep you informed of developments in the MHT process and hearing? 
d. Did they represent your interests? 
e. Did they take instructions from you? 
 
MHT HEARING 
PARTICIPANTS & ROLES 
14. Can you list the people who usually participate in the MHT hearing? 
15. Can you explain the role of each participant you identified? 
a. If not mentioned ask about the following participants: 
i. Chairperson of MHT 
ii. Medical member of MHT 
iii. Lay member of MHT 
iv. Treating psychiatrist 
v. Independent psychiatrist 
vi. Legal representative 
vii. You 
viii. Other 
16. Have the roles of each participant been explained to you? 
a. Who explained the role of each participant to you? 
 
MHT ORDER OF BUSINESS & EVIDENCE 
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17. Could you explain the process at the MHT hearing? 
a. Does the MHT Chairman introduce people? How are they introduced- first names and 
surnames or by titles? 
b. Does the legal representative make initial submissions? 
18. Does the treating psychiatrist provide any information at the MHT hearing? 
a. What information does he/she provide? 
i. Do you understand what information he/she provides? 
b. Does this generally agree or disagree with what the independent psychiatrist has said in 
their report? 
c. How do you feel about what the treating psychiatrist says in the MHT? 
i. Do you discuss this prior to or after the MHT? 
d. Does the MHT medical member question the treating psychiatrist? 
i. What do they ask? 
e. Does the MHT Chairman question the treating psychiatrist? 
i. What do they ask? 
f. Does the MHT lay member question the treating psychiatrist? 
i. What do they ask? 
g. Does your legal representative question the treating psychiatrist? 
i. What do they ask? 
19. Legal evidence 
a. Does your legal representative present your case? 
i. What do they say generally? 
20. Do you understand the circumstances which can affect the validity of your detention 
under the Mental Health Act 2001? 
a. Diagnosis of mental disorder 
b. Persons who may apply for detention 
c. Medical examinations 
d. Time limits (for exams and duration of detention orders) 
e. Gardai powers of detention 
f. Provision of information to service user 
21. Is the validity of your detention (as outlined above) ever raised in the MHT? 
a. What issue is raised? 
b. Who highlights the issue? 
c. Was there any discussion about it? 
i. Who discussed this? 
ii. What happened? 
22. Are you questioned during the MHT hearing? 
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a. By whom? 
b. What are you asked? 
23. Do you feel you can participate to the best of your ability in the MHT hearing? 
a. If no, why? 
24. Does any other participant speak during the MHT hearing? 
25. How long are the hearings usually? 
a. When do you find out the decision of the MHT? 
 
MHT DECISION 
26. Have you ever had a MHT decision that upholds the order detaining you? 
a. Are you informed of the reasons for its decision? 
b. What were the reasons for its decision? 
27. Have you ever had a MHT hearing where it has not upheld the detention order? 
a. Are you informed of the reasons for its decision? 
b. What were the reasons for its decision? 
 
MHT & SERVICE USER FEELINGS 
28. How does the MHT process and hearing make you feel? 
29. Do you think the MHT process and hearing protects your rights? 
a. If yes, why? 
b. If no, why? 
30. Do you think the MHT process and hearing fulfils its purpose? 
31. If you were to change the MHT process, how would you do so? 
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APPENDIX I 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
TREATING PSYCHIATRIST 
 
Researcher: 
Jennifer Brown, 
School of Law and Government 
Dublin City University 
Contact Details: mhtstudy@gmail.com / 087 3343848 
 
Title and Purpose: 
The Legal Powers to Detain the Mentally Ill in Ireland: Medicalism or Legalism? 
The aim of the research is to examine the MHT process and hearing to determine how it 
affects the detention of the mentally ill. The purpose is to determine the extent to which the 
legal, lay and medical members provide an independent review of the need to detain the 
service user. The research will look at what influences the MHT members, including the 
independent psychiatrist and the legal representative. It will also assess the degree to which 
the independent psychiatrist and the legal representative protect the rights of the person 
detained. 
 
Privacy and Confidentiality 
All information concerning you and others involved in the MHT hearings will be made 
anonymous and kept completely confidential. Any documentation relating to the research 
will be kept in a locked and secure unit in Dublin City University that only the researcher 
will have access to. 
 
No names or identifying information will be used in the research or shared with any person 
or organisation. You and all others mentioned in the interviews will be given false names 
when using information in relation to MHTs which you participated in. 
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 Independence 
The research is to be used as part of my PhD. I do not have any relationship with any of those 
involved in the mental health tribunal hearings, the Mental Health Commission or any other 
organisation involved in the provision of mental health services. 
 
As a researcher I have no influence on your performance or your employment. Therefore 
participating in the research study will neither do you good nor harm. It will have no effect 
on your position.  
  
Treating Psychiatrists– please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each 
question) 
I have read the Plain Language Statement (or had it read to me)  Yes/No 
I understand the information provided     Yes/No 
I understand that this research study will have no impact on my position or 
 employment         Yes/No 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study   Yes/No 
I have received satisfactory answers to all my questions    Yes/No 
I am aware that all information about me will be kept confidential and 
anonymous         Yes/No 
I am aware that I may withdraw from the research study at any point Yes/No 
  
Signature: 
I have read and understood the information in this form.  My questions and concerns have 
been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this consent form.  Therefore, I 
consent to take part in this research project 
  
Participants Signature:         
 Name in Block Capitals:         
 Date:        
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APPENDIX J 
INTERVIEW TOPIC GUIDE 
 TREATING PSYCHIATRIST 
Identifier 
Date 
Time 
1. Basic information: 
a. Approximately how many MHTs have you attended? 
PURPOSE OF MHT 
2. Why do you think MHTs were introduced? 
3. What is the purpose of the MHT? 
TRAINING 
4. What does the training provided by the Mental Health Commission entail for 
consultant psychiatrists? 
a. Legal requirements for lawful detention 
i. Admission/renewal orders 
ii. Time limits 
5. Is there similar training for GPs? 
6. Have you ever refused to admit a person? Why? 
a. Do not meet the criteria for detention 
b. Reason? Faulty paperwork? 
PRE HEARING PROCESS 
RELATIONSHIP WITH SERVICE USER 
7. In your interactions with the service user do you ever discuss the MHT hearing? 
8. What is discussed about them? 
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9. Who explains the MHT process and hearing to the service user? 
a. What is explained? 
b. Do you think they understand the MHT process? 
10. Do you show the service user any documents prior to the MHT hearing?/ Do you 
know if the legal representative shows the service user any documents? 
a. Medical reports 
b. Section 17 independent psychiatrist‘s report 
c. Admission/renewal orders 
d. Other 
11. A significant percentage of detention orders are revoked prior to the hearing, 
why is this? 
a. Where they are revoked in order to avoid a MHT, why is this? 
INDEPENDENT PSYCHIATRIST 
12. Who informs the service user that they will be examined by an independent 
psychiatrist? 
13. What is the purpose of the independent psychiatrist’s examination? 
14. What is the difference between the independent psychiatrist and the treating 
psychiatrist? 
15. What does the examination by the independent psychiatrist entail? 
16. What does the independent psychiatrist ask you? 
17. Would you normally see the report compiled by the independent psychiatrist? 
a. Could you provide an average percentage of how often the report 
complements your own medical opinion? 
b. On what facts could the report differ? 
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MHT HEARING 
PARTICIPANTS & ROLES 
18. Can you list the people who usually participate in the MHT hearing? 
19. What is the role of each participant you identified? 
a. If not mentioned ask about the following participants: 
i. Chairperson of MHT 
ii. Medical member of MHT 
iii. Lay member of MHT 
iv. Treating psychiatrist 
v. Independent psychiatrist 
vi. Legal representative 
vii. You 
viii. Other 
MHT ORDER OF BUSINESS AND EVIDENCE 
20. Could you explain the process at the MHT hearing? 
a. Does the MHT Chairman introduce people? How are they introduced- first 
names and surnames or by titles? 
b. Who makes the initial submissions? 
c. Then what happens? 
21. What information do you provide at the MHT hearing? 
a. Does this generally agree or disagree with what the independent psychiatrist 
has said in their report? 
i. Percentage 
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b. Does the MHT medical member question you? 
i. What do they ask? 
c. Does the MHT Chairman question you? 
i. What do they ask? 
d. Does the MHT lay member question you? 
i. What do they ask? 
22. When does the legal representative present the service user’s case? 
a. What do they say generally? 
i. Do they outline the legal requirements for detention under the 2001 
Act? 
ii. Do they question the medical diagnosis of mental disorder? 
b. What makes a good or bad legal representative? 
23. Does the legal representative question you? 
a. What do they ask? 
b. Is this questioning generally inquisitorial or adversarial? 
i. What is the effect of adversarial questioning? Positive/negative? 
24. Is the service user usually questioned during the MHT hearing? 
a. By whom? 
b. What are they asked? 
25. What evidence if any does the service user provide? 
26. Does any other participant speak during the MHT hearing? 
27. Does the MHT ever consider what would happen if a service user was released, 
regarding their housing, employment or social security situation? 
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28. How long are the hearings usually? 
a. When do you find out the decision of the MHT? 
MHT INDEPENDENCE 
29. In your experience do the same MHT members usually sit on the same MHTs 
together or are there different members for each MHT constituted?  
30. In your experience does the service user have the same legal representative, 
where they have more than one review? 
31. In your experience does the service user have the same independent psychiatrist, 
where they have more than one review? 
32. MHT rules refer to conflict of interest-what do you think constitutes a conflict of 
interest? 
a. Have you ever been involved in a MHT where you believe there could have 
been a conflict of interest? 
i. What was this conflict of interest? 
b. Do you think that being involved in a MHT where an independent psychiatrist 
or medical member is a colleague constitutes a conflict of interest? 
i. Why? 
33. Do you think the small number of psychiatrists working in Ireland and the even 
smaller number working in Dublin, poses a problem for the operation of MHTs? 
MEDICAL OPINION 
34. Have you ever experienced a MHT where there is differing medical opinion as to 
illness or need for detention? 
a. Who had the different opinion? 
b. What did the difference of opinion concern? 
i. Diagnosis 
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ii. Treatment 
iii. Prognosis 
iv. Need for detention 
1. Dangerousness 
2. Benefit of treatment 
c. Was the service user’s detention revoked or approved in this case? 
MHT POWERS 
35. How do you feel about the paperwork attached to a detention? 
36. Have you ever experienced a hearing where the MHT has considered using the 
powers which allow it to cure failures to comply with the legal requirements of 
detention where they do not affect the substance of the order and do not cause an 
injustice to the service user (section 18)? 
a. What was in issue? 
i. Persons who may apply for detention 
ii. Medical examinations 
iii. Time limits (for exams and duration of detention orders) 
iv. Admission/ renewal order form filling 
v. Gardai powers of detention 
vi. Provision of information to service user 
b. Who highlighted these? 
c. Who discussed these? 
37. Was the flaw capable of being resolved by the MHT? 
a. Did this happen? 
38. If it could not be resolved, what happened? 
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39. Is there anything about the tribunal powers you would like to see changed?  
a. If yes, what? 
MHT DECISION 
40. Generally in cases where the MHT upholds the detention, on what basis does it 
do this? 
a. Diagnosis of mental disorder and 
i. Need for treatment 
ii. Danger 
iii. Both 
41. In cases where the MHT does not approve the detention, on what basis does it 
usually do this? 
a. No existence of a mental disorder 
b. Existence of a mental disorder but no need for treatment  
c. Existence of a mental disorder but not a danger 
d. Existence of a mental disorder but no need for treatment and not a danger 
e. Legal flaw in the detention that is not capable of being resolved (by section 
18). 
42. There are a percentage of detentions based on a diagnosis of personality disorder 
or addiction, which are prohibited by the MHA 2001, what happens in the MHT 
in these cases? 
43. Have you ever readmitted a person after the MHT has ordered the revocation of 
their detention order?  
a. Why did you re-detain them? 
MHT AND SERVICE USER 
44. Do MHTs act in the best interests of the service user? 
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45. In your opinion what does the term ‘best interests’ mean? 
46. Do they have a positive or negative effect on the mental health of the service 
user? 
RESOURCING 
47. Do inadequate resources affect the operation of MHTs, or rather just the rest of 
your practice? 
 
 
 
